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SUMMARY 
The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) is responsible for 
a comprehens ive program of price controls and mandatory allocations 
that affect all levels of the petroleum industry. The program is in­
tended to insulate the domestic economy from the effects of rising 
world oil prices and to protect the independent sector of the petro­
leum industry. FEA is also charged with achieving these primary goals 
with the least possible loss in economic efficiency . 
During the summer of 1976 the price at which increased do­
mestic crude oil product ion could be sold was limited to an average of 
$11 . 28 per barrel , while imported oil was costing about $13 . 50 per bar­
rel . If that differential is cont inued to 1985,  U . S .  oil production may 
be 1 million barrels per day lower than it would be in the absence of 
controls . Because more expensive imports must be substituted for 
this lost 
_
production, oil costs would rise by about $500 million.
Another FEA program, the "ent itlements" program , causes the price of 
refined products to be based on the average rather than the incremen­
tal cost of crude oil .  This system creates a subsidy t o  imports on 
the order of $ 3 . 00 per barrel. As a result oil demand is larger than 
it would be in the absence of controls; the stimulus to demand im­
poses an efficiency cost between $400 million and $2 billion per year . 
From the point of view of energy consumers , the efficiency 
costs may be overwhelmed by the fact that crude oil price controls 
prevent about $15 billion per year from being transferred from consumers 
to energy producers. Other systems than price controls might be able 
to achieve similar income transfer with lower efficiency costs . 
Gasoline and kerosene j et fuel remain subj ect to price con­
trol and allocation prugrams , while other refined products have been 
exempted from such controls . If the refining and marketing sectors 
of the petroleum industry are competitive , the crude oil price control 
and entitlements programs could be used to control prices of these 
products (and other) without imposing price ceilings on the products 
themselves . Consequently refined product price control and allocation 
programs confer no benefits on consumers in the aggregate ,  but serve 
to reduce the efficiency of resource allocation in refining and to 
distort the structure of retail markets .  No quantitative estimate o f  
overall efficiency loss has been made, since i t  would b e  the sum o f  
many individual effects throughout the petroleum industry. One parti­
cularly disturbing aspect of the FEA ' s  regulatory program is its ex­
press intent of keeping less efficien� refiners and marketers in busi­
ness despite the resulting economic cost . 
Under current law, oil price controls are scheduled to ex­
pire in May 1979. However , the rate at which prices are allowed to 
rise will keep price ceilings well below market prices in 1979.  Con­
sequently , price controls are likely to be extended beyond 1979 unless 
the current law is changed. Elimination of price control and allo­
cation programs would elimimate at tendant efficiency losses , but at a 
substantial cost to energy consumers.  Allowing price ceilings to rise 
sufficiently rapidly to achieve deregulation in 1979 could give con­
sumers time to adjust to those higher costs.  
If price controls were to be cont inued indefinitely , it 
would be possible to eliminate the restraint on oil production created 
by the ceiling on prices of additional oil produced domest ically. 
Eliminating that ceiling would cost consumers about $2 billion annual­
ly. Price controls on gasoline could also be eliminated at no cost 
to consumers and a considerable gain in efficiency. 
A third alternative is the replacement of price controls 
�ith an excise tax on domestic oil production . Such a tax would pre­
vent the transfer of wealth from energy consumers to energy producers 
without the stimulus to demand created by price controls . It would 
raise energy prices , but purchasing power lost in consequence could 
be restored if receipts from the exise tax substituted for other 
sources of government revenue.
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I :  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Controls on uil prices have exist ed , with one brief hiatus , 
since President Nixon announced the wage-price freeze that began the 
Economic Stabilization Program on August 15, 1971. However, controls 
des igned specifically to deal with rising oil prices were not insti-
tuted until the summer of 1973.  At  that time the Cost of Living Coun­
cil developed a system of controls which have evolved rapidly but with 
little fundamental change into the current program. 
Problems perceived in 1973 included rapidly rising gasoline 
and home heating oil prices ; a "squeeze" on independent refiners who 
were finding crude oil difficult to obtain ; and the rapid disappear­
ance of independent , low price gasoline retailers . To deal with some 
of these problems a voluntary allocation program was also instituted 
during the summer of 197 3 .  
Before the Cost o f  Living Council ' s  price controls were 
three months old , the Arab oil embargo began and the price of available 
imported oil began to rise. In response to those events , Congress 
passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975 (EPAA) , which 
brought together price control and allocation programs . Responsib ility 
for those programs was delegated to the Federal Energy Office , later 
the Federal Energy Administration . 
After a series of temporary extensions , the EPAA expired in 
December 1975 . It was extended by the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (EPCA) , which rolled back oil prices but provided a mechanism 
through which those prices would gradually be allowed to rise.  The 
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EPCA was passed at a time when it was believed that allowing oil prices 
to rise suddenly , as they would if price controls lapsed , could plunge 
the economy back into recession. The EPCA was amended in August 1976 
to allow more rapid escalation of oil prices . 
THE SITUATION FROM AUGUST 1971 TO AUGUST 1973 
Condit ions at the Inception of Price Controls 
Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act in August 
1970 ; that act empowered the President to impose sweeping economic 
controls . Between January and August 1971 the consumer price index 
increased at an annual rate of 3 . 8  percent , a substantial decline from 
6 . 1  percent inflation experienced during 1969 . In August 1971 output 
and employment were in the early stages of recovery from recession, 
although the unemployment rate was still 5 . 9  percent in the last quar-
ter of 1971. 
In mid-1971 the Administration saw signs that price indices 
might be start ing to rise again: after a peak in 1969 and a trough in 
1970 , all price indices were slightly higher in the second quarter of 
1 1971 than they had been at the bottom of the trough . 
In response to this situation the President announced the 
Economic Stabilization Program--which lasted from August 15 , 1971 to 
April 30,  1974 . On August 15 , 1971, President Nixon exercised powers 
granted in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 to impose a ninety 
day freeze on all wages and prices ( "Phase I") . The freeze was· fol­
lowed , on November 14 , by a set of comprehensive regulations designed 
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to prevent price increases anywhere in the economy from exceeding an 
annual rate of 3 percent ( "Phase II") , which lasted until January 11, 
197 3 .  
Conditions in the petroleum industry o r  energy markets had 
little to do with the initial price control system imposed on the 
petroleum industry. During Phase I and Phase II the purpose of con­
trols was to combat general inflation, caused in large part by pre­
vious monetary and fiscal policy. The petroleum industry was not 
seen as posing a special inflation problem, and it was not singled 
out for special treatment until 197 3 . 2 
The Changing Oil Market 
During Phase I and Phase II a number of changes were occur­
ring in the domestic and international oil industry . Until 1970 the 
structure of the U . S .  petroleum industry was keyed to the existence 
of large supplies of crude oil at stable prices . During the 1960 ' s  
domestic crude oil became increasingly expensive relative t o  foreign 
crude oil, especially that imported from the Middle East . To control 
imports an oil import quota had been in existence since 1959 .  The 
quota was implemented by issuing import tickets that ent itled the 
holder to import oil .  Although the t ickets would not b e  sold for 
cash, they would be tr�ded by means of crude oil exchanges . The 
terms of those exhanges implied that during the 1960 ' s  the value of 
import t ickets was as high as $1. 25 per barrel--indicating that im­
ported oil was that much less expensive than domestic . 3 
Beginning in 1970 , a numb er of world events combined to 
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reduce the availability and increase the cost of foreign oil . Po-
litical tensions in the Middle East led to the closing of the Trans-
Arabia Pipeline and reduction of exports from Libya . To substitute 
for these sources of oil , it was necessary to send more tankers around 
the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf.  
Later in 1970 the members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries began to demand increased prices for their oil . 
Between February 1969 and February 1972 the landed cost of one type of 
foreign crude oil increased 33 percent . Table I exhibits some trends 
in international oil prices . 
The results of these events was a change in the basic de-
terminants of domestic oil prices . During the sixties a quota limited 
crude o il imports , which were available at a price of about $1. 50 per 
barrel: The price at which demand for crude o il equalled domestic 
plus imported supply was ,  at that t ime , above $2 per barrel .  Because 
imports were limited by the quota,  any change in demand for crude oil 
resulted in a change in domestic product ion. Consequently the incre-
mental cost of oil , on which the domestic price was based , equalled 
the cost of increasing domestic supply by one barrel . During the six-· 
ties domestic production costs det ermined domestic prices . 
By 1973 domestic demand for crude oil had increased suffi-
ciently that when the import quota was removed , the price of imports 
determined domestic crude oil prices Despite .the higher price of 
import ed crude oil the amount of oil that could be produced domesti-
cally at a cost less than the cost of imports fell far short of demand . 
Consequently oil imports represented the least expensive source of 
Table 1 
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addit ional oil supplies , and the world price of oil det ermined all 
domestic crude oil and petroleum product prices. That price was set 
unilaterally by OPEC, supported by production restrictions , and rising 
rapidly. 
By 1971 U . S .  dependence on foreign oil supplies had become 
firmly establ ished . Accord ing to FEA, 
Exploration, dr�lling, proved reserves, and production in 
.the United States grew rapidly for ten years following World 
War II.  By 1958 the combination of domestic success and rapid 
growth in oil imports produced a surplus in production capacity 
• • .  [M] ore than 3 . 5  million barrels a day of production capacity 
stood idle in 1964. 
Exploration and development declined after . • .  1956 ,  be­
cause of discouraging prices , prora�ed production, and dimin­
ishing prospects for exploration compared to the attractive op­
portunities abroad . This decline was unaffected by the resump-
tion of strong growth in demand after 1965 The domestic 
surplus diminished rapidly and disappeared altogether by 1971, 
forcing the nation to rely entirely on foreign supplies for 
nearly all of its new supplies of petroleum. 4 
U. S .  reliance on foreign sources began, unfortunately, at 
a t ime when foreign sources were limiting supplies to obtain higher 
prices : 
Venezuela, Kuwait , and Libya • . .  imposed limits on their produc­
tion well before the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973 . By early 
' 
1973 the historic [world] surplus of crude oil had disappeared , 
supplies were right , and three-fourths of the increase in demand 
over the previous year was being supplied by Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Iraq, and Abu Dhabi . 5 
Simultaneously , increasingly stringent air quality regula-
tions encouraged refiners to reduce the amount of sulfur contained in 
their refinery products .  Two ways of reducing sulfur content exist : 
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obtaining low sulfur crude oil or removing sulfur during refining . Un-
til refiners could add equipment for removing sulfur from crude oil, 
demand for low sulfur crude oil was greatly increased. With this in-
creased demand supplies of low sulfur crude became part icularly tight , 
and the tanker shortage was exacerbated because longer voyages were 
required to obtain low sulfur crude.  
Between the mid-sixties and 1973 there also was essentially 
no new construction of oil refineries in the United States . Uncertainty 
about supplies of crude oil because of the oil import program is cited 
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as a maj or reason for this stagnation. In the 1960 ' s  the refining in-
dustry had considerable excess c�pacity, but by 1972 and 1973 it was 
operating at close to capacity. 
The capacity constraint was particularly severe in regard 
to the facilities needed to process and clean high sulfur crude oil . 
The combination of reduced supplies of low sulfur crude oil and limited 
facilities to process high sulfur crude combined to exacerbate t he gen-
erally tight condition of petroleum markets . 
The Changing Structure of the Oil Industry 
By mid 1973 there was widespread concern , based oii some 
real market forces and tr�nds,  that the position of independent gasoline 
marketers was being threatened. Because of the less visible connection 
between independent refiners and ultimate sales of petroleum products 
to consumers , concern about the position of independent refiners was 
genuine but less pervasive . 
To describe the evidence regarding independents ' market 
shares it is necessary to d igress into definitions . The term 
"independent" is ambiguous when used in describing oil companies , 
and the place of independents in the oil industry is exceedingly 
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complex. Figure 1 depicts the typical pattern of crude oil and pe-
troleum product flows between the various segments oof the industry. 
The petroleum industry is commonly d ivided into three 
levels: oil production, refining, and marketing. The maj or, inte­
grated oil companies 7exist at all levels , producing crude oil , re-
fining it , and selling products .  The maj ors sell gasoline and other 
petroleum products directly to the public, through company owned 
and operated stations , to branded independent dealers who own or 
lease their stat ions but sell under the brand name of the maj or , and 
to dealers that resell gasoline under their own brand name . The 
maj or integrated companies also trade oil and refined products among 
themselves (and with small and independ ent refiners) . To be class-
ified as a maj or integrated concern a company must have substantial 
activity at all levels of the industry and must be large. 
Some refiners commonly classified as independent actually 
produce much of their own crude oil; others have substantial control 
over ult imate marketing. They are differentiated from maj ors either 
by size or by being act ive in no more than two levels of the industry. 
Independent crude oil producers sell to maj or, integrated 
refiners and to independent refiners that control little or no crude 
oil of their own. Independent refiners obtain about one-half their 
crude oil inputs from the maj or o il companies . They sell gasoline 
Figure 1 
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and other products in the same fashion as the maj or integrated re­
finers :. throu�h company owned stat ions , through retailers who own 
or lease stat ions but sell under the refiner ' s  brand name , and to 
independent resellers that market under their own name . These inde-
pendent, "unbranded" resellers depend about equally on independent 
refiners and on maj or, integrated refiners for gasoline. Independent 
refiners sell little gasnline to major brand outlet s .  
The share o f  "independents" varies with the industry sector 
chosen and with the definition of "independent . "  At the refinery 
level it is possible to refer to only two groups -- the maj or, inte­
grated refiners and all the rest - the "small and independent re­
finers" referred to in the EPAA. 8 But some large independent refiners
differ only marginally from some maj ors , while some small refiners 
own nothing but one refinery one-tenth the size of a typical single 
refinery in a maj or multi-refinery operation. The average capacity 
of a refinery owned by a maj or, integrated refiner is 100 , 000 barrels 
of crude oil input per day; each maj or company owns an average of 
5 . 4 refineries . The average capacity of an "independent" refinery is 
2 0 , 000 barrels per day; most independents own only one refinery. 9 
There are some economies of scale in refinery operation. 
Unit co�ts decline as a refinery becomes larger, with no apparent 
limit . In a recent study M. Adelman cites 100 ,.000 barrels per day 
h mi . ff. . . f f . 10as t e nimum e 1c1ent size or a re inery . 
All of the independent and most of the small refiners rely 
heavily on supplies of crude oil from sources outside the company. 
When there were ample supplies of crude oil, all independent 
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refiners had access to crude oil at stable prices . Under the ·sur-
plus conditions that existed until the seventies, it was also pos-
sible for refiners that lacked their own sources of crude oil to 
shop around for crude oil and , by frequently taking advantage of a 
buyer's market , obtain crude oil at an average cost lower than that 
of an integrat ed operat ion . 11 
In addition, small refiners (100, 000 barrels per day of 
capacity or less) received preferential treatment under the oil 
import program by means of a disproportionate allocation of import 
tickets. All of these factors added up to a cost advantage in ob-
taining crude oil that made it possible for small refiners to com-
pete with maj ors even though in general small refineries were techni­
cally less efficient than the large operations run by the maj ors . 12
As the value of import tickets fell to zero in the early 
seventies the small refiner preference disappeared . 13 (See Figure 2 ) . 
Simultaneously, some small and independent refiners found they were 
no longer able to purchase crude oil from maj or , integrated oil com-
panies as readily as during the period of crude oil surplus.  Ac-
cording to John Hill, during 1973 "maj or refiners, seeing that they 
were going to need crude for their own refineries • • •  began to cur­
tail supplies • • •  to independents . 11
14 
Price controls during the early stages of the Economic 
Stabilization Program (before passage of the EPAA) were probably re-
sponsible for further restricting independent refiners access to 
crude oil. With price controls, 
Figure 2 
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" [ s ] ellers of the commodity are faced with potential cus­
tomers willing to purchase more output at the ceiling price 
than the seller can profitably produce. The seller in this 
situation may exercise discret ion over which of the willing 
buyers he decides to supply without any adverse effect on his 
profits . Given such discretion when the government ceiling 
price was below the free market price, int egrated firms had a 
natural incentive to supply their own outlets in preference 
to independent firms By doing so,  they may have done some 
damage to their competitors at no cost to themselves. And they 
may even have been able to exploit loopholes in the regulations 
to boost indirectly the price of their product as it passed 
through the company ' s  vertical structure. Price controls 
therefore, in removing much of the incentive which 
maj or firms had to supply independents ,  made it more difficult 
for independents to obtain . supplies than would have otherwise 
been the case. 1115
Evidence of the problems of independent refiners in 1973 
is found in the higher capacity utilizat ion rates among maj or ante­
grated refiners than among independent refiners . 16
The existence of excess refining capacity prior to 1972 
also made the integrated refiners willing to sell gasoline to inde-
pendent marketers at a lower price than that charged to their branded 
dealers . Throughout the sixt ies investment planning was based on 
the assumption that a new refinery would operate at 70 to 80 percent 
of capacity . Productiox. in excess of 80 percent of capacity could 
be sold profitably at a cost little greater than the cost of crude 
oil ,  if all capital charges were applied to the prices of the first 
80 percent of capacity output . It is claimed that maj or refiners 
established such a system, charging higher prices for branded 
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gasoline and lower prices for gasoline sold to independent , unbranded 
marketers . 17
In addition, marketers of "unbranded" gasoline were of ten 
able to make "spot" purchases of gasoline from maj or refiners unwilling 
to store production in excess of current demand from their own dealers . 
That arrangement benefited both parties : maj or who found that branded 
retailers were taking less of their refinery output than anticipated 
could sell rather than store their excess output , while independent 
purchasers obtained supplies of gasoline at considerably lower prices 
than were charged maj or-brand dealers. 
These opportunities to buy cheap gasoline were removed when 
refineries reached full capacity in 1972 and 1973 . To be more precise 
about the changing fortunes of independent s in gasoline marketing re-
quires' examination of several different types of independent opera-
tion. 
The narrowest definition of independent marketer would in-
elude only those gasoline stations not owned by a refiner and not 
selling under a brand name . That sector of the gasoline marketing 
industry clearly increased in size during 1972 and declined in size 
during 197318 (See Figure 3) .  Its market share followed the same 
19 patter�. 
One FEA report attributes this decline to a decline in 
gasoline supplied by small and independent refiners who supplied 60 
percent of the gasoline sold by unbranded independents . It states 
that 
• • • declines [in sales of nonbranded gasoline] occurred 
Figure 3 
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at the same time that total gasoline sales declined for large 
independent and small refiners . In the third quarter of 1973 
(wh'en total nonbranded gasoline supplies reached their lowest
point of decline) the supplies of large independents and small 
refiners were only 81 and 78 percent , respectively, of 1972 
20 base quarter levels .  
Those independent marketers that depended on spot sales o f  gasoline 
clearly suffered a substant�al decline in market share between 1972 
and 1974. 21 Smaller changes in market.shares for independents as a 
whole probably indicates that most independent marketers were pur-
chasing gasoline under more stable arrangements . 
PRICE CONTROLS - JANUARY TO AUGUST 1973 
As these changes were taking place in the structure of the 
petroleum industry changes were also occurring in oil price controls· 
Phase III of the Economic Stabilization Program, which be-
gan on January 11, 1973 , replaced the mandatory price controls of 
Phase II with a system of voluntary restraint on price increases -- a 
system which could revert to mandatory controls on specific industries 
if prices rose excessively. During January and February home heating 
oil prices increased sharply. Hearings held by the Cost of Living 
Council -- responsible for Phase III price controls -- established that 
those price increases were within Phase III guidelines . Apparently 
the hearings also revealed problems in the petroleum industry. A Cost 
of Living Council staff paper prepared after the hearing descriped 
conditions in the petroleum industry. 
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A classic demand pull situation exists in the oil industry • • •
Demand is rising rapidly and supplies of petroleum products 
are inadequate to meet demand . Additional supplies are not 
readily available in sufficient quantities at current prices and 
production is at roughly full capacity. 22
The paper recommended mandatory controls that would allow the oil 
industry some flexibility to respond to market conditions but re­
strain price increases to a level consistent with the " integrity of 
23 
the Economic Stabilization Program • • •  " 
On March 6 , 1973 , the Cost of Living Council issued Special 
Rule Number One, imposing price controls on the oil industry alone. 
Thus it was only well into Phase III that the oil industry was 
singled out for special treatme�t . 
Special Rule No . 1  "reimposed mandatory controls on the sale 
of crude oil and petroleum products for firms with annual sales of 
$250 million or more. (The 24 
tory rule accounted for 95% of 
firms covered by the special manda­
industry gross sales . ) 1124 Because
the 24 largest firms were effectively prevented from increas ing pro­
duct prices by more than an average of 1 . 5% ,  Special Rule No . 1 
created a two-price system at every level of ·the petroleum industry. 
The purpose of Special Rule No . l  was , according to the CLC , 
"to provide an orderly system under which the inflationary pressures 
from rising crude and petroleum prices could be balanced against 
the need for sufficient pricing flexib ility to insure adequat e sup­
plies . 1 125 The flexibility provided by Special Rule No . 1 lay in ad­
justing the relative prices of different petroleum products while 
maintaining restraint on average price increases . However ,  Special 
.18 
Rule Number 1 did not succeed in its objective of controlling gaso­
line and home heating oil prices, which rose at a rate considerably 
larger than the general Phase III target of 1 . 5  percent . 26
The increases were in large part driven by increases in the 
price of imported oil described in Table 1 and by uncontrolled re­
finers bidding up domestic crude prices . The uncontrolled segment 
of the oil industry was able to increase its own prices and to buy 
products from major oil companies at.controlled prices and sell them 
at uncontrolled prices . In retrospect , the exemption of small firms 
from regulation appears to have been responsible for the failure of 
Special Rule Numb er One to control prices. 27 However ,  its failure
to provide real incentives to expand domestic production may have 
doomed it anyway . 
It has been claimed that Special Rule Numb er 1 also exa­
cerbated the difficulties forcing the independent sector of the in-
dustry. William Johnson has observed that " [O ] ne way the maj ors 
could increase prof its under Special Rule Numb er 1 without in­
creasing prices was to switch gasoline and distillate from spot­
market to regular customers and from bulk to retail purchasers" ,  thus 
switching the products to markets with higher price ceilings . 
Johnson also claims that even in those markets maj ors were 
compelled . to undersell independent marketers "whose niche in the in-
d b d . . II 28ustry was ase on price-cutt ing • 
On June 13 President Nixon again froze all oil prices and 
directed the Cost of Living Council to develop Phase IV regulations 
that would "stabilize • • •  the price of gasoline . "  Phase IV took 
19 
effect on August 14 , 1973 . Current FEA price regulations derive di­
rectly from the Phase IV regulations instituted by the Cost of Living 
Council . Under Phase IV price increases were allowed , but only to 
pass specific, allowable cost increases through to consumers.  How­
ever, the basic price structure was designed to stimulate additional 
domestic oil production, which was seen as the only long-run solution 
to inflationary pressure from the petroleum industry. 
The Cost of Living Council created a two-tier price system 
for all domestic crude oil . Imported crude oil was exempt from con­
trols . "Old" oil was defined as oil produced from a property -­
roughly the same as a lease tract -- in quantities less than 1972 
product ion levels on that property. The price of old. oil was set at 
the posted price in effect on that field on May 15, 197 3 ,  plus $ 1 . 35 
per barrel. That rule resulted in an average price of old oil of 
about $5 . 0 0 .  
Crude oil produced in excess of 1972 production levels 
from the same property ( "new oil") and oil from properties that aver­
aged less than 10 barrels per well per day was exempt from controls . 
In addition, each barrel of new oil produced "releases" one barrel 
of old oil from controls. By December 1975, uncontrolled oil was 
selling at a price of about $13 per barrel. This price control sys­
tem is described and evaluated in detail in subsequent sections. 
During the Spring of 1973 the apparent shortage of crude 
oil and products and concern about the independent sector also led to 
development of an allocation program for the petroleum industry. 
In April 1973 Congress enacted the "Economic Stabilization 
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Act Amendments of 197 3 " ,  which included authority to order mandatory 
allocation of gasoline and other petroleum products .  A voluntary 
program was created on May 10 , 19 7 3 ,  with two purposes : to alter 
the geographical availability of petroleum products and to halt the 
erosion in the position of the independent refiner.s and marketers 
who were having difficulty locating supplies . 
AUGUST 1973 to DECEMBER 1975 
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
In October, 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) announced a reduction of crude oil supplies to coun-
tries supporting Israel , cutting off about one-third of U. S .  oil im-
ports at the height of the embargo . 
On November 2 7 ,  1973 , Congress enacted the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA) , which brought the allocation pro-
gram and the price control program together. 
In Sect ion 2 of that Act , Congress determined that " shor-
tages of crude oil ,  residual fuel oil ,  and refined petroleum products 
caused by inadequate domestic production, environmental constraints , 
and the_ unavailability of imports sufficient to satisfy domestic de-
mand now exist or are imminent" and that "such shortages have created 
or will create severe economic dislocations and hardships . "  
The EPAA directed the President to "promulgate a regulation . 
for the mandatory allocation of crude oil, . residual fuel oil, and each 
refined petroleum product • • •  and at prices specified in • • •  such re­
gulation. "29
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Those price controls also had the clear purpose of prevent-
ing windfall prof its to energy producers that would result from domes-
t ic oil prices rising to the price of imported oil , and of transferring 
those potential profits into the hands of consumers as lower energy 
prices . 
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was conceived as a 
temporary measure des igned to cope with a sudden drop in petroleum 
supplies . The reason for the legislation was stated in the Conference 
Report as 
• • •  the conferees are in unanimous agreement that due to various 
factors the self-regulatory laws of supply and demand are not 
currently operating in the p etroleum market . It is imperat ive 
that the Federal Government now accept its responsibility to 
intervene in the market place to preserve competition and to 
. bl d. "b . . f . . 11 h l "  30assure an equita e istri ution o critica y s ort supp ies . 
The report emphasized the allocation of p etroleum products to priority 
uses , but also mentioned that 
• • •  this legislation requires the mandatory allocation program 
to be so structured as to prevent maj or oil companies from in­
equitably restructuring crude production for their own use or 
from favoring their directly-owned outlets over independent 
31products .  
The House report on the EPAA reiterated the intended tern-
porary nature of the allocation program. It stated that the EPAA 
• • •  is not designed to increas e [ e] supplies • • .  The shortage 
problem is the result of policies which have been in effect 
over a number of years , and it awaits a more far reaching and 
long range solution. Instead , this b ill focuses on the short 
term obj ectives of seeirig to it that during times of shortage
our priority needs are met and that whatever limited supplies 
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we have are equitably distributed throughout the nation to meet 
regional needs and preserve compet ition in the marketplace. 32
Objectives of the allocation program were specified in terms 
of the uses of petroleum products and the structure of the petroleum 
industry. Uses to be awarded high priority were those sustaining 
"public health safety and welfare (including maintenance of residen-
tial heating, • • • ) and the national defense; • •• maintenance of all 
pub lic services • . •  ; [and] maintenance of agricultural operations • •  �·33
The House report emphasized the need to use the allocation 
system to protect the competitive position of independent distr.ibutors 
and dealers of gasoline : 
Witnesses . • •  testified that over 2000 independent marketers 
of gasoline had been forced out of business by July of [1973] . . .  
S ome have suggested that the gasoline shortage has been 
continued by the maj or oil companies to purge from the business 
their only significant competitors , the independent , non-branded 
dealers . The Committee does not have the means of assessing the 
truth of that allegation, but -- whether intended or not -- this 
34 clearly has been the result. 
Allocation of crude oil at the refinery was described in the 
reports as having two purposes : 1) "to assure the maximum utilization 
of refinery capacity , "  in particular - by providing supplies of low-sulfur 
crude oil to refineries unable to process high sulfur oil, and 2)  to 
adjust the mix of products being produced in U. S. refineries "so as to 
assure accomplishment of the Congressionally stated obj ectives.
1 135
The Committee believed that by directing crude oil toward refineries 
producing relat ively more of desired products , the President could 
cause changes in the produc� mix. In other places , the EPAA stated the 
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obj ective of "preserving the competitive viability of independent 
refiners ,1136 which might also be pursued through crude oil alloca-
tion at the refiner level. 
The EPAA was not, however , intended to establish a prolonged 
alteration of the structure of the petroleum industry. The House 
Report stated that 
If the current distress of independent refiners ,  branded inde­
pendent marketers ,  and non-branded independent marketers is 
subsequent ly shown to reflect a.permanent shift in competitive 
advantage in favor of the large int egrated oil companies , it 
may be in order for Congress to consider remedies in the field of 
tax, import , and anti-trust policy. However, the direct allo­
cation program established pursuant to this bill is not for the 
purpose of permane��ly reforming the structure of enterprise 
. . . h 1 . d 37 or incent ives in t e petro eum in ustry. 
Price controls were authorized as an adj unct to the allo-
cation program. The conferees stated that pricing authority was 
" included on the premise that it does no good to require the allo-
cation of products if sellers are then permitted to demand unfair and 
unrealistic prices .11
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They continued that "reference to equitable
prices is specifically intended to emphasize that one of the obj ect ives 
.of the mandatory al1ocation program is to prevent price gouging or 
price discrimination which might otherwise occur on the basis of 
.,39current shortages. 
Coping.with inflation was not mentioned as a purpose of 
price controls. The Congress had no foreknowledge of the increases 
in prices of imported oil that would be demanded by OPEC during and 
subsequent to the embargo. 
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Terse mention was made of " economic efficiency" and "mini-
mization of economic distortion, inflexibility, and unnecessary inter-
ference with market mechanisms" as objectives of the mandatory allo-
40cation program. 
The price control and allocation authorities granted in the 
EPAA were scheduled to expire on August 30 , 1975. During the summer 
and fall of 1975 Congress faced a decision regarding extension of 
controls . 
THE ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT 
When the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) was be-
for Congress in the fall of 1975, attention had shifted from dealing 
with an acute shortage to dealing with the consequences of the high 
price of imported oil .  Between August 1973 and June 1974 the price 
of imported crude oil rose by about 400 percent . Despite price controls 
on domestic crude oil ,  this precipitate increase in the average cost 
of crude oil caused substantial increases in the cost of petroleum 
products to consumers . Those price increases were in turn seen by 
many economist s as partially responsible for plunging the economy 
into a deep recession during 1974 and 1975 . - Otto Eckstein , for 
e«ample, stated that 
The Vietnam War , faulty policies , and food were maj or causes 
[of the current economic crises] . But the oil embargo and quad­
rupling of OPEC prices were the biggest single factors . Chart 1 
contrasts the path the economy would have followed with and with­
out the energy diffic�lties, all other troubles occurring , • • •
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[T]here would have been a serious recession and inflation, but 
nothing of the severity actually suffered . 1141
The Chart to which Eckstein referred is reproduced as Figure 4 .  
Similar conclusions emerged from a series of papers commissioned by 
the Brookings Institution , 42 and were echoed in the debate on the
EPAA. By late 1975, recovery from recession was underway. However , 
price controls still held energy prices well below their market level ; 
allowing controls to lapse, . and prices to rise rapidly, could abort 
the recovery. 
The report that accompanied the House version of the bill 
that became the EPCA spelled out two reasons for the cont inuat ion of 
oil price controls : protect ion of low and middle income consumers 
from the impact of energy price increases and mitigation of the macro-
economic impact of a sudden increase in energy prices . The report 
explicitly rejected the use of higher energy prices to achieve energy 
policy goals : 
The Committee would also agree that . . •  as prices increase, 
consumers of energy will either us e less energy or use energy 
more efficiently . At the same time , producers of energy would 
be encouraged to make addit ions to supply But the Committee 
believes these effects cannot be achieved in the short term . • •
the Administrat ion ' s  own analyses demonstrate that higher prices 
will not elicit marginal additions to supply of any truly sig­
nificant amount in the next three to five years . And the measure 
of these marginal additions to supply cannot possibly j ustify 
the burden borne by the entire economy in the interim period . 43
In particu�ar, the Committee finds the President ' s  strat egy 
to use price as the principal means of achieving conservation 
unacceptable because it so harshly impacts on the poor and low 
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that 
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income members of our society • • •  the percentage of family in­
come spent on energy declines significantly as income increases. 44
The report al�o referred to macroeconomic conditions , stating 
The Committee ' s  Subcommittee on Energy and Power ' s  own analy­
sis shows that abrupt decontrol of energy prices coupled with a 
further increase in OPEC prices could devastate any hopes for eco­
nomic recovery and could produce an additional half-million un-
45 employed. 
Phased decontrol over a 25-month period was also rej ected. The Committee 
cited a Congressional Budget Office Study of June 30, 1975 , which stated 
"that increases in energy prices proj ected to result from the President ' s  
25-month phased decontrol of oil prices when coupled with an assumed 
increase in the OPEC price in October would rekindle inflation and signi­
ficantly retard recovery from recession . 1146 Similar sentiments were
expzessed by the Senate Budget Committ ee Task Force on Energy : 
The Task Force believes that macroeconomic and energy policy 
must be integrat ed . It rejects • • •  immediate decontrol with tar­
iffs and excise taxes . The Task Force recommends phased decontrol 
. ·1· ·1 ( . h 1 . ) 47 a price cei ing on new oi wit exc usions , • • .  
In Senate hearings on oil price decontrol,  Otto Eckstein of 
Data Resources Incorporated testified that his econometric analyses 
reached the same conclusion: 
In swnmary , I strongly urge this Committee to help protect 
the incipient recovery by averting instant decontrol and working 
with the Administration to achieve a compromise phase-out of 
controls instead. It is time for all of us to be careful to let 
our economic machine resume a healthy growth process.  We should 
minimize the shocks that have done so much damage and instant 
decontrol is another one of those. 48
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The mechanism by which decontrol of prices could increase 
unemployment -- as well as increasing inflation -- and thus retard 
recovery was described by the Congressional Budget Office. 
Higher energy prices raise the cost of virtually every 
commodity and service consumed . Given the well-established 
tendency for wages to rise with prices , these energy cost in­
creases probably would initiate a wage-price spiral • . •
Since consumers cannot easily reduce their use of gasoline 
or heating oil when the price rises, higher fuel prices force 
consumers to spend more of their incomes on energy. This leaves 
l�ss income to spend on other goods and services so the demand 
for other products drops and real output and employment fall. 
Offsetting this impact is the increased flow of profits to oil 
companies, which would result from the decontrol of oil prices. 
If these funds were then spent on goods and services , the em­
ployment-reducing effects of higher oil prices would be largely 
offset . • •
Overall ,  it seems safe to assume that during 1976 and 1977 
the loss of purchasing power of consumers would reduce total 
spending by far more than the increased flow of funds to oil 
companies would increase it . Much of the drop in aggregate 
demand would be temporary , but "temporary" in this context could 
49 mean two or three years . 
CBO ' s  estimates are representative of Congress ional under-
standing of the effects of decontrol at the time . CBO stated that 
"decontrol would
.
add just under 0 . 5  percentage points to the inflation 
rate during the last quarter of 197 5, just over 1 percentage point 
to the 197 6 inflation rate, and about 0. 25 of a point to the 1977 
inflation rate • . •  The unemployment rate, proj ected as falling very 
slowly during 1977 even without decontrol, would stay practically 
unchanged at a level above 7 percent if immediate decontrol took 
29 
place. 1150 The conclusion CBO reached was that gradual decontrol
would delay the effects of higher consumer prices of energy to a 
time when the recovery was stronger and better ab le to cope with 
the shock. 
In passing the EPAA, Congress expressed a clear intention 
of protecting the independent sector of the petroleum industry . No 
such sentiments were expressed in the Conference Report on the EPCA 
although the Act did require that the competitive structure of the 
industry be considered if removal of price controls were proposed. 
The EPCA provided for continued price controls , on crude 
oil and refined products , and mandatory allocation through 197 9. 
It required the FEA to revise the structure of crude oil price con-
trols and allowed FEA to increase crude oil prices and exempt cer-
tain classes of refined products from price controls , subj ect to 
Congressional approval . The regulatory program developed subse-
quent to the passage of the EPCA is described and evaluated in detail 
in later sections . 
The life of the Federal Energy Administration, created to 
administer the price control and allocation programs mandated by the 
EPAA, was not coterminus with the EPAA . Congress faced the question 
of extending the life of FEA in the summer of 1976,  and took the op-
portunity to amend the price control authority granted in the EPCA. 
The Eriergy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA) , signed 
into law on August 14 , 1976 , extended the life of the FEA and made 
further changes in the nature of petroleum price controls.  The Con-
ference Report on ECPA spelled out the reasons why a faster pace of 
decontrol than allowed by the EPCA was j ustified . According to the 
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Conferees , "1975 was a year of cont inuing poor economic condition . • •
[b] ecause the economy had not yet adjusted to the price increases of 
1973-1974,  it could not be expected to bear further price increas -· 
ses • . .  ,.51 Consequently, EPCA was based on " the recognition of the 
justification and need for future price increases tempered by a pro-
cedure which allows these increases to be absorbed by the economy 
without undue economic disruption. This procedure provides the 
necessary weaning of the Nation from a low-cost energy based economy 
to one based on substantially higher-cost energy. 115 2
The ECPA made changes in oil pricing policy that were based 
on a reassessment of macroeconomic conditions . The Conferees stated 
that the "dramat ic change in the inflation rate [to 3 precent in mid-
1976] itself evidences the ability of the economy to absorb more sub­
stantial real dollar price increases. 115 3  Because of this change , the
ECPA amended the EPCA to allow greater increases in crude oil prices • 
The ECPA directed FEA to use some of the newly allowable price in-
creases to give additional incent ives to the use'·of exotic methods to 
increase production from existing fields (" tertiary recovery") and 
to remove some regional crude oil price differences . 53a
II: REGULATIONS UNDER THE EMERGENCY PETROLEUM ALLOCATION ACT 
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As mentioned in the previous section, a new and comprehensive 
program of oil price controls was established in August 197 3 .  Although 
altered and expanded by congressional and administrative action, that 
program remained the same in broad out line from August 1973 until 
December 197 5 .  The most significant change occurred when the crude oil 
entitlements program was established in December 197 4 .  
Effects o f  the regulatory program developed in Phase IV and 
under the EPAA, while still somewhat uncertain , are much better docu-
mented than are the effects of the new price controls established in 
January 197 6 .  Moreover the concepts and organization of present con-
trols are very close to those applied in August 1973 through December 
19 75 . Consequently a description and evaluation of the Phase IV re-
gulatory system can contribute to prediction of the effects of current 
regulations . 
The new oil pricing regulations issued on August 1 9 ,  1973 
established a comprehensive set of controls at every level of the 
petroleum industry -- crude oil production, refining , distribution, 
and retailing. The controls were applied product-by-product, and 
were intended to provide a clear incentive to increase oil production. 
Regulations affecting crude oil and petroleum products 
under Phase IV and the EPAA included four maj or programs : 
Crude oil price controls 
Crude oil cost equalization program (entitlements) 
Petroleum product price controls 
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Mandatory petroleum product allocation program 
Today , crude oil price control and cost equalization pro­
grams are the key elements in FEA regulation . Together they shape 
the basic condition of energy markets .  The effects of crude oil pro­
grams on energy markets can be assessed in qualitative and , in some 
cases and subj ect to some uncertainty, quantitative terms . 
Refined product price control and allocation programs are 
highly visible in daily operations at all levels of the petroleum in­
dustry and could in principle have pervasive effects on economic ef­
ficiency. However, as this study is being written no conclusive 
evidence about the magnitude of those effects is available. Conse� 
quently evaluation of the refined product programs must be confined 
to qualitative judgments . 
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
By January 1974, the regulations developed in Phase IV of 
the Economic Stabilization Program subj ected about 60 percent of 
crude oil produced in the United States to price controls . Imported 
oil was not subj ect to any price controls . 
The objective of the crude oil program was to hold down the 
average cost of crude oil produced in the U . S .  with the least possible 
reduction in incentives to increase production . The hiatus in man­
datory price controls during the early months of 1973 petroleum al­
lowed prices to rise to levels adequate to cover current costs and 
restored market determined price differentials between types and grades 
of crude.  The unexpected rise in world oil prices that occurred during 
3 3  
1973 would in time have cuased domestic oil prices t o  rise t o  parity 
with the price of imported oil . Such an increase would have given 
owners of wells in production during 1972 profits far liigher than 
were anticipated when the investment decisions that created those 
wells were made. Those profits would have been true "windfalls . "  
Consequently the CLC initially imposed controls on oil produced from 
properties that were in existence during 197 2 .  
In August 1973 the CLC set the price of controlled oil 
at its May 15 , 1973 price plus $1 . 35 .  I n  addition, CLC issued re­
gulations that allowed oil producers to sell some of their produc­
tion at uncontrolled prices . 
The reason that ceiling prices were keyed to actual prices 
in 1973 is that crude oil is not an homogeneous commodity. Physical­
ly, crude oil from one reservoir can differ greatly from crude oil 
from another : one type of oil may be thicker and more viscous than 
another, may have a different sulfur content , or contain a different 
mixture of hydrocarbon compounds .  These differences in quality have 
been reflected in price differentials for different types of crude .  
Even physically similar crudes may differ in price depending on lo­
cation. The well-head price of crude which must be transported 
further to reach a refinery will be less than the well-head price of 
a similar crude transported a shorter distance to the refinery . 
To maintain these crude price differentials without a 
massive administrative burden of setting individual regulations , 
the CLC set price ceilings by ordering a uniform adjustment to the 
price at which crude was sold on an earlier date, when price 
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differentials were set by market forces . In the case of controlled 
oil, the regulation stated that " [ t ] he lower tier ceiling price for 
a part icular grade of domestic crude oil in a particular field is the 
sum of (1) the highest posted price at 6 a . m. , local time , May lS , 
197 3 ,  for transactions in that grade of crude oil in that field . . . ' 
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and (2) $1 . 3S per barrel . 
The classification of oil as "controlled" or "uncontrolled" 
hinges on the definition of a "property, " since price controls are 
implemented on a property by property basis . During 1974 and 197S 
a property was defined broadly, as "the right to take oil from a 
specified reservoir . "  In general a property coincided with the right 
granted by an oil lease on a tract of land .SS
A more precise definition of oil not subj ect to price con-
trols includes three categories : 
"stripper well lease oil , "  oil from properties that pro-
duced less than 10 barrels per well per day during the 
previous calendar year, was exempted from FEA ' a  authority 
by an amendment to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act (October 
19 , 1973) . 
"new oil" was defined as that amount of crude oil pro-
duced from a given property in a given month in excess 
of the amount produced from the same property in the same 
month of 1972 . New oil includes all oil produced on any 
property that was not in production during 197 2 .  
"released oil" was defined a s  an amount of oil . equal t o  
the amount of new oil produced from a property. 
3S 
For example, if the 1972 production level was SO barrels 
per day, and the owner produced 60 barrels per day in 197 3 ,  20 barrels 
(10 new plus 10 released) would be exempt from controls , and 40 barrels 
would be subj ect to controls . That 40 barrels is also called "old oil . "  
The proportion o f  domestic oil production assigned t o  each category 
during 1974 and 197S is given in Table 2 .  
These rules apply only t o  properties on which no " cumulative 
deficiency" exists.  Any producer whose production falls below its 
1972 level in any month must make up that deficiency from new oil pro-
duction before any new oil may be sold at uncontrolled prices . For 
example, suppose a property produced 100 barrels per day during every 
month of 1972 and 1973 , but that in January and February of 1974 pro-
duction fell to SO barrels per day. Then in March and later months , 
product ion in excess of 100 barrels per day would not i.riimediately 
qualify as new oil, but would be applied to reducing the cumulative de-
ficiency created in. January and February. Only after 100 barrels of ad-
ditional output were produced would the increment be classified as new 
oil. 
While these regulations were in effect the price of un-
controlled oil rose from $ 9 . 82 per barrel to $12 . 99 per barrel , but 
the price of controlled oil remained at an average of $ S . 03 per barre1 ?6 
The two-tier system of price controls can be seen as a device 
for capturing a portion of the economic rent inherent in oil fields 
developed prior to the rise in world oil prices . Controlled oil, 
when Phase IV regulations went into effect in 1973 , was oil already 
being produced from fields that were developed when the selling price 
of crude oil was below $4 . 00 per barrel. Prices well above that level 
Table 2 
Crude Oil 
Percentage of Domestic Production Sold at Controlled and Uncontrolled Prices 
Controlled Uncoritrolled 
Old Oil New Oil Released Stripper 
1 974 January 60
·
1 1 7  1 0  1 3  February 62 1 1 5  1 0  1 3  
March . 60 .I 1 6  1 1  1 3  
April 60 1 6  1 1  1 3  
May 62 1 5  1 0  1 3  
June 63 1 5  9 1 3  
J ul y 64 1 5  9 1 2  
August 66 1 4  8 1 2  
September SL 1 3  8 1 2  
October 66 14 8 1 2  
November 67 1 3  8 1 2  
December 66 1 4  8 12 
1975 · January . 58 1 9  1 0  1 2  
February• 6 1  1 7  9 1 2  
March 60 1 8  1 0 . 1 2  
April 61 1 7  9 1 2  
May 62 1 7  8 1 3  
June 63 1 6  8 1 3  
July 62 1 6  8 1 4  
August 63 1 6  7 1 4  
September• 63 1 5  7 1 4  
October 63 1 6  7 1 4  
November 
. 64 1 5  7 1 4  
December 63 1 6  7 1 4  
AVERAGE 62 1 6  8 1 3  
1976 January 54 2 1  1 0  1 5  
February 58 28 - 1 4  
*Totals do not add to 1 00 due to rounding. 
Source: F EA Crude Petroleum Production Monthly Report. 
Source : FEA Monthly Energy Review, August ,  1975 and 
July , 197 6 .  
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translated in 1973 into pure economic rent accruing to the owners and 
producers of old oil. Price controls used some of that "rent" to re-
duce consumer prices . 
CRUDE OIL ENTITLEMENTS 
The crude oil cost equalization (or "entitlements") program 
is intended to ensure that , with specific exemptions mentioned below, 
all refiners incur the same average crude oil cost . In addition, the 
entitlements program makes the cost of incremental crude oil purchased 
by any refiner equal to the national average cost of crude oil inputs 
to refineries . 
The Operation of the Ent itlements Program 
An entitlement is the right to process a barrel of price 
controlled crude oil .  Every refiner must have an ent itlement for 
each barrel of price controlled oil it runs . 
Ent itlements are given to each refiner monthly: each re-
ceives a number of entit lements equ_al to the number of barrels of 
price controlled oil it would run if the percentage of controlled oil 
in its total crude oil input were the same as the national average.  
If the percentage of controlled oil exceeds the national average, the 
refiner must purchase additional entitlements from some other refiner 
which was given more ent itlements than needed for the amount of con-
trolled oil in its refinery runs. For example, in December 1974 the 
national average percentage of controlled oil in refinery inputs was 
40% . A refiner which ran 1 million barrels of oil in that month would 
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receive 400 , 000 entitlements .  If it were in fact using only 200 , 000 
barrels of controlled oil ,  it would have 200 , 000 entitlements to sell , 
whereas if it were using 800 , 000 b"arrels of controlled oil ,  it would 
have to buy 400 , 000 entitlements .  
The numb er o f  entitlements that refiners are required to 
sell in every month will alway s equal the number that must be purchased. 
Ideally, the price of an entitlement would be set so that the cost ad­
vantage that would be created by greater access to controlled crude is 
exactly removed . Such a price would equal the difference between the 
cost of controlled oil and the cost of uncontrolled oil. In September 
197 5 the average cost of controlled oil was $5 . 00 and the average cos·c­
of imported and uncontrolled oil was $12 . 50 .  I f  an entitlement was 
worth $7 . 50 ,  any refiner who substituted a barrel of imported oil for 
a barrel of controlled domestic oil (raising crude costs by $ 7 . 50)  
would have available an unused entitlement that could be sold to re­
coup that $.7 . 50 .  
Somewhat more complex analysis is required t o  establish that 
entitlements make the marginal cost of crude oil to any refinery equal 
to its average cost . Consider the case of a refiner deciding to in­
crease refinery runs by one barrel . Suppose that the refiner must 
choose between a barrel of controlled oil at $5 . 00 per barrel and a 
barrel of imported oil at $12 . 50 per barrel. If the controlled oil is 
purchased , the refiner will need an additional ent itlement , but will 
automatically receive four-tenths of an entitlement (because total crud� 
oil input increases by one barrel) . If an entitlement is worth $7 . 50 ,  
purchasing the controlled oil will actually cost $9 . 50 per barrel 
(; $12 . 50 - . 4  x $9 . 50) , b ecause the refiner gains the $3 value of the 
39 
additional four-tenths of an entitlement . 
Similarly , if one additional barrel of imported oil is pur­
chased , the refiner wi:l need one less entitlement and will receive 
an addit ional four-tenths of an entitlement worth $3.  The net cost 
of a barrel of imported oil is thus reduced to $9 . 50 per barrel . 
Consequently, no matter whether the refiner buys a barrel of oil at the 
average uncontrolled ( import) price or at the average controlled price, 
its cost after entitlements will be the same . That cost will in turn 
equal the nat ional average cost of all crude oil inputs -- in this case 
. 4  x $5 . 00 + . 6  x $12 . 50 $9. 50. 
The Need for Entitlements 
A two (or more) tier price system for crude oil can hold down 
the average cost of crude (at the expense of crude oil producer ' s  pro­
fits) , and keep that average cost below what it would be with a single 
market-determined price. Sect ion I of this report mentioned that under 
current production and demand conditions , absent controls all domestic 
crude oil would sell at a price (adj usted for quality and location) equal 
to the landed cost of imported oil . Multi-tier price controls prevent 
all oil from selling at that price.  
Such a system of crude oil price controls would not by itself 
lower the ·prices paid for refined products .  Even with price controls 
the lowest cost source of incremental crude oil for refiners was imports .  
Increased product ion o f  old oil would occur only i f  refiners bid up its 
price, which they could not because of price controls , and increased 
production of new oil -- which already sold at world market prices 
would occur only if prices above the cost of imports were paid. 
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Consequently when refiners as a whole increase or decrease (within 
limits). their production rates , they do so by changing their purchases 
of imports .  In the absence o f  entitlements ,  the effect o f  crude oil 
price controls would be to hold down the price refiners pay for some 
of their crude oil inputs , but to leave the cost .of incremental oil 
inputs unchanged . If there were no petroleum product price controls 
but only crude oil price controls, the prices of petroleum products 
would be bid up until they equalled the marginal cost of crude oil 
i . e . , the cost of imports -- plus a markup for operating costs and 
profit . As long as demand is sufficiently large that refiners must 
purchase some imported oil to meet it , refiners will only produce 
suffficient products if the market price of petroleum products is 
based on the cost of imports .  In the absence of entitlements ,  price 
contrbls would serve only to increase refiners profits,  reducing the 
cost of some refinery inputs and thus by transferring revenues from 
h d . h f . . 57 t e pro ucing sector to t e re ining sector. 
The entitlements program utilizes competitive market forces 
to pass those profits directly through from crude oil producers to 
refined petroleum product consumers . Ideally, entitlements would make 
the cost of any barrel of oil purchased by any refiner equal to the 
average cost of crude oil to all refiners . Thus all refiners would 
sell petroleum products at prices based on the average cost per bar­
rel of total crude oil input ,  which is less than the cost of imported 
oil. 
The entitlements program was invented in FEA to deal with a 
problem created by the existence of price controls and cost pass-
through rules in each sector of the petroleum industry. The two-tier 
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price system resulted in different refiners having different costs 
for crude oil . A refiner purchas ing (or owning) more controlled oil 
-- measured as a percentage of total crude input -- than another 
would have lower costs .  Given product price controls a t  each level 
after the refining level , the lower crude cost would be reflected in 
lower product prices than could be charged for products produced from 
higher cost crude. This was perceived in FEA as creating a compet itive 
disadvantage for refiners using higher priced crude ,  and it was decided 
that a crude oil cost equalization program was required if such re­
finers were to survive. 58
The two-tier price system was in effect for over a year be-
fore the entitlements program was instituted . Figure 5 displays the 
different crude oil costs that faced different types of refiner during 
that ti.me. 
Other problems were also created by the two-tier system with 
only one tier subj ect to controls . Stories abounded of tie-in sales : 
a crude owner offering controlled crude for sale only if the purchaser 
would also purchase some new oil at a price far above the normal market 
price. (Subsequent FEA investigat ions found no evidence of such 
dealings) . 59 Another fear was that the higher price of imported oil
might reduce oil imports during a time when domestic supplies were 
clearly inadequate to �eet demand at the controlled prices . 
Table 3 shows that during 1975 the average across all re-
finers of the cost of crude oil was the same before and after the value 
of entitlements is taken into account . Not all types of refiner , how-
ever , faced the same costs , and within types refiners varied dramatically 
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in their crude oil costs . 
Even in an ideal system, ent itlements would not equalize the 
cost of controlled and uncontrolled oil for all refiners ,  only for 
those that faced an actual price differential equal to the average dif-
ferential . Since price control regulations may specify different 
prices for crude oil produced from different properties and since im-
ports vary in price by g�ade ,  quality, and port of entry, such devi-
ations are likely. 
In addition, the ent itlements program that existed during 
1975 had two sources of bias that systematically provided some refiners 
with lower crude oil costs than it provided others. 
Small Refiner Bias 
The entit lements system has from its inception provided 
favored treatment to small refiners -- the definition of which has 
varied . When entitlements were first introduced , Special Rule Number 
3 allowed small refiners to assume gradually the obligation to purchase 
entitlements . Any refiner with capacity below 30, 000 barrels per day 
was exempt from the program for two months. During the third month 
such refiners were required to purchase only one-third of their entitle-
ment o?ligation, and during the fourth month two-thirds . Only after
four months were such refiners required to have a full entitlement for 
each barrel of controlled o il they ran. Refiners with capacity between 
3 0 , 000 and 100 , 000 barrels per day were given similar relief , on a de� 
clining scale; refiners with 100 , 000 barrels per day capacity or more 
were placed under the entitlements system immediately. 60
45 
Small refiners have in addition been granted preferential 
treatment under the entitlements program to preserve the advantages 
that existed during the sixties under the imp ort control program. All 
refiners , large and small , receive a basic monthly allocation of en-
titlements ; each refiner with capacity less than 175 , 000 barrels per 
day is granted additional ent itlements on a sliding scale. 61 No addi­
t ional ent itlements are granted to refiners at the 175 , 000 barrels per 
day level; 1 , 258 are granted to a refiner with 100 , 000 barrels per 
day capacity; 1, 690 to a refiner with 3 0 , 000 barrels per day capacity, 
and 123 . 8  per thousand barrels to refiners with capacity under 10 , 000 
barrels per day. 
This "small refiner bias" has exist"!d since the inception 
of the entitlements program. When the price of entitlements reached 
its peak, $8 . 94 , 62 in November ,  1975 ,
· 
the cash equivalent of 1, 238
entitlements was $11 , 000. Refiners with less than 10 , 000 barrels per 
day capacity received the largest per-barrel benefit under the pro-
gram -- . 1238 entitlements per barrel, translating into $1. 10 per 
barrel or 2 . 6� per gallon subsidy. 
In December 1975 Congress amended the EPAA to exempt certain 
small refiners from the entitlements purchase obligation entirely . 
In Special Rule Number 6 ,  issued on Decemb er 31, 1975 , the FEA retro-
act ively exempted all r�finers with capacity less than 50 , 000 barrels 
per day from the purchase requirement . Refiners with capacity between 
50, 000 and 100 , 000 barrels per day were required to purchase entitle-
ments on a sliding scale: at 75 , 000 barrels per day, for example, a 
refiner faced a purchase requirement one-half as large as it would 
have b een absent Special Rule Number 6 . 63
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Special Rule Number 6 benef itted only small refiners that 
were required to purchase entitlements , reducing their crude oil 
costs below those incurred by refiners of the same size that were re-
quired to sell entitlements .  FEA found that the maximum advantage 
given by Special Rule Number 6 amounted to 23 cents per gallon, or 
$ 9 . 66 per barrel. Table 4 shows how those benefits were distributed 
among exempted refiners . 
In December 1975 seven received less than 1 cent per gallon 
and nine more than 10 cents , while 33 were in between. Sixty-four 
refiners with less than 100, 000 barrels per day capacity received no 
benefits , because they were entitlement sellers. 
The exemption, which was applied retroactively to October , 
November , and December 1975 , resulted in great variations in crude 
oil costs among refiners (see Table 5) . A refiner exempted completely 
from the ent itlement purchase requirement and able to obtain 100 
percent of its crude oil from price controlled sources could have in-
curred a crude oil cost of $5 . 00 per barrel (or less,  since some oil 
was controlled at prices as low as $3 . 00 per barrel) . A refiner not 
exempted could have incurred a post-entitlement crude oil cost of 
$10 . 92 ,  the average December post-entitlement cost for maj or refiners,  
or  more if  crude oil of above average cost were purchased . Spreads 
wider than $6 . 00 ,  as reported in Table 4 ,  are possible because some 
refiners paid less than average prices, while others paid more. 
Because these differences between actual prices paid for crude oil by 
individual refiners and national averages_ existed prior to Special 
Rule Number 6 ,  not all of the cost variation in Table 4 can be attri-
buted to the Rule .  Moreover, some variation could also result from 
Table 4 
Distribution of Benefits of Special Rule 6 
Octol>t:r Hl':'5 No,•cmh1!r 1�45 Dr<-cnibcr 1!175-
��!i��:11�rl���:�1-1;k���lLn���1i .. \�.crt::: :: : ::::::::: :: : : : ::'l'ot�il \'1l.IUC ol 1•Xt.'lll1iHOll • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • . . . . . • . . . . . • . • •  ll.:\111-:l! or hrn�f1t$ lo cx1!1llJ'lh•tl firms • . . . . . •• • . . . . . . . . . .  Numhn or Hrm::1 wi lh  Jl(·r �nllon hrnefits ranging from: 
LJ1l lo l cent . . . • . . • . . . • . . • • • • • . . • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . •  l l'<'ilt np to!1 ccnt::1 • • • . . . . . . . . • • . • ••••.•••••• . • . • . .  5 c11nU u p  t o  10 ccnU . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • •  10 t."OUW. uud over • • • • • • • • • ••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  
5:! "° 
$:?.5,0.!0. 000 �. �1-$1, 372, 000 
1:! 21 J!i • 
,IJ 17 . .'i *'41. ii'0, 000 fli, �ll-f.I, 1�. 000 
7 21 a • 
•l!I :ti S.:?.5,GA0.000 !0,000-s-1 . . r.�.ooo 
7 C'3 10 • 
1 F1)r Octoh1•r, 4 or tho nr1ns rccclTlng bcn•l\t.s tro1n the oxompUon wore partially uompt4?d, aud tor NovewOOr ond lJ�1u.hl•r, respectively, 5 and 3 fLnns wero p1u-tlally exempted. . 
Source : 41 Federal Register 3992, March 4 ,  197 6 .  
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Source: 
Table 5 
PostentillemMI crude cost• for December 1975 
Ro-glon • 
Ilhr;he5t In Lot\'l'Stln DUT<"rcnce do1����r'r-Par dollars P<'t LctWl'l'n bnrrd hlc;hc::;t ond lowest 
h a 7.iJ 5.11 l�.'12 9.-10 3.0:.! 
. ·- .. 'i�."7G . . . . . . . . · · ·  ,i:ij · · · · ·  . . . .  · - .  ��4i . . . . .  . 
1L3:i ti.If.I 1 . r1G 1 1 .:.m 5.GO 5.li4i 13. �� Ii. 05 7. '17 
10.77 <t . 1 8  0.5� !.I 10.J1 · s.60 <t.n 
10 13. 411 6, 17 7. 32 
11 10.Jil !1.:.'tj 1 . 13 
12 11.35 lUI:! 4.53 13 u.H 3.3� ct o.:i  I I  
• nureuu of )ltm• rafinlll& dis\.rlcts. 
41 Federal Register 9392,  March 4 ,  1976 
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exemptions from entitlement purchase requirements granted by FEA' s 
Office of Exceptions 'and Appeals . 
REFINED PRODUCT PRICE CONTROLS 
Price controls were placed on refined products in the 
Phase IV regulations in order to prevent refiners or marketers from 
raising prices in the face of a shortage of various products.  Unt il 
the entitlements program was devised ,  they were also necessary to 
prevent product prices from reaching their equilibrium level , which 
would be based on the price of imported oil rather than the average 
cost of all o il .  Refined product price controls allow price ceilings 
to be raised only if certain types of costs incurred by refiners or 
marketers increase.  
Price Controls on Refiners 
Since shortly after the promulgation of Phase IV regulations 
the base price for each product sold by a refiner has b een the price 
at which it was sold , to a particular class of purchaser, on the same 
date to which crude oil price controls are keyed . Certain types of 
cost increases occurring subsequent to that date could b e  passed 
through on a dollar for dollar basis . 
Under EPAA re;.ulations , the ceiling price was equal to 
(1) The refiner ' s  May 15 , 1973 selling price t o  a class of 
purchasers for that product plus (2) an amount representing 
the increase in the cost of crude oil to that refiner since 
May 15 , 197 3 ,  plus (3) under certain circumstances , some of 
the increased costs of doing business (other than increased 
costs of crude oil) such as increased labor, marketing, or 
· 1 ·  64uti ity costs.  
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Each refiner could have a different ceiling price for each 
class of purchaser. If the refiner sold gasoline to independent ,  
unbranded marketers a t  a low price on May 15 , 1973 , the low price 
was perpetuat ed . The allocation program, described below, required 
refiners to continue to make sales to each class. of purchaser on a 
uniform basis . 
The theory underlying the choice of dates is that under 
Phase III price adjustments adequate to restore market-determined 
price differentials and profit margins had occurred ; that if crude 
oil prices and other costs were unchanged , refined product prices 
would be adequate to maintain refiners' profits ;  and that having crude 
oil and product price controls keyed to the same date would simplify 
the task of tracking price and cost increases . 
Adj ustments to product price ceilings are designed to re-
cover an amount of revenue equal to the allowed cost increases . The 
adj ustments operate with a lag : if a refiner incurs allowable cost 
increases of $50 , 000 in January the refiner is allowed to increase 
prices during February or any later month sufficiently to generate an 
additional $50, 000 in revenue over and above the revenue that would 
be earned with proj ected sales at January prices . Allowable costs 
that have not yet been recovered through price increases are called 
"banked" costs . At various times , there have been limitations on what 
types of cost may be banked and on how these banked costs may be ap-
1 .  d . d . 65  p ie to increase pro uct prices . 
The manner in which increased costs could be allocated among 
various types of product was also specified in the regulations . Through 
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1975 FEA distinguished four classes of products : general refinery 
products ,  (including residual fuel oil) , special products (home 
heating oil and diesel fuel) , gasoline and propane. 66 Special pro-
ducts could not be assigned more than their proportionate share of 
product costs. For example, if a refinery produced 5 0 , 000 barrels 
per day of product , of which 5 , 000 was home heating oil or diesel fuel, 
only 10% of allowable cost increases could be applied to raise ceiling 
prices on those fuels. General refinery products must also , taken 
together, bear no more than their proportionate share (by volume) 
of increased costs ,  but refiners may allocate costs a s  they wish within 
that category. Gasoline , on the other hand , may be allocated as much 
of the refiner ' s  increased cost.s as the refiner wishes . 
Refiners were required to maintain a single price for a 
product to all customers within a particular class , based on a weighted 
average of the prices the refiner charged members of that class on 
May 15 , 1973 . Again , the purpose of this regulation was to preserve 
the market structure and distribution patterns that existed prior to 
the imposition of controls . However, the "single price" rule prevented 
refiners from granting individual or regional price concessions in 
order to assist their branded retailers during local price wars or for 
other reasons . 
Price regulat ions encouraged refiners to maintain historical 
differentials between the weighted average prices charged different 
classes of purchasers while allowing some flexibility in allocation of 
increased costs.  If a refiner allocated some portion of increased 
costs equally among classes of purchasers , the remainder could be 
52 
banked and used to increase prices at some later date.  If,  on the 
other �and , a refiner increased prices to one group by, say 2 cents 
per gallon and increased prices to all other groups by 1 cent per 
gallon, the amount of costs that could be banked would be computed as 
if the largest price increase had been imposed on all purchasers . 
That is , to continue the example, suppose a refiner had allocated 
$50 , 000 of increased cost to one product , and that there were only 
two · groups of purchasers , the first of which had its price increased 
by 2 cents and the second by 1 cent , providing the refiner with 
$30, 000 of additional revenue. That refiner could not bank $20 , 000. 
Rather , the refiner would have to subtract from $20 , 000 the revenue 
that would have been earned if the price increase to the second group 
had been 2C rather than le . If charging both groups 2 cents would 
have �ncreased revenue by $40 , 000,  the refiner could bank only $10 , 000. 
Consequently, there was an incentive to equalize price increases . 
This provision allowed for some flexibility in pricing, in 
that to raise prices to one group of customers a refiner need not 
raise prices to all groups,  but it did impose a penalty on unequal 
treatment . 
If a refiner could bank the costs not recovered because of 
the decision to hold prices to some group below the ceiling, those 
costs might be used subsequently to increase the ceiling price to a 
different
.
group . To prevent this circumvention of the equal treat­
ment rule,  such unrecouped costs may not be banked . 
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Wholesaler - Retailer Price Controls 
Price controls at the third , and final, level of the indus­
try are simpler and more uniform than at other levels . Wholesaler and 
retailers may pass through to customers their increased product cost s ,  
and must apply their increased costs of any product only t o  that pro­
duct . They may bank any unrecovered costs.  
Because the large number of independent ventures at this 
level of the industry makes auditing prohibitively expensive , in­
creased non-product costs may not be passed through on an individual 
basis . Instead, FEA periodically orders adj ustments in product price 
ceilings to reflect average increases in non-product costs.  
During conditions like those of the 1973 embargo , when price 
controls on oil producers and refiners combined with reduced imports 
to produce a true shortage of refined products ,  price controls on the 
wholesale and retail sector were required to prevent marketers from 
capturing most of the benefits of price controls on earlier stages of 
the production chain. 
CRUDE OIL ALLOCATION 
The mandatory allocation program for crude oil, instituted 
in December 197 3 ,  included a freeze on purchaser-supplier relations 
and a "buy/sell" program, which was intended to provide all refiners 
with equitable access to crude oil . 
The purchaser-supplier freeze was the device chosen by FEA 
to achieve two obj ectives of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act ,  
the maintenance o f  existing channels o f  petroleum distribution and 
54 
protection of the independent sector of the industry. 
The purchaser-supplier rule for crude oil provided "that all 
supplier/purchaser relat ionships in effect under contracts for sales, 
purchases,  and exchanges of domestic crude oil on December 1, 19 7 3 ,  
shall remain in effect for the durat ion of the m�datory allocation 
program. 116 6  For refined products , the purchaser-supplier rule freezes
relationships to what they were in 197 2 .  
FEA has given three justifications for the purchaser-
supplier freez e .  
1)  The freeze made i t  possible for small and independent 
refiners to estimate the deliveries they would receive during February, 
March, and April , 1974 . Those estimates were the basis of the buy-
sell list,  discussed below. 
2) "Since most domestic crude oil contracts were year-long 
contracts which would not terminat e until after December 31,  197 3 ,  
maintaining supplier/purchaser relationships a s  of December 1,  1973 
preserved and stabilized most of the nations ' crude oil distribution 
at the time when the potential for disorder was at its peak. 11 67
3) The freeze made it difficult to circumvent crude oil
price controls . Knowing that his supplier was obligated to continue 
supplying crude oil in the same quantities as in the past , the present 
purchaser would have no incentive , and could not be pressured , to 
arrange back-door methods of increasing the suppliers ' revenues from 
sales of controlled crude.  
The crude oil "buy/sell" program at first applied uniformly 
to all refiners , regardless of size.  At one point , a maj or oil com-
pany was required to sell large amounts of crude oil to another maj or. 
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The "buy/sell" program was later revised to entitle only small and in-
dependent refiners to buy crude o il in specified amounts from the 15 
largest integrated refiners .  
Small and independent refiners are defined , respectively, as 
refiners with a total capacity not in excess of 175 , 000 barrels per 
day and as refiners that control crude oil production equal to less 
than 30% of their capacity. Each such refiner is allowed to purchase 
from assigned sellers an amount of crud_e oil that would make up the 
difference between the refiners ' 1972 production level and the level 
to which the refiner was restricted during February to April, 1974 
(the oil embargo) . That purchase requirement is added up across all 
eligible buyers, and assigned t? refiner-sellers. The price at which 
these transactions will take place is also specified by the FEA. 
Until recently , the transaction price was to equal the weighted average 
price paid for all crude oil by the refiner-seller, with a handling 
fee and transportation costs added . Although apparently equitable , 
this pricing rule could lead to a situation in which a refiner-seller 
was forced to purchase imported oil which he then resold at a lower 
price. In July, 1976 ,  the transaction price was changed , to equal the 
average cost of imported oil to the refiner-seller. 
The loss which the maj or refiners took on reselling ' foreign 
crude was added by them to their foreign crude oil costs ,  and thus 
could be passed on to their customers . The effect of the program, 
however, was to give small and independent refiners a certain cost 
68advantage. 
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REFINED PRODUCT ALLOCATION 
The refined product allocation program is also based on a 
purchaser-supplier freeze.  Every supplier of refined products is  ob-
ligated to continue offering those products to the same purchasers 
which were supplied in 1972 . If the supplier does not .have sufficient 
quantities to provide every purchaser with the quantities it is en-
t itled to purchase, the supplier must observe several FEA rules regard-
ing the allocation of supplies . Purposes of the allocation program 
were specified in the EPAA; the purchaser-supplier freeze was inst i-
tuted both to preserve an existing structure of distribution and to 
simplify the task of providing products to various priorities of �ses . 
Priorities in Obtaining Supplies 
Allocation works through the fixed purchaser-supplier re-
lation at each stage of the distribution chain . To simplify exposi-
tion, it will be assumed that chain includes a refiner , � whole-
saler, and � retailer or end-user (which purchases from the wholesaler) . 
Allocation priorities are based on the use to which the refined product 
is put . 
The allocation is based on either the "current requirements" 
or the "base per'iod volume" of a user . Current requirements of an end 
user are equal to "the supply needed • • •  to meet its present supply 
requirements for a particular use of that product , "  but do not include 
any amounts purchased for resale or for accummulating or inventory 
larger than customary. 69 In practice , current requirements will com-
monly equal what the purchdser is willing to purchase at the current 
57 
price. When the end-user purchases from more than one supplier FEA 
rules specify how current requirements shall be divided among them. 
The "base period volume" is equal to the amount purchased from the 
supplier by an end-user during a specified prior month . 
An end-user entitled to an allocation claims the allocated 
product from a retailer , which then has a legal claim on the product 
from the wholesaler, which in turn may claim it from the refiner. A 
wholesale purchaser-consumer entitled to an allocat ion claims it from 
the wholesaler, who in turn claims it from the refiner . 
Priorities in obtaining supplies of refined products are 
based on the end use of a product , and derive from the priorities 
specified in the EPAA. There are three priority classes under FEA 
regulations. Agricultural production and defense have the first prior-
ity -- without exception those users are entitled to 100 percent of 
their requests.  
Before defining the method by wh ich each lower priority 
user ' s  allocation is determined , it is necessary to define the allo-
cation fraction. Each supplier subtracts from his available supplies 
the amount which must go to the first priority uses and a "set-aside" 
allocated by state energy agencies .  The supplier then divides the re-
maining supply by the sum of the current requirements of second prior-
ity purchasers and base period volumes of the third priority users. 
The resulting fraction is the "allocation" fraction. 
If the allocat ion fraction is less than one , second prior-
ity users -- including emergency services such as hospitals , fire 
and police - receive an allocation equal to the allocation fraction 
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times their current requirements . Third priority users receive an 
allocation equal to the allocation fraction times their base period 
volume . 
If the allocation fraction is greater than one , the supplier 
may declare "surplus product" all his supplies above what is used to 
meet current requirements and base period volumes . Under certain 
restrict ions , suppliers may offer surplus product to whomever they 
wish. One such restriction relates to gasoline. If a supplier is 
assigned independent marketers as purchasers , the supplier must first 
offer them a proportion of the excess supply at least as large· as 
their proportion of the allocated supply , before the gasoline may . be 
sold freely. "This requirement prevents suppliers from favoring their 
owned and operated resellers in distributing surplus product . 1170
Purchaser-Supplier Freeze 
Although the supplier is required to offer each purchaser the 
allocat ion to which it is entitled , the purchaser is not required to 
buy from its assigned supplier . At any time, the purchaser may look 
elsewhere for its requirements , without penalty and without j eopardiz-
ing its. relation with the assigned supplier . 
The allocation fraction for most products has averaged about 
1 recently, which would appear to imply that little surplus product 
is available. 71 However , as much as 10 percent of product sales in 
72a month have involved surplus product . 
One reason for this apparent discrepancy is that a supplier 
may announce as surplus any amount of a product which he does not 
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expect his assigned purchasers to take . Such surplus is referred to 
as "underlifted" surplus . 
For example, a purchaser might be entitled to an allocation 
of 50, 000 gallons of gasoline. If the supplier exp ects the purchaser 
to take only 40, 000 , he may announce 10 , 000 gallons of surplus pro­
duct even if his allocation fraction is less than one . Because of 
this flexibility considerable amounts -- indeed all -- of a product 
could be sold as "underlift"ed" surplus . 
Occasionally a supplier is caught ·off-guard , by a customer 
who has taken none of his allocation for several years but suddenly 
decides to claim his allocation . The possibility probably limits 
the willingness of suppliers to declare surplus product until rather 
late in the time period during which assigned purchasers may claim 
their allocation. 
Purchasers requiring stable, long-term supplies may also find 
surplus product sales somewhat unattractive , because a supplier may 
only be willing to enter into long-term contracts with his assigned 
customers . Nevertheless,  surplus product sales could create a signi­
ficant spot market of the type that supported the independent marketers 
in the past . 
The type of product that is declared surplus because of 
underlifting is , however, likely to be high cost product . Because of 
the unequal incidence of costs on refiners -- created by small refiner 
bias in ent itlements and by unequal non-product and imported crude 
oil costs the same refined product may have many different prices . 
Customers of suppliers with access to low-cost products would tend to 
take more of their allocation than purchasers from suppliers with high 
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cost products ,  who would be expected to shop around . 
These factors , and the simple scheduling problem of finding 
surplus product before deciding whether to take an allocation, may 
inhibit purchasers from moving around . As in musical chairs , all 
purchasers must move simultaneously if there is to be a niche other 
than the one already occupied . The process could be started , how-
ever , by any supplier with an allocation fraction greater than one . 
Although the average allocation fraction is less than one, the vari­
ation of individual suppliers around the average leaves some with a 
fraction greater than one. 
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III : EVALUATION OF 1974-1975 CONTROLS 
Phase IV controls were instituted during a world crude oil 
shortage and developed under the severe pressure of the Arab oil boy­
cot t .  A shortage o f  refinery capacity existed simultaneously. Under 
these conditions the extension of price controls and mandatory allo­
cation to all levels of the industry could be necessary to hold down 
consumer prices and to provide access to petroleum products on a 
basis judged equitable by policy makers . 
However, by the end of 19 75 refining capacity was adequate, 
and unlimited supplies of crude oil were available from foreign 
sources (at a high price) . Under these conditions prices charged 
consumers could be controlled e£fectively through the crude oil price 
control and entitlements system without refined product controls . 
Although effective in controlling prices , with attendent consumer 
and macroeconomic benefits ,  crude price controls and entitlements 
were responsible for a decrease in the efficiency of use of energy 
resources . 
The remaining structure of product price regulation and al­
location can be justified in efficiency terms only if there is a 
significant lack of competition in the refining, wholesaling, and re­
tailing sector. To b e  sure, that structure could serve other pur­
poses : to squeeze the profits of specific sectors of the industry, 
to preserve existing market structure as an independent goal, or to 
provide price advantages or penalties to specific classes of energy 
users . For example, during Phase IV and the embargo consumption of 
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gasoline was seen as less meritorious than heating of homes. Con-
sequent�y higher retail prices and lower refinery yields of gasoline 
were encouraged to provide adequate supplies of heating oil at low 
cost. 73 However, if competition in the industry is adequate,  any 
aggregate consumer benefit from across the board lowering of domestic 
oil prices could be achieved with the crude oil program alone . Re-
taining that program alone would also remove many of the individually 
minor but pervasive -- and in total probably large -- inefficiencies 
created by product price and allocation rules. 
The plan of this Chapter is to identify and evaluate the 
consequences of crude oil and refined product price control and allo-
cation programs that existed prior to 197 6 .  T o  carry out that plan 
it is necessary to provide a descript ion of the basic economies of 
crude · oil exploration , production, and refining. 
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
Factors Affect ing Crude Oil Production 
Exploration for oil is characterized by uncertainty and 
frequent failures. After a series of geological investigations de-
signed to identify the strong probability that oil will be found in 
a given location, test wells are drilled . Between 1973 and 1975 
only 25 percent of all exploratory wells drilled were successfu1. 74
Drilling statistics include wells drilled in the hope of 
extending the boundaries of or increasing production from f ields 
which are already in production. These wells are more often sue-
cesful than are exploratory wells , so that on average about two-thirds 
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of all wells are successfu1!5 All exploration and drilling activ-
ity , including that in proved fields,  carries a risk of failure :  the 
incentive to engage in those activities is . provided by the expectation 
that revenues from productive wells will sufficiently exceed cost of 
product ion to compensate for expenditures on attempts that failed to 
find oil. 
For example, suppose that half the wells a company drills 
are successful, that the company spends $10 million on exploration 
and drilling , and that the company requires at least a 10 percent 
rate of return after taxes . Then to earn a 10 percent return on 
that investment , it must have profits after taxes of $1 million a 
year. Suppose further that this company drilled 100 wells , at a 
cost of $100 , 000 each ; and that the 50 successful wells produce 
oil sold for $100 , 000, with annual operating costs of $80 , 000. The 
profits per successful well are .then $20, 000 per year ($100 , 000 -
$80 , 000) for total profits of $1 million. 
The total investment in finding and drilling those fifty 
wells was $5 million ($100 , 000 x 50) ; consequently profits on that 
investment would be about $1 million � $5 million = 20 percent . But 
these profits are necessary to provide an adequate return on the total 
exploratory investment , which turned up fifty dry holes as well as 
fifty product ive wells . 76 The return on the total investment in-
volved is j ust 10 percent . 
The decision regarding exploration, then, is based on 
expectations of profits to b e  earned from successful wells. Once 
a well is drilled , however ,  all exploratory and development costs 
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are sunk and no longer relevant to decisions about how the well 
should be used . A well will be kept in operation as long as revenues 
are adequate to cover its variable costs of operation. In the above 
example , wells would cont inue in operat ion as long as total revenue 
remained above $80 , 000 per well, which is $20 , 000 less than the sum 
required prospectively to justify investment in finding the wells. 
However, opportunities for investing in an oil well or re-
servoir are not exhausted when the well is first put in operation. 
Oil is a non-renewable resource,  in that every barrel of oil produced 
leaves one less barrel underground . In many types of field, reduc-
tion in the amount of oil left in the ground reduces the pressure which 
forces oil up the well .  Consequently, for any amount of effort supplied 
by the manager , less oil will be forthcoming over time. 
The natural decline in oil production can be overcome by 
actions open to the oil field manager. For example, it is possible 
to drill another well and pump water into the reservoir to drive 
oil out ("reinj ect ion" ) .  Many of these actions involve significant 
initial investments , which are repaid when oil revenues are increased 
sufficiently by additional output . Investments which change the 
characteristics of the oil reservoir to increase production are often 
referred to as '.'enhanced recovery. "  
Some change in production rates can be achieved without going 
to enhanced recovery. These quickly achievable changes are limited 
in magnitude, but can be undertaken rapidly in response to temporary 
price condition. Enhanced recovery proj ects , because of their long 
life, are like exploration proj ects more responsive to expected future 
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prices . Consequently the effect that price controls have on expecta-
t ions of future prices is likely to be as important as their effect 
on current prices . 
A Model of Oil Production 
No simple account of how crude oil production decisions re-
spond to regulatory policy can deal adequately with all the complex 
forces at work. However , some elementary economic concepts can serve 
to give an orderly and broadly accurate desc
0
ription of the effects of
oil price regulations . Three sources of complexity must be kept in 
mind . 
oil fields differ drastically from one another 
the behavior of a field changes over t ime , as a function 
of the amount of oil taken from the field and the method 
of production 
large, discrete investments are required to make signi-
ficant changes in a field ' s  production levels . 
The decision problem facing a manager is similarly complex. 
The manager must take into account not only current prices and costs ,  
but also expectations o f  future prices and the effect which current 
decisions will have on the future relation between production costs 
and crude oil output . 
To describe these decisions, we posit the existence of a 
marginal cost curve like that drawin in Figure 6 .  The horizontal 
axis measures the production to be achieved from a well in the 
current year . The vertical axis measures dollars per barrel . The 
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Marginal Cost Curves ·in Crude Oil Production 
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marginal cost curve shows how much it would cost to increase output 
by 1 barrel per year when output is at the l�vel measured on the 
horizontal axis .  
The position o f  the marginal cost curve changes over t ime , 
as the oil reservoir is depleted . The cost of maintaining any level 
of output increases over time , and when prices are constant the most 
profitable output level declines. In terms of Figure 6 ,  this effect 
is represented by the shifting of .the marginal cost curve to the left 
(from MC"' to MC") '1Ver t ime.
Enhanced recovery can be represented by shifting the mar-
ginal cost curve to the right.  The curve MC" might be obtained if 
reinj ection were applied to a well that previously had marginal cost 
curve MC" . 
Marginal cost curves can be used to predict how much oil 
will be produced from a well at any given price. Consider , for example, 
a $5 . 03 per barrel price. The marginal cost curve reveals that when 
output equals Q1 , changing output by one barrel will change costs by
exactly $5 . 03 .  If production were increased much above Q1 , each ad­
ditional barrel of oil would cost more than the price of $5 . 03 at 
which it could be sold . Consequently when prices are $5 . 03 per barrel, 
Q1 will be produced . 
The marginal cost curve is the supply curve,
showing the prices that would induce various rates of production. 
Technically , the marginal cost curves discussed thus far 
are short run marginal cost curves , since they state the relation 
between cost of increasing production and level of production on the 
asswnption that a specific type of investment has taken place 
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(None for MC" ,  reinj ection for MC" ' ) .  It is also possible to con-
struct a long run marginal cost curve that will represent the relation 
between an existing output level and the cost per barrel of increasing 
output when the cost of investing in enhanced recovery is taken into 
account.  The long run marginal cost curve is also the long run supply 
curve and can be used to predict how in the long run oil production 
will respond to price levels that are expected to be stable over time. 
At some points in the discussion that· follows short term b ehavior is 
important , and at other points long term b ehavior. The distinction 
will be noted when it matters. 
Criteria for Evaluat ing Crude Oil Price Controls 
To characterize an efficient allocation of resources in oil 
production and consumption it is necessary to examine the market for 
crude oil . Supply and demand for crude oil is depicted in Figure 7 ,  
based on July 1975 prices and quantities. 
Demand for crude oil, by refiners , is a derived demand based 
on consumer demand for petroleum products .  If there were no effective 
price controls on refiners , consumer prices (and demand) would vary 
with the cost of crude oil to refiners.  With adequate competition 
in the refining industry, the price a refiner is willing to pay for 
crude oil is a measure of the amount consumers are willing to pay for 
petroleum products . 
Supply of crude oil would , if there were no price controls 
on domestic crude o il ,  be represented by the curve OCDE . Up to $12 
per barrel OC represents d�mestic supply; at $12 per barrel unlimited 
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Figure 7 
Supply and Demand for Crude Oil 
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supplies of imports are available. Since demand at $12 per barrel 
(Q1) exceeds domestic supply at that price (Q2) ,  the quantity Q1-Q2 
of oil would be imported . 
Efficiency in Crude Oil Production 
With a given level of energy demand � efficient production 
of crude·  oil implies keeping the total cost of oil77 -- the total re-
sources used to produce oil domestically and to pay for imported oil 
-- as low as possible. In order to achieve the most effic ient allo­
cation of resources in oil production, domestic oil production should 
include all o il that can be produced at a unit cost less than the price 
of imported oil .  This efficient use o f  resources requires that pro­
duction rates for all domestic oil fields be adjusted so that marginal 
cost -- the cost of increasing output by one unit -- is equal every­
where . 78 Marginal cost of domestic production should also equal the
price of imported oil .  I f  marginal cost o f  domestic production is 
greater than the cost of imported oil, it would be possible to save 
resources by decreasing domestic output and increasing imports.  Al­
ternat ively, if marginal cost of any domestic energy production is 
less than the cost of import s ,  it would be possible to save resources 
by increasing domestic production and reducing imports .  
These criteria apply t o  both short term and long term de-
cisions . To avoid complicated technical discussions , it will be as­
sumed that all oil producers include "user cost" , or the value of oil 
resources conserved for later sale, in their perceptions of current 
cost of production. Whether oil producer ' s  perceptions of the cost of 
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leaving oil in the ground lead to efficient production decisions will,  
in part , depend on how price regulations affect those perceptions . 
The effects of price controls on economic efficiency in crude 
oil production can be analyzed by finding how they alter the position 
and shape of the domestic supply curve OC. As drawn in Figure 7, the 
supply curve OC represents a situat ion in which all oil produced do­
mestically costs no more than the market price of oil ;  market prices 
are established by the price of imports,  because demand exceeds the 
amount of oil that can be produced domestically at a cost less than 
or equal to the price of imports .  
The area underneath the domestic and import supply curve 
shaded diagonally in Figure 7 equals the total cost of crude oil. 
If the conditions of economic efficiency are satisfied, that area will 
be a minimum. Price regulations that increase the total cost of crude 
oil impose an efficiency loss equal to the change in cost.  
Economic Efficiency in Crude Oil Demand 
An efficient level of demand for crude oil would be one in 
which oil is used only in ways that have an economic value no less,  per 
unit of oil consumed, than the price of imported oil. This result could b e  
achieved i f  each consumer paid a price for refined products that was 
based on the cost of imported oil. As long as demand exceeds domes-
tic supply, every change in demand changes the level of imports in 
a like amount , increasing or decreasing the energy bill by the cost 
of imports .  Unless consumers pay the full price of o il that they 
cause to be imported, consumption decisions will not be based on the real 
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trade-offs involved in energy use. Consequently, a system which 
charges consumers less than the cost of imports can create a loss in 
efficiency. 
Other Criteria 
The legislative history of oil price controls makes it clear 
that an addit ional criterion for evaluating crude oil programs has to 
do with the distribution of wealth . Congress intended that price con­
trols should prevent the transfer of income from oil consumers to oil 
producers and owners of oil properties . The magnitude of that trans­
fer can be estimated by subtracting the revenues that crude oil pro­
ducers actually receive from selling domestic crude oil under price 
controls from the amount they would have earned on that quantity of 
crude oil in the absence of price controls . 
Transfer of income is a cost to one sector of the economy, 
but a gain to another. The cost and the gain cancel each other out 
when viewed from the point of view of economic efficiency. Transfer 
of income from consumers to oil companies is not necessarily a cost 
to the economy as a whole . 
Another criterion by which oil price controls may be judged 
is their impact ?n oil import s .  The efficiency crit erion specifies 
a level of imports at which the cost of oil production is a minimum. 
Because of the potential damage which reduction in supplies or in­
creases in the price of imported oil could cause ,  a case can be made 
that imports should be lower than the level at which the cost of in­
creasing production equals the price of imports .  
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A compet itive petroleum industry in which investment· and 
production decisions were not distorted by special tax incentives , 
price regulations or import controls would sustain an efficient allo­
cation of resources in oil production and use. Preservation or en­
couragement of compet ition could be seen as a means of achieving ef­
ficient resource allocation or as a goal in itself . 
Price Controls and Crude Oil Production 
When price contrlls were imposed on "old" oil in August 197 3 ,  
ceiling prices were set a t  levels roughly equal to existing market 
prices . The initial price rule set ceiling prices equal to the May 
15 , 1973 selling price plus $ . 3 5 .  The $ . 35 increase was designed to 
give all oil producers a $ . 35 increase in prices that some producers 
had declared between May 15,  1973 and the effective date of regulations . 
Because price regulations did not roll back exist ing prices , 
the initial ceiling price gave producers an incentive to continue the 
same oil production rates that had been adopted before the reinstitution 
of price controls . With a fixed ceiling price, however , the amount of 
oil it was profitable to produce would decl ine over time ,  as depletion 
of the reservoir increased unit costs .  The exemption of o il produced 
in excess of 1972 production levels from price controls was designed 
to give an incentive to maintain or increase production. 
The effectiveness of that incentive depended on how produc­
t ion rates in effect at the beginning of controls related to the 1972 
production rates that defined old oil. Because oil prices and produc­
t ion costs had increased between 1972 and 197 3 ,  the 1972 production 
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rate on any property might be larger or smaller than the 1973 rate.  
If 1973 rates were greater than 1972 , any increment to production 
could be sold at uncontrolled prices (as could the difference between 
1973 and 1972 production) . If
.
1973 rates were less than 1972 , however ,
a producer that increased production might be required t o  sell some 
of the increment at controlled prices . 
In December 1973 the ceiling price for controlled oil was 
raised by $1 . 00 .  The increase was granted t o  bring controlled oil 
prices closer to the rising price of imports , 79 but it also served 
as an additional production incentive . These adjustments resulted in 
an average price of controlled oil of $5 . 03 per barrel during 1974 
and 1975 . 
A precise account of the effect of price controls on oil 
production can be constructed with the aid of the concept of marginal 
cost . The marginal cost curve labelled "1974" in Figure 8 is con-
structed with the assumption that Q1, the amount of oil that would 
be supplied at a price of $5 . 03 in 1974, is exactly equal to the 
amount of oil produced in 1972 . 
With a two-t ier price system that did not include released 
oil, production in excess of Q1 would be sold at market prices -­
about $10 in early 1974. Suppose that the producer who was producing 
Q1 was contemplating an investment that would increase the rate of
flow. Then the producer would compare increased revenue , equal to 
the market price times the increment to production, to the increase in 
cost resulting from the change in production methods . If the invest-
ment appeared sound , it �ould be mad e ,  and the decision would be exactly 
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the same as i t  would be i f  Q1 , the amount o f  oil subj ect to price
controls , could have been sold for upper tier rather than lower tier 
prices. Put another way , revenues from existing production are irre­
levant to the decision to expand production. Only revenues on the 
increment resulting from an inves tment matter. 
In terms of Figure 8, the increase in revenues is equal 
to $9 . 88 (the average January 1974 price) times Q2-Q1 , the increase
in production. Costs are equal to the diagonally shaded area under 
the marginal cost curve ; consequently by increasing production to 
Q2 the producer can earn additional prof its equal to the area shaded 
with vertical lines. When production is at Q2 the area, and profits ,
are at a maximum. The rule for maximizing prof its is to adjust pro-
duction so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue the rate 
at which revenue increases when output is increased . In this case 
marginal revenue equals the market price of $9 . 88 ,  because every ad� 
dit ional barrel of oil can be sold at that price. 
"Released" oil complicates the analysis . Every barrel of 
oil above Q1 that is produced allows the producer to sell one barrel
of his production below Q
1 
at market prices. Thus an additional 
barrel of o il (above Q1) increases revenues by $9 . 88 -- the price at
which the barrel can be sold -- plus $4. 85 ( $9 . 88 - $5 . 03)  -- the in­
crease in the price at which one other barrel of oil can be sold . 
Consequently marginal revenue is $14 . 73 -- and output will be increased 
to Q3 • 
Efficient allocation of resources requires that a producer 
like the one described in this model produce Q2 , the production rate
77 
at which marginal cost equals the price of imports .  Released oil 
results in production of oil that costs more than it would cost to 
obtain imported oil or oil from new properties . 
It is possible that released oil not only results in more 
than optimum output , but also results in the use of inefficient pro­
duction methods to obtain that output . This problem derives from 
the perceived temporary nature of price controls and the "release" 
provisions . If price controls were removed , marginal revenue could 
not exceed the free market price of oil , $9 . 88 in early 1974.  
The incentive provided by released oil is  purely a creation 
of price controls. If controls were to lapse -- and their termination 
date was explicit in the EPAA -- the j ustification for choosing a 
product ion rate with marginal cost greater than market price would 
disappear . Because the high marginal revenue resulting from re­
leased oil could disappear in one or two years , investments taking 
longer to pay off might appear unwise. 
The opposite is true of investments which would be justified if 
all incremental output could be sold at uncontrolled prices . Re-
moval of controls would not cause those market prices to fall , and 
would not change the profitability of such investments.  
In principle, one would expect producers to respond to the 
large reward for increasing production by finding ways to achieve 
t emporary increases in production during 1974 and 1975 at the expense 
of further production levels. Some of these actions would simply 
bring up earlier oil that ultimately would have been produced anyway; 
others would mean that in total less oil would be recovered from 
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the reserve . Some evidence that these act ions were being taken can 
be found in drilling stat istics.  One method by which short-term 
increases in production can be achieved is through repairing old 
wells and drilling new wells in existing fields. Demand for drilling 
rigs appropriate to these activities climbed during the period of 
price controls that included released oil , and produced a temporary 
shortage of such rigs . 80 Another method of increasing output tem-
porarily is by drilling shallower wells -- and during the first year 
of "released" oil the average depth of wells drilling declined . 
(See Table 6 ) . This method is particularly damaging to ultimately 
recoverab le reserves . 
Redrilling of existing fields would be stimulated by the 
broad definition of a "property", as the "right to take oil from a 
specific reservoir . "  All oil produced from a property in quantities 
less than 1972 production levels (except for released oil) was subj ect 
to controls . Consequently if a producer drilled an additional well 
on a lease in existence in 1972 , that well ' s  production could be 
subj ect to price controls . If drilling an additional well increased 
total production from a property, the increment to production gener-
ated "released" oil and revenue increased by almost $15 for each 
barrel of increased production. 
The result of released oil provision was to provide a greater 
incentive to re�drilling of existing fields than to exploration for 
new reserves.  Moreover , the perceived temporary nature of that in-
centive could d ivert attention from long-term enhanced recovery 
proj ects -- which involve �ctions to change the properties of the oil 
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TABLE ' 6  
AVERAGE DEPTH O F  WELLS 
(Thousands of feet) 
1973 Jan 9 . 00 
Feb 9 . 46 
Mar 11 . 5 7 
Apr 10 . 51 
May 9 . 20 
Jun 9 . 67 
Jul 9 . 5 2  
Aug 7 . 88 
Sept 9 . 54 
Oct 8. 77
Nov 8 . 5 1  
Dec 11 . 05 
1974 Jan 7 . 5 7  
Feb 8 . 9 7 
Mar 9 . 40 
Apr 9 . 67 
May 8 . 12 
Jun 9 . 06 
Jul 7 . 97 
Aug 8 . 18 
Sept 8 . 30 
Oct 8 . 89 
Nov 7 . 39 
Dec 9 . 55 
1975 Jan 8 . 17 
Feb 7 . 49 
Source : FEA Monthly Energy Review, July 197 6 
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reservoir itself and increase the amount of oil that can ultimately 
be extracted -- and turn that att ention toward short-t erm ventures . 
The exempt ion of stripper well lease oil from controls ac- · 
tually gave producers an incentive to reduce output . If,  for example, 
a property was producing an average of 20 barrels per day, all of 
which was being sold at $5 . 00 per barrel , revenues could have been 
increased by reducing production to 10 barrels per day. After that 
rate had been in effect for a year , th entire production from the 
property could be sold at uncontrolled prices which have been above 
$10 since September 1974 . Not only is revenue from selling 10 barrels 
at more than $10 per barrel greater than revenue from selling 
20 barrels at $5 each, but unit costs of producing 10 barrels per day 
are lower in many instances than unit costs of producing 20 barrels 
per day. 
The area OAC in Figure 9 represents prof its when all oil is 
sold at controlled prices . If production is reduced to 10 barrels 
per day profits equal to the area BCD are lost . But the entire 10 
barrel per day production can be sold at uncontrolled prices. Pro-
fits on that 10 barrels per day are increased from OABD to OEFD . If 
increased profits on the lower production, AEFB , exceed foregone 
profits on lost production, BCD , it is profitable to reduce output 
and qualify as a stripper well .  
The perceived temporary nature o f  price controls could also 
give producers an incentive to reduce output . Economic models of 
the relation between price expectations and oil output shows that 
if prices are expected to >ise when controls lapse (as would the 
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prices received by any producer selling its entire output at controlled 
prices) , it is wise to reduce current output so as to save oil for 
80a 
sale later at higher prices. Technical difficulties in reducing oil
production may make the effect of this incentive smaller than a simple 
model would suggest , but the incent ive clearly existed . No quantita-
tive estimates of its importance have been made .  
These patt erns were likely early in the life of price con-
trols -- into 1974.  Because of the rising costs of  production as  an 
oil reservoir is depleted , even the incentive that released oil gave 
to increased production was weakened by late 1975 . 
The cost of increasing output uses because of removal of oil 
from a reservoir causes the natural rate of flow to decline. This 
natural decline in self-driven reservoirs results in production inevi-
tably dropping further and further below any historical production 
level when prices of oil are constant and no enhanced recovery is un-
dertaken . The older a field becomes , the more its flow rate would have 
to increase in order to qualify some production for uncontrolled prices . 
To increase flow, the first methods of long-term enhanced 
recovery likely to be usable are pumping and water inj ection. Both 
require some fixed investment and increase variable costs . If such 
techniques do no ·more than half the natural decline in a field , all 
oil being produced would still have to be sold at controlled prices . 
In analytical terms , the amount of old oil that can be 
produced at a marginal cost equal to the fixed lower t ier price 
ceiling declines with t ime . The rate of return on an investment in 
advanced recovery technique� will depend on how much of the oil 
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produced with that method can be sold at upper t ier prices . 
The decline in a field ' s  production potential over t ime can 
be represented by the shift of the marginal cost curve in Figure 8 
from its 1974 to its 1975 position. 
Any oil produced in quantities less than Q1 must be sold at
the ceiling price (here assumed to be $5. 00) . However , by 1975 the 
amount of oil thaat can be profitably produced at $5 . 00 declines to 
Qi. If all oil above Qi co.uld be sold at $11. 28 -- a representative
1975 price -- Qz would be produced . (Again , efficient allocation of
resources requires that Q� be produced) . However , because of the shift
in the marginal cost curve, only Qz-Q� can be sold at market prices . 
A quantity of oil equal to Q1-�i must ·be sold at a los s ,  equal to 
the triangle ADE . The maximum profit that can be earned selling some 
output at market prices is the triangle ABC . If the area ABC is less 
than the area ADE , the producer will let output decline to Qi· 
The ability to sell new and released o i l  a t  market prices may 
induce production at levels above Q1 if the amount of oil that costs
more than the controlled price at which it must be sold is small .  
Maximum profits on selling new and released o i l  would be equal to 
- the area of the triangle AFG, which may exceed the loss taken on sell-
ing oil at controlled prices, ADE . If this is the case, Q;, the profit
maximizing output with released oil, will always be larger than Qz · 
If AFG is less than ABC , then ADE is also less than ABC , so that only 
QJ: is produced . The general conclusion is that under price controls in 
existence during 1974 and 1975 oil producers always produced at a lower 
rate (if they produced no new and released oil) or at a higher rate ( if 
they produced any new and released oil) than required for efficient 
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allocation of resources in oil production . 
The disincentive to increased production that resulted from 
the natural tendency of production rates to decline was exacerbated 
by the FEA regulation regarding · "cumulative deficiency . "  Any pro-
ducer whose production falls below its 1972 level in any month must 
make up that deficiency before any future increases in production 
quality as "new" oil. 
The cumulative deficiency provision was quite important be-
cause the difference in price between new and old oil widened quickly 
during the period of price controls . When controls began, the price 
of new oil was so close to the price of old oil that in some cases. 
there would be no incentive or reason to arrest the natural decline 
in oil product ion . A decision in 1973 to allow production to decline 
below 1972 levels resulted in a large cumulative deficit by 1974,  when 
the price of new oil was almost twice the price of old oil . At that 
time , desirable investments in advanced recovery become unprofitable 
because of the losses producers would incur in overcoming the cumula-
t ive deficiency. 
The effect of this regulation is to push Q1 , the production
level that must be achieved before incremental output may be sold at 
market prices , to- the right at the same t ime that nature is pushing 
the marginal cost curve to the left . The combination of effects was 
sufficient to make increased production highly unattractive by late 
197 5 .  
Table 2 showed that production of released oil declined 
during 1974 and 1975 , despit e the rising price of imports and the 
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and the widening differential between controlled and uncontrolled prices . 
These developments increased the reward for producing a barrel of 
new oil (and releasing a barrel of oil from controls) from $14 in 
early 1974 to $22 in late 1975 . Nevertheless,  production of released 
oil declined in relative and absolute terms . Production of stripper 
well lease . oil, on the other hand , increased in absolute and rela-
t ive terms . 
Some Specific Examples 
Four situations can be compared to illustrate the effects 
of FEA price controls in 1975 on the incentive to increase production 
from existing properties . In each situation certain technical and mar-
ket conditions will be assumed . The current production rate on the 
property is 150 barrels per day, and the operator is considering an 
enhanced recovery investment that- would raise production to 300 bar-
rels per day. The investment would cost $2 . 5  million, but would re-
quire no increased operating costs.  Finally , it is assumed that when 
the investment is under consideration the price at which uncontrolled 
oil can be sold is $12 . 50 per barrel , and the ceiling price on con-
trolled oil production is $5 . 00 per barrel . For simplicity, it is 
assumed that production increases to 300 barrels per day immediately 
after the investment takes place, remains at that level for 10 years , 
and drops to z ero after that time. (In a real situation, production 
would increase slowly to a peak and then fall off) . 81
The first situation illustrated is that in which the pro-
perty is not subj ect to price controls, perhaps because it was 
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developed after 197 2 .  Then the investment would increase annual re­
venues from $684 , 375 ($12. 50 x 150 barrels/day x 365 days) to 
$1, 368 , 750 . The increase in revenue is $684 , 3 7 5 .  
That increase in revenue represents a 2 4  percent rate of 
return on the $2 . 5  million investment . If the operator requires a 
ZO percent rate of return to adopt the proj ect , he will proceed with 
the enhanced recovery investment . 
The second situation is one in which the first 150 barrels 
per day of production must be sold at $5 per barrel , but any produc­
tion above that level can be sold at $12 . 50 per barrel . Then adopting 
the proj ect would increase annual revenues from $273 , 750 ($5 x 150 x 365) 
to $958, 125 ($5 x 150 x 365 + $12. 50 x 150 x 365) . The increase in 
revenue , $684 , 375 , is exactly what it was in the first situation, be­
cause all additional production can be sold at the uncontrolled price. 
Consequently the investment decision will be the same as well. 
The third situation is based on the assumption that the 1972 
production level for the property was 250 barrels per day, so that only 
oil produced in quant ities greater than 250 barrels per day may be sold 
at market prices. It is assumed that no cumulative deficiency exists.  
Now installation of enhanced recovery will increase revenues 
from $27 3 , 750 ( $5 x 150 barrels per day x 365 days) to '.$684 , 375 
($5 x 250 barrels per day x 365 days + $12 . 50 x 50 barrels per day 
x 365 days) . The increase in revenues is now $410 ,625 , which repre­
sents only a 10 percent rate of return on the initial investment (be­
cause those revenues last only 10 years) . Consequently an operator who 
requires' a 20 percent rate of return will reject the enhanced recovery 
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proj ect . 
In the final situation, "released" oil is introduced , and it 
is still assumed that 1972 production was 250 barrels per day. Then 
the enhanced recovery proj ect would create 50 b�rrels per day of new 
oil (300-250) and also release 50 barrels per day of old oil from 
controls. 
Revenue would increase, if enhanced recovery were under­
taken , from $273 , 750 (as in the previous situation) to $821 , 250 ($5 
x 200 barrels per day old oil x 365 days + $12 . 50 100 barrels per 
day new and released oil x 365 days) . The increase in revenue than 
is $547 , 500,  giving a rate of return of 18% on initial investment .  
Thus it may b e  seen that even with the incentive provided b y  released 
oil ,  the distance between current production rates and the rate that 
must be achieved to qualify added production for uncontrolled prices 
is too great . The enhanced recovery proj ect is again rej ected . 
Efficiency Losses from Crude Oil Price Controls 
It is necessary to distinguish b etween four cases in evalu­
ating the effects of price controls . Oil properties can be classified 
as 
properties developed in 1973 or later 
properties producing at a rate less than or equal to the 
rate which would qualify additional output for sale at un­
controlled prices 
properties on .which new and released oil is produced 
properties that would qualify for the stripper well exemp­
tion. 
88 
New Properties 
Ar).y property that was not in existence , or on which oil was not 
produced, during 1972 was exempt from price controls until January 197 6 .  
The entire production from such a property would b e  sold at prices 
roughly equal to the price of imported oil. Prod�ction from these 
properties would respond to changing import prices , with more produc-
t ion forthcoming when prices increase .  The supply curve for this 
portion of the market is depicted in ·Figure lOa.  These properties 
satisfy the preconditions for efficiency in crude oil production: 
production will take place at the rate at which marginal cost equals 
the price of imports.  
Figure 10 
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� second group of properties are those which produced no new oil 
but did not qualify for the stripper well exemption. Unwillingness 
to invest in enhanced recovery methods on these properties might re-
sult from actual production rates significantly below 1972 levels or 
from a large cumulat ive deficiency. Either circumstance could result 
in a situation in which the loss incurred by selling some of the in-
creased output resulting from advanced recovery outweighed the profits 
to be earned selling the remainder at market prices . On such proper-
ties production of oil would be unresponsive to changing import prices. 
It would be no higher if the price of uncontrolled oil were $12 per 
haul then it would be if the market price were $5 . 00 per barrel. 
Thus the supply curve for old oil will be the curve S� in Figure lOb 
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fields absent controls . 
Oil_ production on such fields is set at the low level which re­
sults in marginal costs equal to the ceiling pric e.  If all the oil 
produced on such fields could be sold at the higher price of import s ,  
more would b e  produced -- Q2 rather than Q1 in Fi�re lOb . All of the 
incremental oil , Q2-Q1 , would cost less than the oil which is imported
to satisfy demand in its stead . The additional cost incurred to ob­
tain crude oil is equal to the shaded area in Figure lOb . It equals 
the difference between the cost of purchasing Q2-Q1 barrels of im­
ported oil and the cost of producing Q2-Q1 barrels domestically.
Properties Producing New and Released Oil 
If it is profitable to produce new oil at all from properties 
existing in 1972 , it will be profitable because of the relased oil 
rule to produce beyond the point at which marginal cost equals the 
controlled price . With the prices assumed in Figure lOc ,  released oil 
will take production on some properties up to the level at which 
marginal cost equals $19 per barrel . This cost is greater than the 
marginal cost of oil from new fields or of imports.  The excess cost 
incurred in obtaining oil in the shaded area in Figure lOc , which 
equals the amount by which the cost of producing the quantity Q
2
-Q1 
exceeds the cost of imports . 
Properties Producing Stripper Well Oil 
Any property with an established production rate which averages 
less than· ten barrels per day per well was exempt from price controls .· The 
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rationale for this exempt ion was based o n  the high unit costs that 
could be incurred to maintain production from a property in the last 
stages of its life cycle . If price ceilings were applied to such 
wells , they might be closed down completely when some additional re­
covery was still warranted. Stripper well oil is a significant part 
of domestic production, with a share of about 13 percent in 1975 . 
The stripper well exemption can , as described previously, give 
an incentive to reduce output to qualify as a stripper well. In 
Figure lOd such a case is illustrated . 
The net economic loss from decreasing production is the shaded 
area in Figure lOd . Instead of producing domestically a quantity of 
oil equal to Q1- 10 barrels per day, at an average cost less than 
the ceiling price, oil is imported at a cost of $12 per barrel. 
The measures of efficiency loss due to price controls can be 
brought together in a single crude oil supply-demand diagram based 
on December 1975 prices and quantities (which will also be used to 
characterize the effects of price controls on demand) .  
Each of the marginal cost diagrams used in i the discussion of 
crude oil production characterized a single property. Aggregating 
them over all properties gives the supply relation of Figure 11 . The 
three shaded areas next to the supply curve corresponds to the ef­
ficiency losses identified earlier. They are identified with 
Roman numerals , explained below: 
I :  efficiency cost o f  limiting output on fields not producing 
new oil 
II : efficiency cost of producing oil at high cost on properties 
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qualifying to sell new and released oil 
III : efficiency cost of incentive to reduce output to qualify as 
stripper well 
Only I, the efficiency cost of limiting output on fields pro-
ducing only old oil, can be estimated quantitatively. Given the long 
distance which some fields had to go to be able to sell any oil at 
uncontrolled prices , continuation of the two tier price system into 
the future without revision could have posed an obstacle to use of 
more expensive enhanced recovery methods . 
An FEA study performed in 1975 found that about 50 percent 
of crude oil produced in the United States was derived from fields 
using some form of advanced recovery . Most of that production was 
with conventional t�chniques , investment in which FEA found would 
continue to be profitable under price controls. The FEA study 
constructed an upper bound estimate of the increase in oil produc-
t ion that would result from the incremental production from all en-
hanced recovery proj ects b eing freed from price controls by assuming 
that enhanced recovery would be zero on controlled fields.  This 
resulting loss was 1 . 3  million barrels per day. 82
Other estimates have been considerably lower . A study for 
the Environmental Protection Administration concluded that enhanced 
recovery might increase oil production by as little as 350, 000 to 
400 , 000 barrels per day in 198o . 83
If price regulation were to prevent all investments in 
enhanced recovery on old fields , the loss in production due to price 
controls would equal the enhanced recovery potential of those fields . 
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The studies cited placed that potential in the range of 300, 000 to 
1 . 4  million barrels per day . For a mid-range est imate,  one might 
assume that 750 , 000 barrels per day of additional production could be 
achieved after several years of investment in enhanced recovery at an 
average cost of $7 . 50 per barrel. If this increased oil production 
were substituted for imported oil costing $12 per barrel (a reason­
able 1975 figure) , the saving would be something over $1 billion per 
year. Thus the area ABC is a cost of · about $1 billion. 
The loss might actually range from $2 b illion to less than 
$500 million. Lower figures are more likely because by 1975 some 
fields presumably retained an ability to sell an adequate fraction 
of increased production at uncontrolled prices , whereas the estimates 
are based on the assumption that none could do so.  
No quantitative estimates of the increase in oil production 
due to released oil exist ; nor do estimates of the decrease in 
production .due to the stripper well provision . Consequently, it is 
impossible to even guess at the magnitude of the result ing efficiency 
loss.  Because released oil does not exist under current regulations , 
the exact magnitude of the loss caused by released oil is of little 
relevance to current decisions . Both the stripper well provision and 
the incentive to reduce output while prices are rising, however , con-
t inue .  
Domestic oil production with crude oi� price controls in 1975 
was Q4 , probably less than production without controls (Q2 ) because
of the declining ability to produce new and released oil from existing 
properties . 
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Crude Oil Prices and Oil Demand 
Because of the ent itlements system, each refiner perceives 
the cost of addit ional crude oil imports as equal to the average cost 
of crude oil. That average cost is actually a weighted average of 
the prices of controlLed , uncontrolled , and imported oil. As dis­
cussed previously, competition would make refined product prices 
equal to the sum of refining costs and the cost of incre�ental 
crude oil· supplies . With no price controls , incremental cost would 
equal the price of imports .  With price controls and entitlements , 
it equals the lower averag� cost of crude oil. 
Efficiency in the use of petroleum products requires that all 
consumers pay a price based on .the cost of import ed oil . With price 
controls and entitlements , however, consumers pay less than the full 
price of crude oil that they cause to be imported . Consequently 
consumpt ion decisions are not based on the real economic trade-offs 
involved in petroleum use. Since prices of petroleum products are 
below the cost of the oil that must be imported to satisfy demand , 
consumers will use petroleum products in applicat ions in which the 
benefit to the consumer is less than the cost of imported oil . More 
oil will be consumed than would be if prices were established on 
unregulated markets .  The magnitude o f  the resulting loss depends on 
how demand responds to price. 
One measure of the efficiency loss due to the effect of price 
controls and entitlements on demand is illustrated in Figure 11. Ef­
ficiency loss is equal t o  the difference between what it costs to 
import a certain quantity of o il and the amount that consumers are 
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actually willing to pay to have that amount o f  oil . This difference 
is equal to the triangle labelled IV in Figure 11 which may be esti­
mated by subtracting total willingness to pay for the quantity Q3-Q1 
(the area of ABCD) from the total cost . of that quantity of imports . 
Q1 is demand for all in the absence of controls , _while Q3 
is demand 
with price controls and entitlements . Q3-Q1 equals the increase in 
imports that results from average cost pricing of crude oil .  
T o  estimate that welfare loss estimates o f  the price elas-
ticity of demand for crude oil are required . Removal of controls in 
1975 would have increased average crude oil prices by about 34 per� 
cent . 84 Crude oil consumption in 1974 was 6 billion barrels. 85 If 
a one percent increase in price reduced demand by 0 . 3 6  percent (a 
price elasticity of -0 . 36) removal of controls would reduce demand by 
734 million barrels ( . 36 x . 34 x 6 billion barrels . )  Thus the amount 
paid for imports -- since such a reduction in demand would create an 
equal reduction in imports -- would fall by $10 . 2  billion. To esti-
mate the welfare improvement that results from the reduction in im­
ports , it is necessary to subtract from $10 . 2  billion the value 
consumers would place on their foregone consumption. That value must 
be at least $10 . 38 per barrel , since that is what consumers were paying 
(thr01:1gh refiners) for crude oil , or $7 . 6 billion. Thus welfare loss 
when the price elasticity is . 36 is no larger than $2 . 6  billion, and 
probably less.  It would be less because consumers would very likely be 
be willing to pay more than $10 . 3 8  (but less than $13 . 93 ,  the work 
market price) for some of the oil consumpt ion which is foregone when 
prices rise. Taking this effect into account and assuming constant 
9 7  
price elasticity suggests that the welfare loss from increased imports 
is on the order of 1 . 4  billion . 86
A ·price elasticity of . 36 is a middle ground estimate .  
Some authorities have estimated elasticities as low a s  . 1 ,  and others 
as high as . 5 . 87 That range of elasticity estimates implies that wel-
fare loss could be between four hundred million and two billion dollars 
annually. Based on 1980 demand proj ections at various prices reported 
in FEA ' s  1976 National Energy Outlook, the loss would be under $1 billion 
88per year. 
Redistribution of Wealth 
In addition to their efficiency effects , oil price controls 
transfer purchasing power from owners of oil properties to consumers 
of petroleum product s .  During 1975 that transfer amounted t o  about 
$14 billion. 89 (= $ 7 . 5 0  price differential times 1 . 8  billion barrels
of old oil production . )  
If price controls were continued to 1985 , production of con-
trolled oil would decline due to the natural deterioration of fields. 
Taking a high estimate of the decline rate (13 . 5  percent per year) , 90
old oil production in 1980 would be about 50 percent of 1975 production. 
The income transfer in that year would consequently be about $7 b illion. 
From the point of view of consumers ,  the perhaps $2 billion efficiency 
loss was definitely overshadowed by the income transfer . 
Encouragement of Imports 
When the vulnerability of imports to embargo or sudden price 
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increases are taken into account , an additional potential economic cost 
of price controls appears . The price of imports probably underestimates 
their cost to the economy, in that they bear with them a risk of future 
economic harm. By adding to the price of imports a "supply interruption 
premium" equal to the expected present value of the harm that would 
. l[M:  done by an embargo which made it impossible to obtain that barrel 
of oil , an estimate of the true cost of imports would be obtained . The 
complexit ies involved in determining that premium are beyond the scope 
of this report . But any such premium would increase the economic loss 
due to reduced domestic production and reduce the loss associated with 
released oil . The change would equal the premium times the amount 
of imported oil involved . As long as the effects of released oil on 
production are less than the effects of price regulations that tend 
to reduce production, introducing a supply interruption premium in-
creases the economic loss due to price controls . 
PRODUCT PRICE CONTROLS 
Even if refined product price controls were completely inef-
fective, crude oil price controls would hold the cost of refined pro-
ducts to consumers below the levels that would exist in the absence 
of all price controls . Whether or not refined product price controls 
have any effect on the efficiency of resource allocation in oil refin-
ing , market ing or consumpt ion depends on whether those controls do 
anything not also done by the crude oil program. Thus the first ques-
t ion that arises in evaluating refined product price controls is 
whether they are effective, in the sense of holding the prices received 
by a refiner below the levels that would be established in an unregulated 
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refined products market given the existence of crude oil price controls 
and entitlements . There are three possibilities : all , some, or no re-
finers face effective price constraints . 
Consequences of Effective Controls 
If all refiners were forced to sell at prices below those 
that would clear the market ,  demand at the legal price would exceed 
supply . All refiners would be able to produce additional products at 
prices less than those consumers were willing to pay for the additional 
output , but refiners would find that production unprofitable at control-
led prices . Such a situation represents a clear loss in economic effi-
ciency. Some kind of allocation program would also be required to 
distribute the inadequate supplies among potential customers . 
A less obvious type of problem could occur if effective price 
ceilings were high enough to balance supply and demand in the short 
run but failed to provide an adequate incent ive to expand refinery cap-
acity .in the long run . Refinery capacity increased less than two 
percent between January 1975 and January 197 6 ; 91 some industry sources
claim that limitations on the recovery of certain non-product costs pre-
vent them from earning an adequate return on increased capacity. During 
1974 and 1975 not all expenditures that an economist would consider 
costs could be used to revise price ceilings . The definition of "non-
product" costs does not include all adj ustments necessary to maintain a 
competitive rate of return. Although interest charges may be passed on, 
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increased cost of equity capital (a less precise concept , to be sure) 
may not be translated into higher prices . With rising interest rates 
and difficulties of raising equity capital since 1973 , that restriction 
adds up to difficulty in earning a sufficient return on investment in 
additional refining capacity to j ustify expansion. A similar problem 
arises from being unable to pass through increased depreciation charges 
occasioned by inflation or additional investment . 
According to testimony by an· Exxon spokesman , FEA regulations 
in late 1974 would allow a new facility to earn a profit margin only 
about one-half as large as that required to provide a ten percent re-
turn on investment . Exxon concluded that 
"Price controls in their present form, which restrict refiners 
to historical margins plus an incomplete recovery of additional 
costs,  are clearly inadequate to justify the higher level of 
investments and operating costs faced by refiners planning new 
facilities at this t ime . 1192
The same source pointed out another problem that could result from 
price ceilings based on crude oil costs,  
" • . . lower quality crudes normally cost less to purchase but 
require higher investment and operating costs to make the products 
required by consumers . The lower purchase price is normally the 
incentive to incur the costs.  However ,  current regulations re­
quire the lower crude price associated with lower quality crudes 
to be passed through as lower product prices and at the same 
time , do not make adequate allowance for recovery of the higher 
investment and operating costs" 92a 
There is , however, evidence that price ceilings are not effec-
t ive for all refiners . FEA regulations provide for the "banking" of 
increased costs which refiners , for any reason , are unable to pass 
on to their customers . Subj ect to some restrictions , these banks 
can be applied to raise prices at any time that market conditions 
permit . Consequently the existence of cost banks , data on which is 
provided in Table 7 ,  implies that refiners could increase prices if 
they wished . Any refiner with cost banks would tperefore be free of 
effective price controls . 
Some caution must , however, be exercised in interpreting 
the data in Table 7 as evidence that price controls are not generally 
effective . There is some seasonality in the size of banked costs,  due 
to reasons other than market prices being at a level below statutory 
price ceilings . During late. winter and spring, for example, some re­
finers increase their gasoline output and store excess production for 
sale during the high driving season. Such refiners would build banks 
if , for example, crude oil prices increased during late winter and 
spring and would not recoup those cost increases ("draw down banks") 
until mid-summer .
93 Moreover , the total $1 . 2  billion in unrecouped
costs is only about one-half the costs which � recouped in any typi-
94cal mo;ith . 
Consequences o� Pa:-tial Ef f ecti-reness 
Even if cost banks demonstrate that price ceilings are not 
effective on all refiners , they may be effective on some . This situa-
t ion could occur if different refiners were to incur different cost 
increases or began with different base prices . 
To describe this situation it is necessary to begin with 
a general analysis of the effect of price controls on refiners ' out­
put decisions . If unit costs of refining increase as the output of a 
refinery of fixed capacity increases , a point will be reached at which 
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Tabla 7 
Unrecouped Costs for Refined Products for 30 Largest Refiners 
Aviation 
Motor Jet Other 
Distillate Gasoline Fuel• Products Total 
Millions of dollars 
1 974 January 1 1 6 9 1  43 250 
February 1 84 87 1 75 446 
March 1 98 BS 237 520 
April 223 2 1 5  346 783 
May 261 255 446 963 
June 326 394 630 1 ,350 
July 355 325 648 1 .327 
August 392 349 665 1 .405 
September 409 431 650 1 ,490 
October 295 424 531 1 .250 
November 245 475 595 1 ,31 5 
December 209 4 1 3  492 1 , 1 1 4 
1 975 January 254 431 672 1,357 
February 300 4 1 8  790 1 ,508 
March 282 452 966 1 ,700 
April 302 485 807 1 ,594 
May 292 370 771 1 .433 
June 284 266 785 1 ,334 
July 233 2 1 9  624 1 ,075 
August 280 344 583 1 .208 
September 347 335 661 1 ,342 
October 338 245 673 1 ,255 
November 426 275 796 1 ,497 
December 446 2 1 1 826 1 ,483 
1976 January 336 242 1 3 1  5 1 5  1 ,224 
0Prior to January 1 976 refiners were not required to maintain separate banks for aviation jet fuel. 
Source: F EA. · 
Sou+ce : FEA Monthly Energy Review, July 197 6 ,  p .  6 6 .  
the refiner would obtain reduced profits i f  output were expanded 
further . If the controlled price is below the market price, that 
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point will be reached at a lower output than would be the case without 
price controls. Consequently effective price controls tend to reduce 
refinery output . Price ceilings above market prices do not affect 
output decisions. 
If two refiners have different ceiling prices (for the same 
product in the same location) , the refiner with the lower ceiling 
price will, if the ceiling is effective , produce less output than it 
would if it were allowed to sell at the higher ceiling price . 
Unit costs of the refiner with a higher price ceiling will 
be greater than unit costs of the refiner with the effective lower 
price ceiling, because each refiner will adjust its output until the 
cost of increasing output by one barrel equals the price it receives 
for one barrel of output . Suppose, for definiteness , that one refiner 
faces an effective price ceiling of $10 per barrel , while the other 
is charging a price of $15 per barrel that is less than its price 
ceiling. Then the first refiner could increase its output a small 
amount at an average cost , per added barrel , of about $10 .  The second 
refiner would , if it reduced output a small amount , reduce its costs 
by about $15 per barrel of reduction. Thus by shifting some customers 
from the high cost to t�e low cost refiner, the same demand could be 
satisfied at lower total cost . 
Consequently , when some refiners face effective controls 
and some do not , supply of p etroleum products is les s ,  at the price 
paid by customers of the high cost refiner, than it would be without 
controls . Removal of controls would cause some prices to fall 
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in 
particular , those charged by refiners not subj ect to controls. At the 
same time , removal of controls would allow prices received by other 
refiners to increase. 
The net effect of removing price controls would be to in� 
crease the economic efficiency of the refining sector , by reducing 
the share of high-cost refiners and increasing the share of low-cost 
refiners . 
This conclusion regarding refining efficiency must be quali­
fied by noting that some refiners have relatively low costs , and may 
have low price ceilings , because they benefit from the small refin�r 
bias in entitlements .  Since their lower cost does not derive from 
more efficient operation, price controls that prevent such refiners 
from exploiting their lower cost to increase sales need not cause a 
decrease in economic efficiency. 
Because of the purchaser-supplier freeze,  the low-cost re­
finer must first off er its output to its historical customers.  Those 
customers are likely to purchase their entire allocation, because of 
its advantageous price. Customers historically associated with the high­
cost refiner are unlikely to be able to obtain any products from the 
low cost refiner unless it has surplus product . Different consumers 
will thus face different prices for identical products .  The result 
of such differential pricing is likely to be misallocation of products 
among customers : those assigned to the low cost refiner will be en­
couraged , up to the limit of their allocation, to make less valuable use 
of products than would be K1de by the customers facing the higher price 
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of the second refiner . In the case of motor gasoline, discussed below, 
the situation is somewhat different because no purchaser-supplier freeze 
gives historical retail customers easier access to low priced dealers . 
Possibility of Ineffective Controls 
The final case to be considered is that in which all refiners 
are in effect free of controls , because ceiling prices are above mar­
ket levels . There is some sentiment that when refinery price controls 
were first established , product prices were very high and were pro­
viding unusually large profit margins . If this were true , the ceilings 
might have been and might remain ineffective for all refiners -- and 
thus have no effect on price or efficiency. Even if price controls 
started out giving just adequate profit margins , steadily increasing 
costs would tend to drive price ceilings above market price levels . 
This tendency can be illustrated by means of a drastically 
simplified analysis of refined product supply and demand . It is as­
sumed that there are only two refiners , each of which produces only 
one product and sells it at a single price to all groups of purchasers . 
It is also assumed that increased costs are immediately reflected in 
a revised price ceiling. 
Figure 12 represents two months in the history of one re­
finery. The refiner is allowed to charge a price P1 in January. Given 
January costs , the refiner ' s  supply curve is the curve S .  Between 
January and February, the cost of crude oil to that refiner increases 
by $1 per barrel . Then if there are no losses of crude oil in refining , 
the refiner will continue in February to sell the same quantity sold 
in January only if the price of refined products is increased by $1 . 00 .  
That is , the supply curve is shifted up by $1 t o  s1• 
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Price Controls in Refiners 
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FEA regulations allow refiners to increase prices so that 
their revenues will be increased in a total dollar amount exactly equal 
to their increased cost� . If there is no lag in recouping costs and 
if there are no losses of crude oil in refining , the regulations woulci 
allow a $1 per barrel increase in crude oil costs to be reflected in a 
$1 per barrel increase in refined product prices. 
If the refiner received a $1 higher price in February, it 
* 
would cont.inue to produce Q , and increased revenues would exactly 
equal increased costs .  
I f  all refiners are identical , however, and each i s  allowed 
to increase its ceiling price by $ 1 ,  none of the refiners will be able 
to raise their actual price to the ceiling. The reason is that if 
demand is at all responsive to price, the market will taken less refined 
product when its price is increased. 
In Figure 13 market equilibrium is depicted , on the assump-
t ion that P1, the January ceiling price for each of the identical re­
finers, exactly equals the market clearing price.  The market supply 
curve S is the sum of the supply curves of each independent refiner . 
When that curve is shifted up $1,  to s2 , the market clearing price
rises only to P3 -- which is less than the new ceiling price P2 , which
equals P1 plus $ 1 . 0 0 .
Returning to Figure 12 , i t  i s  seen that the individual re-
finer must off er his product for sale at less than the ceiling price 
** 
and will supply only Q The increased costs which the refiner is al-
lowed to recoup are equal to the increased crude oil price (P2-P1= $ 1) 
* 
times the quantity of crude oil produced in January , Q • S ince the 
UJ 
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Supply and Demand for Refined Products 
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refiner is actually able to charge only P3 , all the allowable costs
would not be recouped . Unrecouped costs may be "banked" and passed 
on to consumers in the form of higher prices when demand conditions 
permit . In this case, the refiner would bank (P1+ $1)-P3 , the <liffer-
ence between ceiling and market prices , times the amount of crude oil 
purchased (and product sold) in February. 
any 
This is exactly what would happen without regulation. In 
increased costs tend to be shared between buyers and sellers . 
Consumers bear a larger share of costs of demand if unresponsive to 
price and a lower share if demand if very responsive . Only with per-
fectly inelastic demand could all costs be passed on , with or without 
price controls . 
This simple analysis ignores one essential feature of FEA 
regulations , that costs may be reflected in higher price ceilings only 
after they have been incurred. The regulations only allow price ceil-
ings in future months to reflect current cost increases . That delay 
can make it impossible for refiners to recover even the port ion of 
costs that would be borne by consum.ers if prices were increased imme-
diately. Because of this lag, refiners' profits may be reduced by 
price controls even though cost banks are large and growing. 
Market prices , unlike price ceilings , are based on current 
and prospective costs.  If , for example , there were a cost increase 
in January alone, while in February costs fell back to their Decemb er 
level , refiners would be allowed to increase their prices in February 
to recover January costs. However , with constant demand and adequate 
refining capacity , no refiner would be able to charge the ceiling 
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price in February : the entire cost increase would have to be banked . 
To be more specific , suppose that during Decemb er a refiner 
paid $10 per barrel, or 24¢ per gallon for crude oil , and that during 
January its costs increased to 29¢ per gallon because of a disadvan­
tageous price being paid for several tanker loads of imported oil. In 
February , the cost of oil returned to its past 24¢ per gallon level . 
The refiner would be allowed to increase February product prices by 
an average of 5¢ per gallon (if proj ect ed February sales equalled 
January sales ) .  Even if all refiners were in this position, none could 
charge more in February than they charged in January . In February, each 
refiner would be facing a cost of production equal to the cost of crude 
oil plus operating cost , say 10 cents . If all refiners declared a 5 
cent per gallon price increase in February, the higher market price 
would cause demand for each refiner ' s  products to begin to fall below 
proj ections. To maintain their proj ected output levels , which would 
be profitable in February at prices of 34¢ per gallon (current crude 
oil costs of 24¢ plus 10¢ operating costs) refiners would begin bidding 
down the market price. Eventually market prices would be bid down to 
exactly their December level, and no January costs would be recouped . 
If demand rose some costs could be recouped . 
Constant fluctuations in crude oil prices probably do at 
times create this situation , in which price controls prevent cost in­
creases from being reflected in higher prices immediately and competi­
tion prevents them from being recouped when price ceilings are raised. 
However , the general upward trend in average crude oil cost s ,  
due t o  rising prices of imported oil, will serve to cause market prices , 
110 
to rise , although at a rate somewhat slower than the rate of increase 
in crude oil costs.  If the 5¢ crude oil cost increase that was as­
sumed to occur in January were due to a permanent increase in the cost of 
imports ,  all refiners would have to charge 39 cents in February to 
cover costs of production in February. If,  in addition, the demand 
schedule for products rose sufficiently in February to keep each 
refiner ' s  sales at their January level despite the price increase, 
the January cost increase could recouped ; if the same cost situation 
existed in March and demand was strong enough to allow all refiners 
to maintain sales at higher prices , February costs would be recouped ; 
and so on throughout the year . 
In other words , a perip.anent cost increase will , eventually, 
be recouped to the extent that demand permits . As in the simple 
example in which it was assumed that costs were recouped without delay, 
the sensitivity of demand to price may prevent all costs from being 
recovered . Indeed , once a cost bank is established the refiner can 
pass on cost increases immediately, until banked costs are exhausted . 
Only in a month during which the price ceiling is binding � 
i . e . , a month in which a refiner has no banked costs -- do price con­
trols prevent crude oil costs from being passed on by the normal mar­
ket mechanism. Even in normal , unregulated markets , only growing de­
mand can allow a refiner to increase total revenues at the same rate 
that total costs would increase if output were constant . 
Because of the lag in recovering costs , the demand curve 
may shift up sufficiently that market prices would be above the level 
required to recover past cost increases . Thus it is not inevitable 
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that cost banks will grow when permanent cost increases are incurred. 
It is more likely that banks will grow subsequent to temporary cost 
increases , but even then rising demand might allow market prices to 
rise sufficiently to cover past costs .  
I t  would , in either case, b e  the current level of costs 
and demand , not the existence of unrecouped costs from previous months ,  
that would cause the rise in market prices . The cost bank would only 
be · permissive , allowing prices to increase if market conditions per­
mitted . 
It also follows from this analysis that even if cost banks 
exist , a drop in refiner ' s  acquisition cost of cr1ide oil will cause 
product prices to fall below the level they would otherwise attain. 
"Ripple" Effects 
An argument advanced for product price controls is that they 
are required to reduce the "ripple effect" of price increases at earlier 
stages of production and distribution . The r
'
ipple effect theory rests
on the assumpt ion that sellers retain their percentage mark-up over 
costs when costs increase ,  so that a crude oil price increase,  for 
example, is magnified as it is passed down the chain of resellers . 
This theory is inconsistent with the principle that profit margins are 
set , in a competitive industry, at the level which provides just the 
minimum acceptable rate of return on invested capital . Under some 
conditions, a fixed dollar markup will provide the same rate of return 
when costs increase. In other cases some increase in markup may be re­
quired to restore the rate of return to an acceptable level, but a 
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constant percentage markup will rarely be required . 
Suppose, for example, that the price of crude oil is increased . 
Then refiners and all later sectors will find their cost curves shifted 
up by the increased crude cost.  Other costs may �lso increase; for 
example, since inventories are more valuable, inventory carrying costs 
will increase. Thus the increase in the cost of producing any fixed 
level of output will be greater than the dollar-for-dollar passthrough 
of increased crude costs.  In a competitive industry, prices will equal 
cost s ,  including a market rate of return on invested capital . If in­
ventory costs are not allowed under product price controls , those 
controls will keep product prices below what they would be without 
controls . 
However , price increases without controls would be restricted 
to the increased cost due to an earlier (crude producing level) cost 
increase ,  and nobody in the petroleum industry affected by those costs 
would obtain a higher rate of return . The "ripple effect" theory 
overestimates price increases and , to some extent , misrepresents cost 
increases as profit increases . Moreover , price controls that prevent 
secondary cost passthroughs simply squeeze the sectors affected by 
primary cost increases , with a long run detrimental effect on invest­
ment in those sectors. 
Conclusion 
The only widely available piece of evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of price controls ,  the size of the backlog of unrecouped 
costs ,  suggests strongly that not all refiners are subj ec t to effective 
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controls. If some are subj ect to effective controls , an inefficient 
pattern of unequal prices for similar products is likely to result . 
Even if all refiners have banks of unrecouped cost s ,  the delay in re­
covering increased costs may reduce refiners ' profits. These reduced 
profits could , as in the case of effective controls on all suppliers, 
giminish the incentive to expand capacity. As noted earlier, these 
efficiency losses are not balanced by any broad distributional gains . 
Reductions in crude oil cost using crude o il price controls and the 
entitlements system could achieve any average reduction in product 
prices that are achieved by means of direct produce price controls. 
The only reason that refiners could even for a short time 
capture the b enefits of lower crude oil prices would be an absence 
of adequate refining capacity. Once demand caused refineries to 
press close to capacity, prices might be bid up without additional 
output being produced . That situation is unlikely at present since 
1974 refineries have been running at a lower percentage of capacity 
than in any year since 1962 . 95
No quantitative studies that would make possible estimates 
of the magnitude of efficiency losses associated with refined product 
price controls are available, It has only been possible to identify 
the tendencies that would result from effective controls , and the 
uncertainty that exists regarding their effectiveness .  
ALLOCATION PROGRAMS 
With multiple prices for identical products , which result 
from FEA controls , some forlil of allocation is required to prevent all 
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customers from flocking to the lowest cos t supplier -- who would have 
incentive and opportunity to find ways around price controls . 
However , the p�rchaser-supplier freeze may create problems 
of its own. FEA has frequently claimed that the freeze reduces com-
petition by inhibiting the movement of customers from one supplier 
to another, 9 6  making it more difficult for purchasers to search for
and find other suppliers . In so doing it would restrict price com-
petition even if price ceilings were everywhere above market prices. 
Historic customers would have an advantage over others in obtaining 
products from low cost suppliers,  while customers assigned to high 
cost suppliers would find it difficult to change suppliers . For 
example , the freeze has made competitive bidding for large long-term 
fuel oil controls nearly impossible?7 Because in the event of a fuel
oil shortage suppliers could be required to cut off all but their as-
signed customers ,  suppliers were deterred from entering into long term 
contracts with any but their assigned customers . To be transferred 
by FEA from one supplier to another , a purchaser needed the acqui� 
escience of both . Thus a historical supplier might block transfer of 
a customer to a competitor who underbid him. 
Performance of FEA Regulations During the Embargo 
The price controls and allocation programs developed under 
Phase IV and continued under the EPAA were directed at other goals 
than economic efficiency. Mitigating the effects of the Arab oil 
embargo on oil markets and particularly on the structure on the oil 
industry are achievements that could be balanced against the efficiency 
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losses that appeared when markets returned to their normal condition 
by mid 1974 . 
A rather lengthy quotation from the "History of Petroleum 
Price Controls" written by a participant in FEO regulatory activities 
gives one view: 
In a sense, then , it was fortuitous that Phase !V ' s  CLC 
mechanism was in place and in force when the maj or disruption 
of the Arab embargo and production cutback hit the world and 
U . S .  supply . The existence of this price control mechanism, 
and the imminent congressionally-mandated crude oil allocation 
program, was of tremendous significance in the accommodation 
the U . S .  was able to make to the supply situation with which 
it was faced . 
A comparison of wholesale price movements in the U. S .  and 
abroad indicates how much less the country was subj ect to dras­
t ic swings in the prices of maj or products .  One advantage was 
that , relative to most other industrial countries of the world , 
the U • .  S .  is primarily dependent for its oil supply on indigenous 
production and the bulk of that production was price-controlled 
under Phase IV and the two-tier system. The other advantage was 
that the cost passthrough system allowed purchasers of incre­
mental product to compete in the world market and yet essentially 
made certain that they would not reap large windfall profits 
as a consequence . 
The flexibility of the cost pass-through system, designed 
and monitored as it was , constituted a maj or element in the 
viability of the program of Phase IV controls . No effective al­
location system had yet been set up , and there was [ sic] -- as there 
still are -- substantial rigidity problems in any volume alloca­
tion .system under severe supply stringency. 
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Perhaps the most salient feature of the patt ern of controls 
developed under Pha �e IV was that , while not designed for the 
extreme shortages and dislocations of the Arab embargo , they 
were flexible and effective enough to preve�t either runaway 
prices or crippling shortages of particular products.  The ul­
t imate step of rat ioning, with all its costs and inevitable 
problems , was avoided. And while there were hardships and even 
some inequities in particular cases , the essential goals of 
preserving a viable industry structure without crippling increases 
in costs of the economy were achieved . 98
Richard Mancke, on the other hand , argues that FEO alloca-
t ions of gasoline and controls on use artif ically increased the shor-
tage , and resulted in larger stocks of crude oil products at the end of 
the emgargo than at the beginning. He points out that in October 197 3 ,  
stocks were 27 million barrels below their level in October 197 2 ,  
whereas b y  April 1974. (the end of the embargo) stocks were 52 million 
barrels above their April 1973 level .  Mancke computes the reduction 
of oil imports due to the embargo as 130 million barrels , and the ad-
ditional reduction in supply due to FEA ' s  restraint on sales are 80 
million barrels 99 • George Perry concurred in the conclusion that 
FEA policies exacerbated the shortage of gasoline. lOO 
The two authors also concluded that some gasoline shortages 
arose from rigidities in the allocation program. Because allocations were 
based on a uniform fraction of 1972 sales , some consumer regions 
were allocated more than their proj ected needs and others considerably 
less. 101
There is however ,- substantial sentiment that the allocation 
program preserved the independent sector of the oil industry. According 
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to F.M. Scherer , "after some initially counter-productive steps , FEA 
regulation has lessened the danger of a crude oil price or quantity 
squeeze on non-integrated refiners . 11102 Testimony of numerous witnesses
from the independent sector of the industry also supported this view. 103
SUMMARY: THE EPAA REGULATORY PROGRAM 
At this point a recapitulation of the nature and consequences 
of the regulatory program that evolved under the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act is in order. 
The regulatory program had four maj or parts : 
crude oil price controls 
crude oil allocation and cost equalization 
petroleum product price controls 
petroleum product allocation 
The Cost of Living Council created a two-tier price system 
for all domestic crude oil . Imported crude oil was exempt from con-
trols . "Old" oil was defined as oil produced from a property -- roughly 
the same as a lease tract -- in quantities less than 1972 production 
levels on that property. The price of old oil was set at the posted 
price in effect on that field on May 15 , 1973,  plus $1. 35 per barrel. 
That rule resulted in an average price of old oil of about $5 . 00 .  
Crude oil produced in excess o f  1972 production levels from 
the same property ( "new oil") and oil from properties that averaged 
less than 10 barrels per well per day was exempt from controls .  In 
addition, each barrel of new oil produced "releases'' one barrel of 
old oil from controls. By December 1975 , uncontrolled oil was selling 
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at a price of about $13 per barrel . Because of "released" oil, the 
additional revenue generated by producing a barrel of new oil was about 
$21 -- the price of new oil plus the increase in �he price at which old 
oil could be sold . 
For a time , that additional revenue may have induced some 
producers to adopt inefficient production techniques to extract oil 
as rapidly as possible. However , by the end of 1975 the crude oil 
price regulations were holding domestic oil production b elow the level 
it could have reached without price controls . Estimates of the magni-
tude of the reduction are uncertain, ranging from 350 , 000 to 1 . 2  million 
barrels per day . The reason that the ceiling b ecame a disincentive is 
that the unit costs of producing oil from a given field increase over 
time, so that maintaining any historical production rate becomes more 
and more expensive. Consequently many properties had 1975 production 
rates well below their 1972 production rates . In some such properties 
investments in enhanced recovery proj ects would have been profitable 
if the entire increment to production were sold at uncontrolled prices . 
Because only part of the increment �- that in excess of 1972 production 
could be sold at uncontrolled prices , some of those proj ects were made 
unprofitable. 
In the absence of price , controls , all crude oil would sell 
at a single· price adj usted for quality and location. With the two-
tier price controls , different refiners may pay very different prices 
for identical crude oil . The entitlements program is intended to equal-
ize the cost of crude oil among refiners , and to ensure that the cost 
a refiner incurs in purchasing a barrel of oil is always equal to the 
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average cost of all crude oil inputs to refineries . 
Price controls on petroleum products establish a ceiling on 
the price of each product equal to its May 15,  1973 se�ling price plus 
a dollar-for-dollar passthrough of increased costs incurred subsequent 
to May 15,  1973 .  Costs are divided into product . (i. e.  crude oil) and 
non-product costs;  product costs are passed through somewhat more 
easily than non-product -costs. The effect of cost passthrough rules 
is to restrict the ability of refiners to recover increased costs even 
more than it would be restricted by the operation of competition. Re­
strictions on the allocat ion of increased costs among refinery products 
probably also prevent price differentials from adj usting fully to al­
tered demand conditions . 
A substantial loss in efficiency occurred because prices of 
refined products were set on the basis of average crude oil costs 
rather than on the costs of incremental oil inputs . If there were no 
product price controls or entitlements ,  consumers would obtain no bene­
fits from the price controls on crude oil. Crude oil controls would 
simply increase refiners ' profits, because the price of all refined 
products would equal the price of the lowest cost source of incremen-
tal oil supply imports plus profits and operating costs . 
Entitlements alone would serve , in normal market conditions, 
to ensure that the price of refined products equalled average crude 
oil cost plus profits and operating costs.  Any system which allows 
consumers to pay average rather than incremental cost serves as a 
subsidy to consumption -- in this case to consumption of imports.  Any 
consumer who increases consumption of some refined product pays only 
120 
$10 . 50 -- the 1975 and current average cost of crude oil -- plus 
markup , but some refiner pays $13 . 50 for the oil that must be im­
ported to meet the increased demand . One common measure (consumers 
surplus ) of the loss in welfare that would result from a permanent 
subsidy of this magnitude indicates that the loss is on the order of 
$1 billion annually. 
To these welfare losses one might compare the loss of consumer 
purchasing power that would result if there were no regulatory program. 
If controls had not existed , consumer costs of petroleum products would 
have been about $14 billion higher in 1975 . 
With the entitlements system, prices of refined products 
could be held down without product price controls under normal market 
conditions . By the end of 1975,  price ceilings were probably above 
market levels for many refiners . However, if price ceilings were ef­
fective for some , they would create a multiple price system for refined 
products in which low cost refiners with relatively low price ceilings 
could not increase output even though they could undersell refiners 
that had higher costs and higher price ceilings . That situation would 
be inefficient , but its prevalence is impossible to assess.  
The entitlements system also contains a bias in favor of 
small and independent refiners . The basic bias , supplemented 0 on two 
occasions by addit ional preferences , works through the granting of 
more entitlements ,  relative to siz e, to refiners with less than 175 , 000 
barrels per day capacity than are granted to larger refiners . This 
bias has enabled small refiners ,  who are maj or suppliers of independent, 
unbranded gasoline retailers , to produce refined products at costs up 
to or lower than those of larger, more efficient refiners . 
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FEA allocation programs are all based on a purchaser-supplier 
freeze.  All suppliers are required to continue to offer their wares to 
purchasers with whom they dealt in 197 2 ;  the quantities that must b e  
offered are also specified in the regulations . Although purchasers 
are not required to deal with their 1972 supplier, the freeze may make 
it· more difficult for purchasers to search for and find other suppliers 
because long-term contracts are only available from 1972 suppliers . 
Against these problems must be balanced the success of the c:i:ude oil 
allocation program in relieving the pressure on independent refiners 
and their gasoline marketing customers that existed in 1972 and 197 3 .  
IV: CURRENT OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
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The Energy Po�icy and Conservation Act (EPCA) passed in 
December 1975 made two important changes in o il price regulation : it 
rolled back the price of some domestic crude oil, creating a "three tier" 
price system, and it provided for gradual easing of price controls over 
thirty-nine months beginning in February 197 6 .  In all other respect s ,  
EPCA left the prior regulatory program i n  effect . The price rollback 
mandated in EPCA was accompanied by a set of energy conservation pro­
grams designed to substitute for higher prices in controlling demand 
and some non-price measures to increase production. 
The legislative history of the EPCA makes it clear that 
Congress intended continued price controls to prevent the macroeconomic 
disturbances and increased cost of iiving that would result from a pre­
cipitate increase in energy prices . Although protection of the indepen­
dent sector of the oil industry was not mentioned in the committee re­
ports that accompanied the EPCA, protection established previously was 
was continued by the extension of price control and allocation programs 
created by the EPAA. 
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
The EPCA required the President ot develop a system of crude 
oil price controls that would result in an average price of domest ic 
crude, at its first sale , of $ 7 . 6 6  per barrel. The proposed system 
was subj ect to Congressional vet o ;  by not acting to disapprove, 
Congress allowed the current program to go into effect on February 3 ,  
1976 .  
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The system of crude price controls that went into effect in 
February was based on a classification of all domestic crude oil into 
two tiers . The third tier , imported oil, was not subj ect to price 
controls . Stripper well lease oil was also exempted from controls 
by Congress in August 1976 and became part of the third tier. 
The definition of the two lower tiers hinges on the concept 
of a "base production control level" (BPCL) of oil production. The 
base production control level for any property is "equal to that pro­
perty ' s  average monthly production and sale of old crude oil during 
104calendar year 1975 . "  
The definition o f  old oil in 1975 in turn reached back to 
product ion that took place in 1972;  "old oil" is synonymous with oil 
subj ect to price controls under the system that existed until February 
197 6 .  
If the quantity o f  oil produced on a property does not exceed 
the base production control level , all oil from that property falls 
in the lower tier of price controls . If production from a property 
exceeds the base production control level, the difference between 
actual production and the base production control level goes into the 
upper tier ,  and the remainder (equal t o  the base production control 
level) goes into the lower tier . 
The upper tier also includes all oil from properties that 
began production after December ,  197 2 .  Stripper well lease oil , ini-
tially included in the upper tier , was exempted from controls by Congress 
in the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976,  passed in August 
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1975 . However, when the average price of domestic oil -- which must 
conform to requirements of EPCA -- is computed , all stripper well oil 
is assigned an upper tier price rather than tne price actually paid. 
This computation, specified in the ECPA, . made it possible to increase 
the price of stripper well oil without lowering the price of some other 
category of domestic oil. 
During the first month of the new price regulations , the 
average price at which lower tier oil could be sold was $5 . 07 per 
barrel; the average price of upper tier oil was $11 . 44 per barre1. 105
That is, in order to reach an average price of $ 7 . 6 6 ,  new oil had to 
be rolled back from its January 19 7 6  price of $12 . 99 per barrel. Ac-
tual prices at which crude oil �as sold varied widely around these 
averages . Ceiling prices on lower tier oil were identical to those 
which existed under the previous control program. The price ceiling 
on upper tier oil was below the level at which uncontrolled oil sold 
prior to enactment of the EPCA. The new price ceiling was set equal to 
the highest posted price for a part icular grade on a particular field 
106on September 3 0 ,  1975 less $1. 32 per barrel. 
Unlike previous price controls , controls under EPCA do not 
provide for released oil. This removes one of the efficiency losses 
which characterized price controls under PEAA, but it also removes an 
incentive to use production methods that would extract old oil costing 
more p er barrel than the ceiling price. The elimination of released 
oil may therefore tend to reduce domestic production and increase imports, 
especially b ecause the new ceiling price for upper tier oil is less than 
the market price at which it sold during 1975 . 
µ5 U6 
Under the new regulations FEA changed the base production 
control ·1evel from its previous definition, actual production in each 
month of 1972 to a new definition, average monthly production of oil 
subj ect to price controls in 197 5 .  Producers could choose between 
taking the new level or retaining the old . At the same time FEA eli­
minated all existing "cumulative deficiencies . "  
The problem FEA intended to correct by this change was that 
the production level that was profitable at lower tier prices was 
moving further and further below the old BPCL, thus diminishing the 
profits to be obtained from additional production. The effect of 
moving the BPCL to equal the amount of oil being produced when the 
program went into effect is illustrated �n Figure 14.  In 1975 each 
producer who produced only old oil was setting this output at Q1 , the 
point at which marginal cost equalled the price at which old oil could 
be sold an average $5 . 03 .  Such producers would have faced a high base 
production control level, such as BPCL1 , based on production in 1972 . 
By moving the base production control level down to Q1 , FEA insured 
that any producer who increased output above its 1975 level could sell 
the entire increment at upper tier prices . 
The situation was more complex for producers with new and 
released oil in 1975 . Released oil is excluded from the "old" oil 
production rate in computing the BPCL. With released oil ,  marginal 
revenue equalled the world price of oil plus the difference between 
world and controlled prices , about $21,  in December 1975.  Some pro­
ducers who had released oil under the old regulatory system would be 
assigned a BPCL (such as BPCL2 ) lower than the amount of oil they would . 
be willing to produce at $5 . 00 per barrel. However, the extra revenue 
that results from this situation is not changed by output adjustments 
and does not affect revenue from increased production; consequently 
the efficiency of the production is undisturbed .  Such producers 
would reduce output from Q3 to Q2 , because without released oil the
revenue that is derived from selling one additional barrel of oil is 
only $11.  28 . 
Others could be given a base production control level higher 
than Q1 , the point at which addit ional output begins to cost more than 
the lower tier price, and below Q2, the point at which additional output
costs more than the upper tier price. In Figure 14, for example a 
producer with a 1972 production level of Q
1972 
might have chosen in 
1975 to produce at the level Q3 , in response to the incentive of released
oil. Then new oil production in 1975 would be Q3-Q 1972 • Since each 
barrel of new oil released one barrel of old oil from controls , an amount 
of oil equal to Q3-Q1972 must be subtracted from the 1972 output level
(Q1972) to determine how much old oil was being produced in 19 75 . 
Figure 14 is drawn so that the difference between BPCL3 and Q1972 equals
the difference between Q3 and Q1972 • Consequently BPCL3 , the amount 
of price controlled oil produced in 197 5 ,  is the base production control 
level assigned under current FEA regulations . That base production 
control level may be between Q1 and Q2 , 
Whereas under previous regulations , reducing output from Q3 
to Q2 would have reduced revenues by $21 per barrel , it would reduce
revenues by only $11.'.28 under the current system. Consequently it 
would be expected that all wells producing new and released oil would 
reduce output from Q3 to Q2 , the point at which further reduction would
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reduce cost by less than the $11 . 28 per barrel revenue loss . 
However , some producers could still find themselves in a 
situation like that described in the previous section, in which losses 
caused by selling some oil at lower tier prices exceed the profits that 
can be earned selling the remainder at upper tier prices . With re-
leased oil , the same producers could find themselves losing money 
unless production were allowed to fall back to low levels .  I f  the 
area of the triangle ADE were less than the area of the triangle ABC ,  
such a producer would contract to Q1 because any higher output level , 
such as Q2 , would
· reduce profits . This result would be contrary to
the intention of the regulations , which were designed to ensure that 
all domestic oil that could be brought out of the ground at a price of 
$11, 28 or less should be produced . 
Imported oil went into a third tier , because its price re-
mained exempt from controls. 
The initial stage of implementation of EPCA thus set the 
base production control level for each property at approximately the 
rate of production at which the per barrel cost of increasing output 
equalled the lower tier ceiling price. The second stage specified 
a schedule under which the price ceiling would be raised and the base 
production control level lowered . 10
7 
The adjustment in the base production control level is in� · 
tended to prevent the increasing disincentive to production observed 
under the previous set of price controls , which specified a fixed base 
production control level. By eliminating this disincentive the ad-
j ustment eliminated the efficiency loss associated with price controls 
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on fields producing only old oil under EPAA. 
The reduction in BPCL was applied initially only to proper­
ties that had produced no new oil since 1973 . 108 FEA reserved judge- · 
ment at that time on how to calculate special decline rates for pro-
perties "whose product ion levels during 1972-1975 reflected the effects 
of enhanced recovery programs . 11109 Any property that was producing new 
oil between 1973 and 19 7 6  would be granted a reduction in the BPCL only 
after its production remained below the initial fixed BPCL for six 
consecutive months . 
The base production control level is reduced by means of an 
automatic , semi-annual adjustment based on "the actual, annual ave�age 
production decline rate between 1972 and 1975 on a property-by-property 
basis . 11110
The gradual increase in the price of lower tier is based 
on authority which EPCA gave the FEA to increase the average of all 
domestic oil prices at an annual rate not to exceed the rate of an addi-
tional "incentive factor" of 3 percent . The combined incentive and 
inflation factors could not exceed 10 percent . FEA has decided to begin 
by dividing the allowable price increases equally between upper and 
lower tier oil. However, FEA determined that as lower tier oil was 
reclassified upper tier oil, through operation of the BPCL adjustment , 
it would eventually become impossible to continue to raise both price 
ceilings at a rat_e greater than the rate of inflation. That is , the 
entire 3 percent incentive factor would be used up by lower tier oil 
moved to the upper tier . (FEA estimates that lower tier oil will de-
cline from its current 60 pe:cent share of domestic production to 
111 36 percent after three years . ) 
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At the point at which applying allowable price increases 
equally would cause the upper tier price to use less rapidly than the 
rate of inflation, FEA will continue to increase the price of upper 
tier oil at the rate of inflation and will allow the price of lower 
tier oil to decline in real (but not nominal) dollars. 112
Whereas the adjustment in the BPCL was intended to compen-
sate for the effects of naturally declining production rates , the ceiling , 
p-rice adjustment was intended to compensate for the effects of inflation
on costs of production. Inflation could, by shifting the marginal 
cost curve up , have an effect similar and additional to the effect
of reservoir decline. The two actions will roughly result in a situ-
ation in which any increment t9 production that can be obtained
through investment in enhanced recovery will be sold at upper tier
prices.
The schedule of price increases announced by FEA is pre-
sented in Table 8 .  That schedule was delayed because of errors FEA 
found in its initial computation of average prices �13 It may b e  re-
vised further because of price ceiling changes required by the Energy 
Conservation and Production Act of 1976 (ECP.A) . 
That Act amended the EPCA to allow FEA to increase the 
average price of domestic oil by 10 percent per year , regardless of 
the rate of inflation. It also required FEA to use the increased 
pricing flexiblity for two purposes : to provide additional incentives 
to oil production using costly and exotic enhanced recovery methods 
("tertary recovery") and to eliminate regional disparities in lower 
tier price ceilings . These adjustments would raise �he prices at 
Table 8 
FEA's initial schedule of crude prices* 
Lower Tier Upper Tier 
May 15, 1 973, posted Sept 30, 1975, posted 
Month price ($3.901 price ($1 2.60) 
February 1976 l. . . . . . . . . . . . .  PLUS: 1.35 ($5.251 . . . . . . . . . . . .  Ml NUS: 1.32($11.28) • 
2. . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . 1.38 . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . 1.25 
3. . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . 1.41 . . . .  . . . .  . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . .  . l.18 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.11 
5. . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . 1.48 . . . .  . .  . .  . . . .  . .  . .  . .  . . . .  . .  . .  1.05 
6. . . . . . . . . . . .  ' . .  . .  . 1.51 . . . . . . . . . .  : . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . . .  . .  .97 
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.54 . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . .90 
8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
10 . . . . .  ·- . . . . . . . . . . .  1.64 . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . .69 
11. . . .  . .  " . . . . . . . . .  1.68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  � . . . . . . . . . .  .62 
12. . .  . . . . .  - . " . . . .  " 1.71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . � . . . . .  . .  . .55 
February 1977 13. . . . .  . .  . .  . •. . . .  . .  . 1.74 ($5.64) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ·" . . . . .47'$12.13) 
14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.83 . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  .28 
17. . . . . . . .  ·" . . . . . . . .  1.87 . .  . .  . . . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  .21 
18. . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  1.89 . . . . . . . .  ·. . . . . . . .  " . . .  . . .  . .  .15 
19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08 
20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 
21. . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . .  . . . .  1.99 . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  PLUS: .05 
22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 
24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Febr�ary 1978 25. . .  . .  . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  2.12 ($6.021 . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  .33($12.831 
26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.14 . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  .38 
27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .43 
28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
29. . .  . .  . . .  . . . .  . .  . . .  . 2.19 . . . . . . . . . .  : . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  .55 
30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.21 . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  .77 
33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.21 . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .84 
K . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . .  W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . � 
a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . � 
36. .. . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  2.23 . . . .  I. . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . .  . 1.07 
February 1979 37. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  2.23 ($6.131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  l.14($13.741 
38. . .  . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . .  2.25 . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . 1.22 
39. . .  . . .  . . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . 2.26 . . .  . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . 1.29 
40. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.26 ($6.16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l.35i$13.95l 
(•Prices are based on the current rate of innation, and will be revised at &.month 
imervals to reflect changing inflation rates and congressional actions, incl'uding possi­
bly ;in increase in the current 3% incentive rate.) 
Source : Oil and Gas Journal, April 1976 ,  p .  2 6 .
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which significant quantities of crude oil could be sold . According 
to FEA, those price increases would by themselves cause the average 
cost of domestic crude oil to rise above the level allowed by law. 
Consequently, the general ceiling price adjustments announced in April 
114 
1976 could be delayed even further . 
The delay in implementation of ceiling price increases due 
to FEA miscalculations moved the effective date to February 197 7 .  
Further delay due to the price revisions mandated by ECPA and t o  a 
change FEA made in the definition of "property" could delay the 
ceiling price increases to some time between May and October 197 7 .  
The more production responds t o  the ECPA incentive , the longer will 
be the required delay. FEA has indicated that a one-time adjustment 
of the composite price ceiling, which would require Congressional 
action, or a price rollback are alternatives to delayed implementation 
f . 1 . . . 114a o cei ing price increases . 
Even under the schedule of price increases announced in 
April 197 6 ,  crude oil price ceilings would not increase at a rate greater 
than the rate of inflation . Consequently, it is likely that when the 
40 month control program mandated by the EPCA expires there will still 
be a substantial difference between domestic and imported oil prices. 
Few observers expect imported oil proces to increase at anything less 
than the rate of inflation. Consequently problems associated with 
precipitate decontrol , which arose when the EPAA expired and led to 
the passage of the EPCA, are likely to reappear when the EPCA expires. 
'.Che authority recently granted FEA to raise prices at 10 
percent per year , regardless of inflation, would not resolve this 
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prob lem even if price increases began immediately and world oil prices 
increased at a rate of inflat ion well below seven percent . If the 
upper tier price were increased at a rate of seven precent per year , it 
would reach about $14 by the expiration of price controls . If imported 
oil prices rose at a rate greater than one percen� , they would exceed 
$14 by that time. 
ENTITLEMENTS 
Under EPCA the entitlements system b ecame more complex. Its 
goals remained those of ensuring that all refiners incurred the same 
average crude oil cost and that the cost of any incremental barrel 
equalled the nat ionwide average cost of crude oil. But under EPCA 
there were three rather than two tiers of crude oil prices ; costs of 
lower ' tier, upper tier , and uncontrolled oil had to be made equal to 
the average cost of all crude oil. This equalization is accomplished 
by subdividing entitlements .  Ignoring biases introduced by exception 
relief, small refiner bias , and import bias, the value of an entitle-
ment is set equal to the difference between the average price of lower 
tier oil and the average price of uncontrolled imported oil. One full 
entitlement must be purchased to run a barrel of lower tier oil. Upper 
tier qil is fitted into the system by requiring that a fractional en-
titlement be held for each barrel of upper tier in the refinery input . 
The fraction of an entitlement required for each barrel of upper tier 
oil equals the ratio of the difference between the price of imports 
and the upper tier price to the difference between the price ·of imports 
and the lower tier price. 115
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The import bias was introduced "to preserve [ the] incentives 
for refining domestic crude oil11116 that were provided by the 21¢ oil
import fee. It was introduced at the initiative of FEA, which set 
bias at a fixed 21 cents per barrel , and amended entitlement regula-
tions to provide that "the entitlement price will be the exact differ-
ential between the weighted average costs to refiners of old oil and 
of imported crude oil less 21¢ . 11117
The upper tier entitlement fraction was adjusted similarly. 
Its formula can be expressed as : 
Upper tier entitlement fraction = 
(average price of imports - average upper tier price - $ . 21)-
(average price of impqrts average lower tier price - $ . 21) 
=· . 178 in Apirl 197 6 .  
With these rules an average barrel o f  lower tier oil cost the control 
price, $ 5 . 48 in April 197 6 ,  plus the value of one entitlement , $7 . 85 
in that month , or $13 . 33 • An average barrel of upper tier cost the 
control price , $11 . 9 4 ,  plus the cost of the required fraction of an 
entitlement , $1. 40 or $13 . 34 .  A barrel of imported oil costs an average 
$13 . 55 . 118 The difference between the post-entitlement cost of domes-
tic oil and the cost of imports is the fixed 21 cent import bias in 
the entitlement system. 
As in the ent�tlement system that existed under EPCA, every 
refiner receives a basic allocation of entitlements .  The basic allo-
cation reflects the national average proportions of lower tier , upper 
tier, and uncontrolled (imported and stripper) oil in refinery runs . 119
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Increasing refinery inputs by one barrel (of oil in any category) 
gives the refiner an addit ional fraction of an entitlement· The value 
of that fract ional entitlement is sufficient to reduce the perceived 
cost of domestic oil to the average cost of crude oil, $10 . 50 in January 
1976.  The cost of incremental imported oil is 21¢ greater than the 
national average. 
When EPCA regulations were formulated, Special Rule Numb er 6 
was still in effect . That rule exempted small refiners from the obli-
gation to purchase entit lements , on a sliding scale related to size.  
In May 1976 FEA replaced Special Rule 6,  which provided large benefits 
to some small refiners and no benefits to others , with a more generous 
formulation of the basic small refiner bias . 
Until this action, the basic bias provided small refiners 
with more entitlements than they would receive if their basic allocation 
were d etermined by the same rule applied to larger refiners .  The num-
ber of additional entitlements granted was related to size. The bias 
gave small refiners a subsidy that rose from zero for a 175 , 000 barrel 
per day refiner to 2 . 4  cents per gallon for a refiner with 10 , 000 barrels 
per day capacity or less.  
FEA rescinded Special Rule Number 6 on May 12 , 197 6 , which in-
creased the entitiements bias for all small refiners. The number of 
additional entitlements given refiners with capacity under 10 , 000 barrels 
per day was increased from 123 . 8  per 1000 barrels per day capacity to 
222 . 8  per 1000 barrels . At the May 1976 price of entitlements that 
amounted to a 4 . 4¢ per gallon subsidy . 120 Larger refiners were granted
smaller per gallon subsidie� , on a schedule graphed in Figure 15 . 
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A refiner with capacity of 100 , 000 barrels per day received a . 24¢ 
per gallon S__llbsidy, the same as it had received prior to May 12 . 120a
The benefits of the increased small refiner b ias went exclusively to 
refiners with capacities under 100 , 000 barrels per day. 
FEA stated two reasons for increasing the small refiners bias : 
" when the entitlements program was instituted in late 1974 • • •
FEA determined that [a b ias equal to] the historical preference 
granted to small refiners under the oil import program as in ef­
fect in 1972 was sufficient to preserve the competitive viability 
of that class.  However , over the first year that the program was 
in effect FEA received substantial evidence that the b ias may not 
in fact be adequate for its intended purpose" . 
"In addition, FEA is basin� its determinations to increase the 
small refiner bias to a significant extent on the congressional 
concern for small refiners • • •  11120b
Entitlements granted to each refiner are also adjusted in some 
cases to reflect imports of refined petroleum products and production 
of residual fuel oil ( for refiners selling in the Northeastern States) . 121
PRODUCT PRICE CONTROLS 
The EPCA required that refiners pass through their decreased 
crude oil costs (resulting from the price rollback) on a dollar for 
dollar basis and that they allocate the cost decreases proportionately 
to each product.  A the time of passage of EPCA, FEA estimated that 
refiners had banked about $1 . 2  billion in banked costs. Subj ect to 
certain restrictions , they were allowed to retain those banks and apply 
them to reduce price rollbacks . Despite that provision, gasoline prices 
dropped over 1 cent per gallon in two months after rollback. 122
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Figure 15 
Small Refiner Bias in Entitlements 
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Such a fall is exactly what would be expected in a competi-
tive oil industry with price controls at the crude oil level alone. 
If competition sets refined product prices on the basis of marginal 
costs,  the fact that producers incurred costs in the past which were 
not covered by increased revenues is irrelevant to current pricing or 
production decisions . The drop in gasoline prices was less than the 
reduction in average crude oil costs that resulted from the rollbacks 
of upper tier prices. The difference may be explained by the in-
creased demand for gasoline .that would result from lower prices . 
With increased demand refiners can expand output somewhat , raising 
incremental refining costs and thus increasing the markup on crude oil 
costs that is required to cover refining costs.  Such a development 
is normal in competitive markets ,  and would not imply that refiners 
were obtaining windfalls from reduced crude oil prices . 
Early in 1976 FEA granted refiners substantially increased 
discretion in how they allocated increased costs among products ,  and 
broadened somewhat the definition of allowable costs . 123
Decontrol Actions 
During 1976 FEA has proposed , and Congress has approved , re­
moval of price controls and mandatory allocation requirements on all 
maj or petroleum products except gasoline and j et fuel . The rationale 
for these decontrol actions was that product price ceilings were 
generally above the levels that prices would reach on free markets ,  
and that removal o f  controls would make for more efficient and compe-
t itive markets .  
The EPCA allowed F EA  t o  propose elimination of mandatory 
allocation and price controls on any category of refined products ,  
subj ect .to the condition that FEA must first make three findings :  
" • • . that such oil or refined product category is longer 
in short supply and that exempting such oil or refined 
product category would not have an adve�se impact on the 
supply of any other oil or refined product • • •  " 
" • . • that competition and market forces are adequate to 
protect consumers and that exempting such oil or refined 
product category will not result in inequitable prices 
for any class of users of such oil or product • • •  " 
that exemption is "consistent with the obj ectives" of 
the EPAA. 
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In addition any proposed exemption must be accompanied by "a state-
ment of the President ' s  views as to the potential imports (if any) 
of such (exemption) amendment . • •  11
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In March 1976 FEA proposed elimination of mandatory allo-
cation and price controls on residual fuel oil, used as boiler fuel 
by electric utilities , industry, and large residential complexes . The 
FEA based its proposal on four findings : 
1) Residual fuel oil is not in short supply , in that adequate 
refining capacity exists , to satisfy U . S .  demand in conjunc-
tion with available imports .  
2)  Exemption of residual fuel oil would not have an adverse 
impact on the supply of any other oil or refined products .  
3 )  Compet ition and market forces are adequate t o  protect con-
sumers . 
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4) Exemption of residual fuel oil would not result in inequit­
able prices for any class of . . • product user.
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The FEA analysis relied heavily on the existence of banked 
costs to establish that residual fuel oil prices would not rise if con-
trols were removed . The analysis of price ceilings on refiners in 
Section III of the study and the drop in gasoline prices after crude 
oil prices fell despite cost banks support the conclusion that when 
banked costs exist , decontrol of product prices would either leave 
unchanged or reduce market prices . The price reduction can occur if 
refiners are subj ect to different ceilings . If the marginal supplier 
in such a market is selling at a market determined price, lower than 
its price ceiling , and others are selling at lower effective ceiling 
prices , low cost production from previously controlled refiners can 
substitute for the high cost production of the marginal supplier . 
FEA supplemented this argument with a discussion of the 
residual fuel oil market shares of maj or and independent refiners ,  
which they believed showed the competitive nature of that market . 
FEA concluded that "the relative market share of maj or refiners has 
declined considerably during the period 1972-1975 while large ind e­
pendent and small refiners have had a corresponding increase. 1 1126
In 1975 maj or refiners had a 36 . 4% market share and nonmaj ors' 36 . 1% .  
I n  addition, in 1975 no::-refiner marketers controlled 27 . 5% of the 
market . According to FEA, nonmaj or refiners and independent marketers 
"have a record of price competitiveness . 11127
About 60 percent of the residual fuel oil consumed in the 
Northeastern United States is imported from Carribbean refiners . 128
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In those states the price of domesticly refined residual fuel oil was 
about equal to the price of imported res idual. FEA argued that under 
these conditions further increases in the price of residual fuel oil 
were unlikely to result from decontrol ,  because domestic prices could 
not exceed the price o f  imports and the price of imports was unlikely 
to rise because of decontro1 . 128a
At the same time it proposed decontrol of residual fuel oil, 
FEA altered the entitlement program for East Coast imports of residual 
fuel oil . It granted importers (refiner and non-refiner) of residual 
fuel oil three-t enths of an entitlement for each barrel of residual im-
ported into the northeastern states . FEA also penalized domestic re-
finers one-half an entitlement for each barrel of residual fuel oil 
refined domest ically and sold in the Northeastern states .  The first 
5000 barrels of such residual production by any refiner was exempted 
from this reduction in ent itlements .  
The purpose of these adj ustments was t o  remove an anomaly 
that had existed in me east coast market without increasing the price 
of residual oil in that or any other region. Prior to the change, a 
Virgin Islands refinery owned by Amerada Hess had enj oyed a signifi-
cant cost advantage over other importers . Despite its offshore loca-
tion, the Hess refinery was considered domestic and received entitle-
ment benefits for all the foreign crude oil it refined . Competing 
importers were at. a substantial cost disadvantage ,  and lost significant 
market shares to Hess.  
The adj ustments reduced the cost advantage which domestic 
refiners enj oyed over foreign refiners to $ . 60 per barrel . FEA claimed 
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that this advantage would place product importers "under substantial 
market pressure to passthrough the maximum amount of entitlement b ene­
fits received whether or not price controls remain in effect. 11129
FEA concluded that the changes should "effectively prevent 
any price increases in the East Coast residual fuel oil market . 
• . •  [E]ntitlement benefits that would otherwise have b een available for 
domestic residual fuel oil produced or sold in the East Coast will b e  
reduced 50% , subj ect to the ·first 5000 B/D exemption. The amount of
this reduction is expected to be approximately equal t o  the amount 
of entitlement benefits that will be provided to imports of residual 
fuel oil. ,.l30
Congress approved the proposed decontrol when the House nar-
rowly failed to pass a resolution of disapproval . 
On June 16 , 1976,  FEA proposed removal of mandatory alloca-
tion and price controls from middle distillates -- including home 
heating oils , diesel fuel , and kerosene. The proposal was accompanied 
by the same statutorily required findings that were made in the case of 
residual fuel oil . Again , FEA based those findings on the argument 
that no price increases would result from decontrol b ecause existing 
price ceilings exceeded market levels -- and that the "market share of 
large, integrated refiners has been decreasing since 197 2 ,  while that 
of the large independent and small refiners has been increasing . 11131
FEA did , however , express the intention of taking corrective 
action if distillate prices rose by 2 cents per gallon more than would 
be predicted if controls remained in effect . 132 Essentially, that ca-
veat meant that FEA would act if prices rose above the level to be 
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expected in a long-run competitive equilibrium. Some Congressional 
leaders argued , opposing decontrol of distillate, that distillate 
prices would increase to the level of imported products . 133 Oil in-
dustry spokemen, on the other hand , argued that the 2 cents per gallon 
increase above a base proj ection and the proj ection itself were so low 
that reimposition of controls could occur even if competitive pricing 
policies were followed . 134
Imported distillates run under 5% of U. S .  output of distil-
late as compared to the 60 percent characteristic of residual fuel 
oi1. 134a Adequate refining capacity exists that 100% of residual 
fuel requirements could be satisfied from domestic refineries , prob-
ably at a cost per additional barrel little above the current price.  
Because U . S .  refineries have lower crude oil costs than foreign re-
- fineries (because of domestic price controls) ,  only substantial inef-
ficiency in U. S .  refineries (compared to foreign operations) would 
prevent the U. S .  refineries from eliminating imports before domestic 
prices rose to the price of imports .  Consequently , except in areas 
where transport cost give imported distillate a clear advantage over 
U. S .  competition, domestic distillate prices are likely to be inde-
pendent of the price of imports.  
Gasoline and some j et fuel prices remained controlled , and 
as of Decemb er 1976 FEA had not formally proposed removal of price 
controls and mandatory allocations. Substantial cost banks for gaso-
line do exist : they have , however, declined from a high of $485 mil-
lion in April 1975 to $242 million in January 197 6 .  (January 1975 
banks were $431 million) . 135 The crucial technical and political
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quest ion regarding gasoline price control is likely to be the trend 
in market shares of independent refiners and marketers. 
The share of n·m-branded independents - service stations not 
selling under a brand name belonging to a refiner nor affiliated with 
a refiner -- rose from an October 1974 level of 7 . 4% to a May 1976 
level of 11. 5% .  However, since 1972 the market share o f  "branded 
independent service stations" -- those selling under a maj or brand 
name but owned or leased by its operator -- has declined steadily 
Between October 1974 and May 1976 branded independents share fell 
from 79 . 3% to 7 1 . 7 % .  Sales from gasoline stat ions owned b y  refiners 
increased from 13 . 3% to 16 . 8% of gasoline sales during the same period. 136
On November 16 , 1976 FEA issued its "Preliminary Findings 
and Views Conceiving the Exemption of Motor Gasoline" and expressed 
an intention of proposing exemption when the 95th Congress convened . 
rhe preliminary report details the following findings : 
that supply and demand for motor gasoline are in balance ,  
and adequate refining capacity exists to keep prices from 
rising save to reflect increased crude oil costs . 
that there is sufficient competition in refining distribu- · 
tion and marketing to protect consumers . 
that exemption would not result in inequitable prices to 
any user because no price increase is proj ected to occur as a 
result of exemption. 
The report also provided more current information on market 
shares . Table 9 reveals a small but steady increase in the market 
shares of large independent and small refiners , and a similar small 
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Table 9 
R E F I NE R  S U A R E S  ( l'Tr ncr·=.!!.!1._ o P'  TOTAi. MOTOR CA S O L irrn SA!.F.S 
�·o tAl .Motor Ll>r9c X...r90 Casolinc Sr.le Intc9rntcd Indopcndont Smzill (Million� of C'unrtcr Rcfinci-" Refiners R<?!incr'l Co l l on = >  1972 
J4n-l·lll.r 74.1 0 . 4  17 . 5 23,139 llpr-Juno 74 . 0  8. 0 18. 0 25, 62G July-Sept 73. 6 · 8 . 2 18 . 2  26, 4 93 Oet-D<?c 72. 8 8 . 4 18 . 8  2 5 , 324 ANNUAL 73 . S 8. 3  l.0 . 2 100, 531 19'13 
J.on-Mar 72. 8 8 . 5  1 8 . 7  24 , 5 � G  Apr-June 75. 0 7 . 6  17. 4 2 6 , C 9 8  July-Sept 75 . 0  7 . 5  17 . 5 2 7 , 6 0 G  Oct-Dec 73 . 2 7 . B  u :·o 25, 972 ANNUAL 7 4 . l  7 . 8  1 8 . 1  104, 822 1974 
Jan-Mar 72. 8 8 . 0  19 . 2 �2, 9 35 Apr-June 73 . 6  1 . 1  18.7 2 6 , 277 July-Sept 7 4 . 4  G . 9  1 8 . 7  27, 291 Oct-o"'°' 7 2 . 6  7. 6 19 . 8  26, 370 Al-.'NUAL 73 • .3 7 . 6  19 . l  102,873 
1975 
Jan-M�r n. 6 8 . 4  2 0 . 0  24 , 158 Apr-Jun I!! 72 . 0 7 . 8  2 0 . 2  2 7 , 315 July-Sept 73 . 0  7 . 3  l.9. 7  2 7 , 8-70 O<:t-Dcc 71.. 6 8 . Q  20. 4 2 6 , 9l4 ANNUAL 72. 0 'M 20.J. 106,256 
1976 
Jan-Mar 71.l. 8 . 6  2 0 . 3  25 , � 07 Apr-June 71.2 7.9 20.9· 28,670 
Sourco:s F&A Refiner Survey (F&A P•305-s-o and P•JOG-H�O) , 
Source: FEA " Preliminary Findings Views" Exemption of Motor Gasoline " 
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decrease (1 percentage point per year) in the share of large integrated 
refiners . Table 10 reveals that in 1976 market shares of gasoline re-
tailers appear to have s�abiliz ed , with refiner marketers maintaining 
a share a bit over 17 percent , non-branded independents a share just 
over 11 percent , and branded independents a share just under 72 percent . 
FEA claims that 
These trends indicate the continuing viability of independent 
refiners and nonbranded independent marketers . The reduction of 
lessee dealer outlets is part of a general marketing trend away 
from low-volume sales outlets which tend to have higher average 
prices and is a consequence primarily of the combined forces of 
(1) a shift in consumer preferences to less service in return for 
lower price and (2) the general inflation in the costs of providing 
fuel service that raises the minimum gallonage required for a viable 
full service operation. 137
FEA implicitly exculpates the price control and entitlements 
programs from responsibility for the higher prices charged by branded 
independents . This conclusion may be questioned , for reasons described 
in the next section. If the gasoline price control and allocation pro� 
grams are responsible for the using share of independent , unbranded 
marketers , exemption could reverse that trend. 
Table 10 
J 
U . S .  MllRKET SllJIRES OF CJ\SOLINE SERVICE STJITIONS 
1974 October 
November 
Dcccrnbcr 
1975 Janu"ry 
Fcbrull.ty 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1976 January 
February 
March 
.April 
May 
June 
(Pl P:reliminary 
(Pl . 
Callonaqe Sales by Type of Service St"t!o� 
Non-
u. s. Ref./ branded Branaec! 
Total Mrktrs. Indcpen. Indcecn. 
10 0 . 0  
100 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
100 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
100 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
l O O . o  
!00 . 0  
100 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
10 0 . Q  
1 0 0 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
100 . 0  
10 0 . 0  
1 00 . 0  
loo . o  
13. 3 
13 . S  
14 . 0  
15 . 3  
14 . 5  
15. l  
14 . G  
14 . 8  
14 . 8  
1 4 . (  
14 . 9  
15 . 4  
15. 4  
15 . 6  
17 . 2  
17 . 2  
17.2 
17.S 
1 7 . 0  
1 7 . 1  
1 7 . 3  
7 . 4 
8 . 3  
9 . 0  
9 . 1  
9 . 6  
9 . 6  
1 0 . 2  
9 . 7, 
9 . 7  
9 . 6  
1 0 . 2 
1 0 . 3  
10 . 7  
1 1 . l  
l l . l  
l l .  7 
11 . 3  
lo. a 
11. 0  
ll . 3  
11. 2  
7 9 . 3  
7 8 . 2  
7 6 . 9  
75 . 6  
75 . 9  
75 . 3  
7 5 . 2  
7 5 . 5  
7 5 . 5  
7 6 .  0 
74 . 9  
7 4 . J  
7 3 . 9  
7 3 . 4  
71 . 7 
71 . l  
71.S 
71.7 
72 . 0  
'll.6 
71. S 
Source : FEA. Petroleum Market Shares l!epo:rt on Retail Gasoline Sales. 
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Sou=ce : EA "Prelio.inary Findings and Views Exemption o f  Motor 
Gasoline " 
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V :  EVALUATION OF CURRENT PROGRAM 
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
The new crude oil price regulat ions reduced the disincentive 
to increased production from existing properties that was created 
under the old ,  two tier system. Roughly , any increase in the output 
from an existing property above the production rate at which marginal 
cost equals the lower tier price can be sold a t  upper tier prices . 
The new regulations also removed the distortions created by released 
oil. However, the upper tier price at which incremental production 
and new oil must be sold is over $ 2 . 00 b elow the cost of imported oil. 
Consequently some domestic production that would cost less,  per barrel, 
than imported oil is probably foregone. 
Effects on Production from Existing Properties 
The rollback of upper tier price is not likely to be a signi-
ficant hindrance to maximum production from existing properties . Some 
of that production could come from enhanced recovery proj ects , which 
involve relatively large, discrete investments that will provide an 
acceptable rate of return at oil prices of either $11 . 28 or $13 . 50 
per barrel . During 19 75 FEA estimated that at least half of the oil 
that would be produced using enhanced recovery if prices were decon­
trolled would also be produced with $7 . 00 per barrel prices . 138 The 
exemption of tertiary recovery proj ects from controls is likely to 
allow most enhanced recovery projects profitable at uncontrolled 
prices to proceed . FEA estimates that the exemption will increase oil 
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production by 300 , 000 barrels in 197 9 . 139
This conclusion would be reinforced if it were known that 
oil producers believed price controls would end after 40 months . The 
life of a new well or an enhanced recovery project is sufficiently long 
that revenues during the first 40 months are not crucial to the invest-
ment decision. 
However ,  uncertainty about price controls can make delay in 
some enhanced recovery projects a wise· strategy. In some cases a 
producer has two mutually exclusive alternatives : a low cost invest-
ment that would be optimal if price controls continue indefinitely, and 
a high-cost investment that would be j ustified by higher reputed prices 
if controls were to end in 40 months . Because of the penalties at-
tached to guessing wrong on controls , producers may decide to wait , 
making no new investments until the future of controls is more clear . 140
A schedule of price increases for domestic crude oil can also 
provide an incent ive to delay investment in enhanced recovery proj ects. 141
If prices increase at a 10 percent annual rate, an oil producer can 
earn capital gains at a rate of 10 percent a year by leaving oil in the 
ground . Although generally not sufficient to justify shutt ing down 
wells , these expected price increases could tip the balance against 
some enhanced recovery proj ects that would be marginally profitable 
if begun immediately. With rising prices , it can ·be optimal to wait 
to begin an investment proj ect until significantly after the date at 
which its present value first becomes positive. 142 That decision would 
not , however, reflect any social value of delaying increased production. 
The price increases that result from redefinition of lower 
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tier oil as upper tier would not provide an incentive to delay imple-
mentation of an enhanced recovery proj ect if the base production con-
trol level shifts plann�a by FEA worked in an ideal fashion. The BPCL 
for properties producing lower tier oil is intended to decline at a rate 
such that efforts to arrest the natural decrease in output from a pro-
perty will be rewarded by permission to sell the additional output re-
sulting from those efforts at upper tier prices . 
In more technical terms , the intent of FEA was to shift the 
production control level to the left at the same rate as the marginal 
cost curve shifts (see Figure 8 ) • In that case, net revenue from in-
creased production will be the same, no matter when the increased rate 
of production is begun . 
By applying the same decline rate to all fields , FEA failed 
to achieve this ideal system. But it is almost impossible to say what 
would have happened to production from a property if efforts to main-
tain production had not been made. Although the FEA system retains 
some disincentive to such efforts , since the BPCL adjustment will be 
inadequate for some properties , the uniform approach has merits on 
grounds of administrative feasibility. 
On the other hand , expected increases in the price of upper 
tier oil greater than those required to cover inflation would create 
the incentive to delay investment . Under the current schedule, that 
incentive will not exist , but accelerating the pace of price increases 
to achieve parity between domestic and world prices in three years 
could provide a significant incentive. 
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There is some evidence that FEA' s . revisions of lower tier 
price controls did provide an incentive to increasing production from 
existing properties . In October 1976 the Oil and Gas Journal reported 
that activity directed at renovating and increasing production from 
existing fields had · reached the highest level reported since 1973. 143
Effects on Exploration and Development 
Upper tier price controls are more likely to retard explora-
tion and development of new oil properties than they are to deter invest-
ment in enhanced recovery. Until the change to the three tier price 
system, all production from a well drilled on a new property could be 
sold at uncontrolled prices . The new price regulations rolled that 
price back by over $2 . 00 ($1 . 35 plus the increase in the price of im­
ports between September 1975 and January 1976) . 
It is clear that the price rollback cannot have encouraged 
additional exploration and development of new oil reserves , but it is 
difficult to quantify the resulting loss.  The rollback may not b e  
large enough to make more than a few projects that would b e  profitable 
at work prices unprofitable at controlled prices. Or, producers 
may expect the ceiling to end after three years and consequently give 
a little weight in proj ecting revenues over the life of a proj ect . One 
piece of evidence regarding the effect of the rollback comes from 
examination of the number of drilling rigs in operation before and 
after it took place. The Hughes rig count is an accepted measure of 
activity directed at developing new supplies of oil. In December 1975 
the rig count was 1973;  in February 1976 it had fallen to 1594. 144
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That drop was widely intepreted as a sign of the effects of the price 
rollback, despite the fact that the rig count has been high in Decemb er 
and low in January every year since 1973. 
The drop in the rig count between Janu�ry and May 197 6 ,  on 
the other hand , is statistically significant . Drilling activity in 
those months is almost certainly below the growth trend established in 
1973-1975 . Total footage drilled in January through March 1975 is also 
significantly below the trend : the chances are about 92 out of a 
hundred that the drop is not due to chance . (see the Appendix for 
discussion of the statistical analysis) . However, on this evidence 
alone it is impossible to assign responsib ility for the drop to the 
rollback in upper tier prices , because it could also be due to the 
elimination of released oil. 
If there was a substantial amount or redrilling of existing 
properties to obtain "released" oil -- and a marginal revenue on the 
order of $14 to $21 -- then drilling would be expected to drop off 
when released oil was eliminated . That reduction in activity would , 
on the argument iri Section III , represent a new welfare increase ,  be-
cause of the economic inefficiency involved in expanding redrilling 
until production costs were well above the price of imports.  
By October 1976 drilling activity had climbed back to a 
level higher than that achieved in October 1975. 145 Whether activity
remains significantly below the level that would be expected based on 
;pa�t growth trends has not been determined . In any event , considerably 
more sophisticated analysis would be required to reach a more precise 
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and quantitative qonclusion regarding the impact of controls on explor­
ation. 'Whatever the impact , any decline in oil production that would 
result from a decline in exploration and development would not eventuate 
for several years . 
The annual welfare loss that such a decline in production 
could cause can be bounded roughly by comparing proj ections of U. S .  
oil production in 1985 with and without price controls . With some 
crude interpolations , one can infer from FEA proj ections thar maintain-
ing a ceiling price of about $11 . 50 (in constant dollars) until 1985 
would reduce U . S .  oil production by about 1 . 1  million barrels per day 
in 1985 . 146
Since upper tier prices are about $2 per barrel less than cur­
rent price of imports and production prevented by that price must cosb 
somewhere between upper tier and import prices , a reasonable estimate of 
the cost of the 1 . 1  million barrels per day production is $12 per barrel, 
$1 less than the price of imports . If that production could be obtained 
at a price $1 less than the price of imports , the annual welfare loss 
would be about $400 million. The loss resulting from temporary price 
controls is likely to be smaller unless considerable reduction of invest-
ment in anticipation of rising prices occurs . 
Price Differentials 
Current price regulations governing crude oil also preserve 
price differentials in existence in 1973. Changing market conditions 
may make those differentials inappropriate.  One example of such a situa­
t ion is heavy California crude oil. That oil . was subj ect through 1976 to a 
lower t ier ceiling price of $4 . 21 per barrel, about $1 per barrel below 
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the lower tier ceiling for identical oil in other areas of the coun-
try . 147 On August 15 , 1975 FEA refused to revise the California ceiling,
on the grounds that "there was no evidence to support the conclusion that 
a special upward price adj ustment for California would result in more 
increased production than would result if the same price adjustment 
were applied in other areas of the nation. 11148 FEA was at that ti.me 
authorized to revise ceilings only when so doing would contribute to 
increased oil production. 
The ECPA, passed in August 197 6 ,  changed the situation, man-
dating a revision of California prices . An adjustment for California 
heavy oil has been proposed by FEA, but when this study was completed 
it had not b een adopted. FEA predicted that such revision could increase 
California production. by 40 , 000 barrels per day over two to three years .
148a
Heavy California oil is particularly suited to refining into 
residual fuel oil. Currently, high prices of imported residual fuel 
are leading to a shift in domestic refining yield patterns toward pro­
duction of residual fuel oil�49 Consequently a shift toward increased 
product ion of heavy oils would appear j ustified in light of new market 
conditions . The exist ing lower tier ceiling on California oil prevents 
an effective signal being sent to California producers of the need for 
such a shift . 
Some analysts ,  however, cont ent that the lower price for 
California heavy oil is j ustified by local conditions . Demand for 
gasoline and low sulfur fuel oil is higher in California than in the 
rest of the country, due to air quality requirements , climatic conditions 
and driving patterns . California refineries are not equipped to process 
heavy, high sulfur o.ils. into these product s ,  and consequently demand 
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for heavy oil is weaker than in other parts of the nation. These cir­
cumstances could j ustify a regionally lower price. 150
Effects on Demand 
Welfare losses due to consumer response to average cost pric­
�ng of oil are an intrinsic part of effective crude oil price controls . 
Entitlements provide a subsidy to imports by causing refined product 
prices to reflect average crude oil costs even though oil must be im-
ported to satisfy demand at those prices . The subsidy is an inevitable 
result of the decision to use domestic crude oil price controls to hold 
down prices facing consumers . Because of the subsidy, price controls 
result in an inefficiently high level of demand for imports. Consumers 
are offered petroleum products as if the marginal cost of production in­
cluded crude oil inputs at $10 per barrel, whereas the true marginal 
cost curve is at least three dollars higher (for any demand levels that 
imply imports) . 
The difference between average refiner cost of crude oil, 
including domestic oil and imports , was about $3 . 00 during 1975 . 151
In May 1976 the differential was also about $ 3 . 00 ,  the rollback in 
domestic prices being roughly equalled by the removal of the tariff 
that existed during 1976) . Between mid 1975 and mid 1976 the average 
refiner acquisition cost of all oil was about $10 . 50. 
Consequently, decontrol of all oil would raise the cost of 
crude oil passed on to consumers by about 30 percent , as it would have 
in 197 5 .  The welfare loss due to the increased consumption that results 
from holding prices below marginal cost would therefore be about the 
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same as it was estimated earlier -- something under $1. 5 billion an­
nually . Because of lags in the adjustment of production and demand 
to price, it would take several years after decontrol for this increase 
in welfare to appear . 
Income Transfer 
Under current conditions crude oil price controls also trans­
fer to oil consumers over $15 billion per year of revenue that would go 
to domestic oil producers and owners of oil fields of all oil sold at 
world prices. In May 197 6 ,  refineries processed 140 million barrels 
of crude purchased at an average lower tier price of $ 5 . 50,  and 110 
million barrels of upper tier crude oil purchased at an average price 
of $12 . 50 .  If , instead , refineries had purchased these 250 million 
barrels at the average refiner ' s  acquisition cost of import s ,  $13 . 50 ,  
they would have spent an additional $1, 285 million in May. 152 As­
suming that all these costs were passed through to consumers , and con­
verting them to annual figures , the petroleum products would have cost 
about $15 billion more in 197 6 .  
Price controls on upper tier oil alone are responsible, ac­
cording to these figures , for an annual income transfer of $1, 985 mil­
lion. 
PRODUCT PRICE CONTROLS AND MANDATORY ALLOCATION 
Gasoline represents about one-half of the volumetric output 
of U. S .  refineries . Continued price controls on gasoline mean both the 
refining and marketing sector are subj ect to significant , direct price 
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regulation by FEA. The basic analys is of refinery price controls pre-
sented in Section III remains relevant : those controls will create a 
situation in which gasoline is not refined at the least total cost 
across the nation, as long as some refiners are subj ect to effective 
price ceilings . 
Moreover , the problem of allocating increased costs among 
petroleum products to ret�in appropriate price differentials remain , 
because FEA regulations issued subsequent to decontrol of residual 
oil and middle distillates specify that costs allocated to decontrolled 
d b d . h · 1 · . l "  153pro ucts may not e use to raise t e cei ing price on gaso ine. 
These prob lems are exacerbated by the prevalence in 
petroleum refining of costs not directly connected to any particular 
product.  Such costs cannot be allocated properly save by examining 
the characteristics of demand , a function performed by markets in the 
absence of price controls . 
FEA entered an exceedingly murky area when it specified rules 
for allocating costs among products .  Even within the oil industry 
and prior to the imposition of price controls , there was no agreement 
on the proper method of allocating costs among refined product cate­
gories . 154 In the long run , a decision to change a refinery ' s  product
mix may result in changed equipment and purchase of different types of 
crude oil . Changes in cost s which result can provide some hints as to 
appropriate prices for different products.  However, many costs are 
unaffected by change in product mix , especially in the short run . 
Under these conditions , economically efficient pricing of petroleum 
products requires that the response of demand to prices be taken into 
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account . Consequently no fixed allocation of costs among products 
can avoid losses in efficiency when demand characteristics are chang­
ing . FEA ' s  rules for allocating cost increases among products may have 
b een necessary to make auditing and enforcement of price controls feas­
ible, 155 but unless they were ineffective it is very unlikely they 
resulted in relative prices of refined products that would encourage 
economically efficient resource allocation. 
When all products were subj ect to price controls , FEA regula-
t ions gave refiners some discretion in allocating increased costs among 
refined products . Now that gasoline and j et fuel alone remain control-
led , and FEA rules specify precisely how costs must be allocated , 
maintaining appropriate price differentials among products is nearly 
impossible. 
Competition in Gasoline Retailing 
Various features of the price control and allocation program 
combine with customary practice� of the oil industry to reduce competi-
tion in the gasoline marketing sector. The absence of normal competitive 
markets is suggested by the substantially different prices charged by 
retail outlets of the same type in the same location. Some such differ-
entials have always exis�ed , because of brand identification, credit 
cards,  and minor locational advantages . However ,  in the past price 
wars were also evidence of active competition among retail outlets ; 
they have almost disappeared. 
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Effects on Refiners 
Reta�lers purchase gasoline at different prices , depending 
on how their suppliers are affected by entitlements and product price 
controls.  Without effective product price controls , inequalities in 
crude oil costs created by the entitlements program would not neces­
sarily create unequal product prices . They would , however , give low 
cost refiners an opportumity to increase their market share if they 
could increase refinery output without increasing unit costs suffi­
ciently to erase the crude oil cost advantage. To increase market 
share , low cost refiners and marketers purchasing gasoline from them 
might hold prices below the level that would give acceptable profits 
to high cost refiners and marketers . 
If price controls were effective , they would force inde­
pendent refiners and marketers to sell at lower prices than some maj or 
referers and branded retailers . The price differential could still 
drive some brantled independent retailers out of business , thus in­
creasing the market share of all other retailers including nonbranded 
independents .  However, the effective price ceiling would prevent 
smaller refiners from increasing output , if unit costs are increased 
when output is increased. Consequently the decreasing share of branded 
independents would be more likely to result in an increasing share of 
retail ou�lets owned by the maj or refiners than in an increasing share 
of unbranded independents .  
In different regions of the country both effects are likely 
to be observed . Some refiners have adequate cost banks (or initially 
high price ceilings) to be effectively uncontrolled ; others may not . 
160 
Effects on Retailers 
Because of the small refiner bias , the twenty or so large, 
integrated refiners face higher crude oil costs than do some smaller , 
independent refiners .  The integrated refiners customarily control 
the flow of gasoline all the way down the distribution chain . Re­
tailers selling under maj or brand names have , for the most part , signed 
contracts that prevent them from shopping around for low priced gaso­
line; they must take delivery of gasoline from distributors designa­
ted by the refiner . Consequently independent branded retailers ob­
tain relatively little gasoline from refiners benefitting from the 
small refiner bias . 
Independent unbranded marketers obtain gasoline supplies in 
equal proportion from small and independent refiners and from large 
integrated refiners . The small refiner bias may make gasoline produced 
by such refiners less expensive than gasoline produced by maj or re­
finers , although economies of scale in refining suggest that other 
things b eing equal, integrated refiners would have lower costs . 
Independent unbranded retailers may also benefit from the 
purchaser-supplier freeze and the penalties which FEA imposes on 
changes in the price differentials between various classes of purchasers . 
Price control and allocation programs enab led purchasers in ariy cate­
gory that obtained gasol ine at discount prices from maj or refiners during 
1972 , base year of the purchaser-supplier freeze,  to continue to obtain 
gasoline on relatively favorab le terms . There do not appear to be 
any quantitative estimates of how this has changed the cost of gasoline 
to independent , unbranded marketers from what it would be absent the FEA 
regulatory program. 
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If maj or, integrated refiners charge branded independent 
dealers significantly more for gasoline than the price paid by un­
branded dealers , branded independent dealers would be unable to lower 
their prices sufficiently to compete with unbranded dealers and still 
earn a profit . The natural result of this situation would be the 
persistence of price differentials and a declining market share of
independent branded dealers . 
Refiner owned and operated stations may be able to survive 
on low�r profit margins than dealer-owned stations if refiners anti­
cipate the end of the FEA regulatory program. The long run profita­
bility of gasoline retailing might provide a corporation with lar
_
ge
financial resources an acceptable return on investment , whereas an 
independent owner of a single stat ion would be unable to survive 
several years of reduced income from his sole source of livelihood . 
Price Competition 
In addition to these effects of FEA regulations on gasoline 
price differentials, the requirement that refiners treat all purchasers 
in a certain group equally makes price wars very expensive. Price 
wars were in many instances the mechanism by which price differentials 
at the retail ievel were removed . 
Product price regulations require that all purchasers in a 
given group be charged the same pric e for gasoline. Thus if a refiner 
offers one , or a few, retailers lower prices to assist them in a price 
war, it must lower prices for all purchasers in the same group with 
those retailers. Consequ�ntly the cost of supporting a price war 
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is much larger, if a refiner participates , under price controls than 
it was prior to price controls . 
Finally, it must be emphasized that in a competitive indus­
try the crude oil price control and allocation system would make pro­
duct price controls unnecessary. Consumer product prices can be held 
down to any feasible level by the crude oil regulatory system. In this 
situation, effective price controls at refining and marketing levels 
can only serve to squeeze profit margins and, eventually, lead to 
inadequate refining capacity or a shrinking distribution system. 
Like the ent itlements system, product price controls may 
have a pervasive justification in t erms of redistributive goals even 
if competition is not a problem. Product price controls coupled with 
crude oil price controls and the cost equalization ( entitlements) 
program can only make consumers as a group worse off than they would 
be with the crude program alone. But by alt ering the relative prices 
of different petroleum products or the geographical pattern of such 
prices the product price controls would benefit some consumers at the 
expense of others. Programs with such a fine pattern of distributive 
effects may be very hard to dismantle . 
PURCHASER-SUPPLIER FREEZE 
The purchaser-supplier freeze is important in gasoline re­
tailing because · it allows some unbranded , independent retailers to 
continue to obtain gasoline from maj or refiners at advantageous prices 
prevailing in 197 2 .  The freeze does not , however , tie end users to 
suppliers of gasoline. An automobile driver can buy gasoline from 
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whomever he or she pleases . That freedom appears to be turning cus­
tomers away from full-service ,  branded gasoline stations . Those stations 
do not purchase high-priced gasoline from the maj or refiner under whose 
brand they sell because of the purchaser-supplier freez e. They do so ��­
cause of their own pre-existing contracts with the refiner to purchase 
gasoline only through resellers designated by the refiner. 
The crude oil purchaser-supplier freeze is still in effect . 
However, none of the three justificat ions offered at its inception re­
tain their force. (See Section II) . The end of the embargo and the 
institution of the entitlements system have removed all the problems 
which the freeze was designed to solve. 
1) with adequate supplies of imported crude available and with 
ent itlements to equalize its cost to that of controlled oil,
the buy-sell list for which the freeze was a basis , is unnec­
essary 
2) 
3)  
the end of the embargo suggests that changes in the crude
oil distribution system would be reasonable responses to
market changes 
the ent itlements system effectively removes any incentive 
to bid up the price of controlled oil.
These observations do require two qualifications . If,  as 
the FTC staff has claimed , maj or oil companies have sufficient market 
power to refuse to deal with land-locked independent refineries (an 
action presumably illegal under the Sherman Act) or to .deny them ac­
cess to pipeline transportation, the purchaser-supplier freeze might 
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hinder such act ions . 156
SMALL REFINER BIAS 
The entitlements system is a flexible tool which lends itself 
to efficient operation of such redistributive measures as the small re­
finer bias . · But the entitlements system is closed : an advantage to 
one part of the industry is a disadvantage to another . The addit ional 
entitlements given small refiners were taken away from the larger re­
finers . The result was to give refiners with capaeity under 10 , 000 
barrels per day entitlements a cost advantage of about 4 . 4  cents per 
gallon . The advantage declines to zero as capacity increases to 175 , 000 
barrels per day. 
As a result of this subsidy, refiners less efficient than 
large independent or maj or integrated refiners are maintained in bus­
iness .  Keeping such refiners in business was stated explicitly as the 
purpose of the regulation. However , keeping inefficient refiners in 
business raises the ultimate cost of refined products above what it 
would be if small refineries were replaced by large refineries of equal 
total capacity. Only if the small refiners somehow create a competi­
tive environment that would not exist without them can the bias be 
j ustified in terms of efficiency. 
The subsidy does not , however ,  appear to have created any 
perceptible movement toward an increase in the numb er of small re­
fineries . An FEA refinery survey dated July 1976 found only four new 
refineries with capacity less than 10 , 000 barrels per day comp leted 
since December 1975 , and that only one such refinery was planned for 
165 
1977. 157 The small refineries in operation during 1975 were almost
exactly the same as the small refineries in operation during 197 3 ,  
according t o  the annual refining surveys reported in the Oil and Gas 
Journa1 . 158 There may, however ,  have been some cases in which a small 
refinery was "spun-off" by a large refiner so that it would receive the 
ent itlements subsidy. While changing ownership patt erns , such changes 
would not alter the efficiency of the refining industry. 
COSTS OF PAPER WORK AND COMPLEXITY 
To the efficiency costs of the direct economic effects of 
FEA regulations might be added the cost of running and complying with 
the FEA regulatory program. It is somewhat difficult to determine 
what fraction of FEA ' s  budget could be eliminated if the entire sys-
tem of oil price regulations were eliminated. In 1976 the Office of 
159 Regulatory Programs employed 1500 persons, and had a budget of $30
million. 160 To that must be added some of the budget of other FEA 
divisions which also carry out or support regulatory activities , 
giving a conj ecture of about $50 million as expenditure on regulation 
during 197 7 .  
The reporting requirements of FEA regulations also require 
a substantial effort on the part of the petroleum industry. A tabu-
lation by the General Accounting Office states that in fiscal year 
1976 almost 8 mi,llion man-hours of effort were expended meeting FEA 
requirements . The FEA was second only to the Federal Communications 
Commission in the paperwork burden it imposed , according to this 
161study. 
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The complexity of the FEA regulatory program has probably 
caused substantial additional effort , to understand and apply regula-
tions and to file requests for exceptions and appeals . Widespread 
industry misunderstanding of the rules for recouping non-product 
cost s ,  which was revealed when FEA revised those rules , may be an 
example of ·one type of problem which FEA regulations have caused the 
industry. For two years refiners had been applying non-product costs 
to increase prices and banking some product costs .  In 1976 FEA deter-
mined that such a procedure was contrary to regulations , even though 
many refiners had in apparent good faith interpreted the regulations 
as allowing the procedure.  In Novemb er 1976 FEA was still wrestling 
with whether to require adjustment of the "overcharges" that resulted 
to grant a retroactive exception to all refiners , or to require each 
refiner to file separately for an exception . 162
EXCEPTIONS FROM REGULATIONS 
FEA has an exceptions process , administered by the Office 
of Exceptions and Appeals , to alleviat e serious hardships , inequities 
and other prob lems created by oil price and allocation regulations . 
By modifying the effect of regulations from what would be inferred 
from the published regulations themselves, that Office may significantly 
affect petroleum markets .  
Two patterns in granting exceptions have appeared. One 
is the clear requirement that a firm ' s  viability be threatened before 
relief will be granted on the grounds of severe hardship . As of 
June 15,  1975 , FEA had not granted exception relief based solely on 
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serious hardship to any firm that had not proved that its profits had 
fallen (or were projected to fall) by at least 48 percent . 163 One 
result of this pattern is that no maj or integrated company has received 
an exception based on serious hardship , for such firms have done well 
in profits . 
The second pattern is the lack of any clear guidelines for 
determining that hardship has been caused by FEA regulations . 164 FEA' s 
Off ice of Exceptions and Appeals appears to try to err in the direction 
of gener?sity whenever there is a question of whether FEA is responsible 
for hardship . Relief ,  on the other hand , is generally limit ed to just 
what is sufficient to keep a firm in business . 
In addition to " serious hardship , "  exceptions may be granted 
on grounds of "gross inequity, " "distortion of regulatory purpose;'' 
"third party impact , "  or "rat ional policy. " These subj ective determin­
at ions have no clear relations to economic efficiency. Exceptions 
based on serious hardship , on the other hand , do . 
For example, an exemption may be granted from entitlement 
purchase requirements if a refiner can demonstrate that without relief 
he would be driven out of business .  The more diligent and careful FEA 
is at ensuring that no refiner granted relief could remain in business 
without that relief , the more it interferes with the normal processes 
that make markets work efficiently . 
With the entitlements bias and the crude oil buy-sell program 
small refiners have access to crude oil at a price lower than that paid 
by large refiners . A small refiner that cannot make a profit , in the 
long run , under such a systc� has failed a fundamental market test.  
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It may be at a disadvantageous location relative to crude supplies 
or markets , its refining facility may not be able to use the type of 
crude he has available efficiently , or any of a host of other factors 
may generate long-run unprofitability. A competitive market can achieve 
production at minimum cost precisely because such operations are driven 
out . An explicit policy of assigning some of the rents which normally 
accrue to oil resource owners to such operations to keep them in 
business raises refining cost . 
This is not to say there should be·  no flexibility in price 
or allocation rules , because it may be necessary to alter those to com-
pensate for problems caused by the regulatory system itself . A small 
refiner whose profit margin was squeezed b ecause of inability to pass 
through certain non-product costs b ecause of FEA regulations might be 
conducting an economically efficient operation. Exception relief in 
this case would contribute to maintaining the efficiency of the indus-
try. 
Exception relief under the purchaser-supplier relation can 
also be detrimental to the efficient performance of an industry. Eco­
nomic theory claims that in order to achieve �fficient allocation of 
resources each resource must be directed to its highest valued use 
the use in which it can obtain the highest payment . To the extent that 
exception relief is directed at rescuing failing enterprises rather 
than simulating _the results of a free market , it violates this precept . 
One type of relief is to release a purchaser from relation 
with a high-cost supplier and to assign the purchaser to a low-cost 
supplier. In t erms of efficiency, the result can go either way. 
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Testimony by one independent distributor claimed that his supplier 
had been allowed to increase prices sufficiently that the distributor 
could not resell gasoline save at a loss , and that he could not obtain 
gasoline from the suppliers to his competitors�648 On superficial analysi� , 
such a claim for relief would seem warranted on efficiency grounds.  
A wholesaler facing changing market patt erns , on the other 
hand , might not make a warranted claim .  For example, closing of gaso­
line stations near the distributor and opening of stations further away 
might increase transportation costs . Even if passthrough of these 
costs were allowed , ( for example, because of banked costs) , the whole-
saler might be unable to charge higher prices (new stations might be 
closer to the other sources of supply) . To assign that wholesaler to 
a lower-cost supplier would maintain a business that no longer had a 
place in an efficient distribution system. 
A slight variation on the example could turn the verdict 
around . Non�product costs incurred by a specific wholesaler may not 
be passed on -- only adj ustments b ased on average costs throughout 
the wholesaling sector are allowed . If such a restriction were respon­
sible for inability to charge high enough prices to cover costs ,  exception 
relief could contribute to maintaining an efficient distribution system. 
Without more detailed research , it is impossible to assess 
the impact of Exceptions and Appeals , or of the product price and allo-
cation system they modify, on economic efficiency. In principle, FEA 
could have hit exactly on the right decisions to create the most effi-
cient industry. That result is very unlikely, because errors do not 
cancel out . Giving relief which maintains an inefficient operation 
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in one case while allowing an efficient operation to fail in _ another 
adds up to two decreases in efficiency . Every decision that decreases 
efficiency adds another 3mall , deadweight loss.  
EFFECTS OF PERMANENT CONTROLS 
The system of crude oil price controls has been depicted 
throughout this; report as a device for capturing a certain portion of 
the economic rent inhering in oil fields developed prior to the use 
in world oil prices . The small refiner bias transfers some of that 
rent to small refiners , who appear to be responding by adding high-
cost refinery capacity. Exceptions and exemptions can also transfer 
rents to other parts of the industry. The fundamental purpose 
price controls , naturally, was to transfer those rents to consumers . 
However ,  as the discussion of released oil , the small re-
finer bias , and exception relief revealed , FEA has used its control 
over the economic rents that would accrue to royalty owners and oil 
producers in the absence of controls in ways that have altered incen-
tives in inefficient directions . The very effectiveness and flexibil-
ity of the regulatory system in capturing those rents increases the 
potential for economic distortion. The give and take of the regula-
tory process results in the redistribution of some of those rents 
within the oil industry. There is a danger that continuation of oil 
price regulations will lead to increased industry orientation toward 
manipulation of the regulatory process and lessened attention to the 
market economics of oil production. Thus far , specific regulatory 
distortions (beyond those created by basic effects of price controls 
on supply and demand) may have been small in magnitude,  because of 
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the expected demise of price controls . An unamb iguous decision to 
continue price controls would make investment in regulatory games 
much more worthwhile. 
SUMMARY : CURRENT REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
Again , a recapitulation of the d escription and evaluation of 
current FEA programs is in order. 
When the Energy Policy and Conservation Act was passed at­
tent ion had shifted from problems of a severe crude oil shortage to 
inflation of oil prices caused by rising prices of imports and the 
macroeconomic shock that could result from instant decontrol . Between 
January 1974 and January 1976 the price of uncontrolled oil rose from 
$ 9 . 82 to $12 . 99 per barrel ;  the domestic average price i n  January 1976 
was $8 . 63 per barrel . 
The primary goals of petroleum price control and allocation 
programs , stated in the laws that authorized the programs , were three: 
to hold down the cost of gasoline , home heating oil , and other petro­
leum products to the nation ' s  consumers ; to prevent the macroeconomic 
shock that could result from another precipitate rise in energy prices 
like that experienced in early 1974 ; and to protect the independent 
sector of the petroleum industry. FEA ' s  programs are also intended 
to achieve these primary goals, which are stated explicitly in the 
law (the E�ergy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975) authorizing the 
program, with the least possible loss in economic efficiency. Howeve�, 
given the goals and the intention to achieve them through price controls , 
some loss in economic efficiency is inescapable. 
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The EPCA required FEA to set prices for domestic crude oil 
at levels that would result in an average price of $7 . 66 per barrel . 
This required a rollback of prices in existence at the time of passage 
of EPCA. To achieve that rollback with minimum reduction in the incen­
tive to produce more oil ,  FEA established a three tier price system. 
Imported oil and oil from domestic wells with a maximum 
production of 10 barrels per day or less is not subj ect to price con­
trols . As of 1976,  such oil was being purchased by refiners at an 
average price of $13 . 27 per barrel . 
"Upper t ier" oil comprises any oil produced on a particular 
property in excess of the amount being produced during 19 75 , plus the 
quantity of domestic oil produced in 1975 and not then subj ect to price 
controls . Upper t ier oil was initially controlled at an average price 
of $11 . 29 .  
"Lower t ier" oil is all other domestic oil , roughly equal to 
oil produced in quantities less than the amount of "old" oil produced 
in 1975 . "Lower t ier" oil was initially controlled at an average price 
of $5 per barrel, the same price ceiling that has been in effect since 
December 1973 . 
The classificat ion of oil into lower and upper tiers was 
designed to create the largest stimulus to increased production from 
existing properties consistent with Congressionally mandated average 
prices . Because of the altered definition of old oil, any producer who 
can increase production on a given property above 1975 rates can sell 
the incremental output at upper t ier prices . Consequently the lower 
tier price is not a significant hindrance to increased production of 
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reasonably priced energy . 
Upper tier prices are, however, less than world market prices 
(by about $2) . Thus producers are not encouraged to supply all oil that 
can be produced at a cost less than the cost of imports .  
The EPCA, as amended in August 19 7 6 ,  allows FEA t o  increase 
the average of all domestic oil prices at an annual rate not to exceed 
10 percent . FEA has decided to increase the average price in two ways . 
First,  some lower t ier oil will be redefined every six months as upper 
t ier oil ,  and thus qualify for higher prices . Second , lower and upper 
tier price ceilings will both be raised . The first priority in ad­
justing ceilings is to ensure that upper tier prices increases keep 
pace with the rate of inflation . 
The rationale for this program is maintenance of the incen­
tive to increase production from existing fields . As fields age and 
with inflation, it becomes more expensive to maintain their rate of 
production. The increased price and gradual reclassification of lower 
tier oil is designed to maintain incentives at their initial level de­
spite progressively increasing cost of production. 
However, by 1979 about 36 percent of domestic oil production 
will still be subj ect to a price ceiling of about $6 . 00 ;  the remainder 
will be controlled at about $14 , less than the expected level of world 
oil prices . Thus expiration of price controls would cause an abrupt 
increase in domestic prices . To decontrol oil prices more quickly would 
require affirmat ive action by Congress . 
If all controls on oil prices were removed in 197 6 ,  that ac­
t ion would transfer about $15 billion annually from energy consumers 
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to owners of oil propert ies . Increasing upper tier prices to market 
levels would , on the other hand , provide the same increase in production 
at a cost of about $2 billion annually. Increasing lower t ier prices 
to upper t ier levels would not , given FEA' s current regulations , signifi­
cantly increase energy production . The welfare loss imposed by the con­
straint upper tier prices place on increased production is probably some­
thing under $400 million. 
The welfare loss resulting from the subsidy to imports , which 
still exists under the current price control and entitlements system, 
is about what it was under the previous system, $1 billion per year . 
The EPCA extended the life of all produce price control and al­
location programs that existed before its passage . It did , however , 
provide a mechanism for dismantling those programs . 
One effect of product pricing regulations is to create un­
equal prices for the same refined product;  those price differentials 
may not be competed away because of restrict ions which the purchaser­
supplier freeze puts on shopping around . Such price inequality is a 
source of economic inefficiency , the magnitude of which cannot be 
qualified at the time . Maintenance of historical price differentials 
between types of product probably creates similar inefficiencies , be­
cause demand conditions have changed since the base period of 197 3 .  
During 1976 FEA has proposed , and Congress has approved , 
removal of price controls and mandatory allocation requirements on all 
maj or petroleum products except gasoline. The rationale for these de­
control actions was that product price ceilings were generally above 
the levels that prices would reach on free markets .  Because of crude 
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oil price controls and the cost equalization program, consumer costs 
should in principle be held down without direct controls on any down­
stream prices. That conclusion is supported by the absence of signifi­
cant price increases during the few months since decontrol of residual 
and distillate fuels . Decontrol of gasoline prices will require FEA 
initiative and Congressional approval. 
The decision about decontrol of gasoline rests on beliefs 
about the degree of competition in the oil industry. If the industry 
is competitive , decontrol of gasoline prices would have no harmful ef­
fects on the economic performance of the industry, thoush specific 
individuals (particularly inefficient retailers) might be harmed . 
Since 1974 there has been a significant increase in market 
shares of independent , unbranded retailing and of refiner owned retail 
outlets.  That increase is  at  the expense of the share of independent 
operators of branded stations. 
T,he decrease in the market share of branded independent 
gasoline retailers has probably been due in part to the cost advantages 
which unbranded marketers obtain from the controls on prices charged 
them by large integrated refiners and the entitlements subsidy to 
small refiners -- which sell mainly to unbranded dealers . How much 
of the cost advantage will disappear if price controls on gasoline are 
eliminated depends on which factor dominates . If,  as FEA claims, the 
small refiner bias does nothing more than compensate for the higher 
costs which small refiners incur because they do not enj oy the econo­
mics of scale that attend operation of a large refinery, then the entire 
cost advantage would be due to the class of purchaser rule under price 
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controls . In this situat ion , removal of price controls on gasoline 
could be expected to alter the structure of gasoline market ing. If , 
on the other hand , the small refiner bias is responsible for the cost 
advantage of nonbranded independents ,  only a revision of the entitle­
ments program would change the structure. 
If , as FEA has claimed recently, general inflation and 
changing consumer tastes are responsible for the decline of the branded 
independent , the current regulatory program is irrelevant to the situa­
t ion . 
A pervasive problem arises from FEA ' s  granting exceptions 
from its regulat ions . The Office of Exceptions and Appeals tends to 
err on the side of keeping firms tn business.  Because FEA controls the 
flow of rents (profits above those necessary to allocate resources pro­
perly) , it has great power to keep unprofitable or inefficient firms from 
going out of business. Such actions tend to raise the cost of energy to 
consumers . 
The crude oil price control and entitlements programs developed 
by FEA were creative responses to legislative requirements and were ef­
fective in carrying out the intent of legislation. There is little FEA 
could have done, in developing these programs , that would have reduced 
the economic inefficiency or distortions resulting from the basic price 
controls mandated by legislation. 
In part , this success is due to the int ended temporary nature 
of controls . The oil industry has not made maj or investment decisions 
in response to regulations because,  up to now, it has expected 
regulations to expire in a few years . A clear intention to continue 
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controls could increase the expected payoff from manipulation of re­
gulations , and would make FEA ' s  task much harder . 
The same evaluation cannot be made in regard to refined pro­
duct price control and allocation regulations . Although the detailed 
studies that would ascertain their impacts were �ot available when 
this report was written, the tendency of those programs to interfere 
in the efficient operation of product markets was clear. Without pro­
viding any aggregate benefit to consumers of petroleum products ,  the 
refined product programs created individually minor but pervasive de­
viations from the conditions required for efficient allocation of re-
sources . 
VI : ALTERNATIVES TO OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
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Three goals for alternatives to oil price controls can be 
identified from the lesiglative history of price controls : equity , 
in the form of low energy prices to consumers;  prevention of macroeco� 
nomic shocks ; and protection of the independent sector of the oil in­
dustry. 
Only the third of these goals can be seen as deriving even 
in part from an intent to improve the economic efficiency of oil mar-
kets,  and the third is ambiguous .  Pres ervation of the independent 
sector may be seen by some as a palliative to the market power of maj or , 
integrated oil companies . But for some policy makers , special treatment - of �he 
independent sector could be motivated solely by a desire to distribute 
some b enefits to that sector, without regard for its efficiency of op-
eration or for the market source of maj or oil companies. On this in­
terpretation preservation of independents would not be directed at the 
goal of efficient allocation of economic resources . 
The first goal , of holding down consumer costs , is clearly 
redistributive. Macroeconomic policy, evidenced in the second goal , is 
also normally discussed in terms other than economic efficiency. 
In all the legislation establishing price controls, ,however , 
the President was directed to establish regulations that would accom­
plish the stated objectives with the least possible harm to economic 
efficiency. 165
Except for possible questions about monopoly power and the 
effects of tax preferences, there is little doubt that in normal con­
ditions economic efficiency in oil production would be greatest with 
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an oil industry untrammeled by price controls .  Thus one method of 
constructing oil policy would be to leave investment , production and 
consumption decisions undisturbed while using the transfer of infra­
marginal rents to achieve policy goals.  With this idea as a key , 
several alt ernatives can b e  constituted . 
The three t ier system adopted by FEA holds down prices at the 
expense of a loss in efficiency and increased import dependence . Unless 
administrative outlays and the complexity of pricing regulations were 
increased substantially, that conflict appears inescapab le. 
MAINTAIN CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS 
Two alterations in the current regulatory program of FEA would 
considerably reduce losses in economic efficiency. If the upper t ier 
price ceiling were removed , so that all production in excess of the 
declining base production control level could be sold at market prices , 
crude oil price controls would be nearly neutral in their effects on 
crude oil investment and production decisions . 
Such a system would not be able to achieve the composite 
domestic oil price mandated in the EPCA. If the law were changed to 
make exemption of all upper t ier oil from price controls possible , con­
sumer expenditures on petroleum products would rise by about $2 b illion 
per year. The efficiency loss from upper tier price controls , however, 
may well be on the order of $400 million per year . 
Conceivably, a three or more tier price system could achieve 
the composite price goals of the EPCA without sacrifice of efficiency. 
Such a system would allow all newly discovered oil and some oil from 
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existing properties now in the upper tier to be sold at market prices , 
while continuing price controls at a lower level than the current up­
per t ier ceiling on other oil production. It would be necessary to 
choose for such controls properties on which production in response to , 
say, $10 prices would equal production at market prices . Unfortunately, 
such a system would require detailed information about expected produc­
tion rates and costs for every property in the United Stat es . No 
feasible system of controls is likely to be superior to a two-tier 
system such as that just described in terms of economic efficiency and 
consumer cost . 
If the entitlements program were retained , price controls on 
lower t ier oil alone would hol� consumer expenditures down by about 
$13 b illion initially. As lower t ier oil is reclassified due to the 
declining base production control level , that saving will decline . As 
long as it exists , price controls will represent a subsidy that increases 
oil consumption and imports .  
T o  achieve reductions in consumpt ion the plan o f  EPCA could 
be followed : mandatory and voluntary conservation program could sub­
stitute for rising prices to reduce oil consumption. However , such 
programs are likely to reduce the efficiency of resource allocation un­
less carefully designed . 
A second alteration of the regulatory program is the elimin­
ation of remaining allocat ion programs and refined product price con­
trols . As has been mentioned frequently in this report , those controls 
confer no benefits on consumers in the aggregate .  With a competitive 
industry, adoption of any alternative to oil price controls would make 
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product price controls no more necessary than they are under the cur-
rent system. Antitrust policy could be an alt ernative to those con� 
trols if the refining and marketing sector of the oil industry is not 
competitive . 
That act ion could be purused either through the Justic De­
partment166 or through legislation aimed at reducing the market power 
of maj or oil companies . An example of the latter is divestiture legi-
slation currently being considered by Congress.  
ACCELERATED REMOVAL OF PRICE CONTROLS 
If the efficiency loss associated with the first alternative 
makes continuation of the current program of price controls unacceptable, 
an alternative could be accelerating the rate of decontrol or allowing 
controls to lapse suddenly when the mandatory price controls program 
created by EPCA expires in May 197 9 .  That alt ernative performs poorly 
both in terins of macroeconomic consequences and in terms of consumer 
cost . By May 197 9 ,  the current schedule of ceiling price increases 
would leave those ceilings considerably below projected market prices 
that would prevail absent controls . If the price of imported oil in-
creases at only 5 percent annually , it would reach $15 . 40 per barrel by 
May 197 9 .  By that date, scheduled increases would take lower and upper 
tier prices to only $6 . 16 and $13 . 95 respectively. Consequently , de-
control by May 1979 would transfer about $14 billion in constant dollar 
annual purchasing power from consumers to energy producers (See Table 
11) . 
Old Oil 
New Oil 
Transfer : 
Table 11 
Transfer in May , 1979 
Cost at 
Controlled 
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Cost at 
World 
Gontrolled Price Quantity Price Price 
(million $) 
$ 6 . 16 122 million barrels 752 1879 
$ 13 . 95 132 million barrels . 1841 2033 
World Price at 5% escalation per year 
$15 . 40 
$1318 . 8  per month 
$15825 ·per year in 1979 dollars 
$13671 in constant dollars 
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If decontrol were to occur suddenly in May 19 7 9 ,  the shock 
to the economy resulting from that drop in purchasing power would be 
smaller than but still comparable to that anticipated when EPCA was 
passed. In late 1975 CBO estimated the drop in purchasing power at 
$16 billion. An explicit rationale for passage of EPCA was that shock 
at that time would have unacceptable consequences . 
In 1979 the economy is likely to be much more healthy than 
in 197 5 ,  so that monetary and fiscal policy measures could compensate 
for the shock of decontro l .  Assuming that the shock in 1979 would b e  
the same a s  proj ected in December 197 5 ,  an idea of appropriate fiscal 
and monetary policy for 1979 can be inferred from analyses of decontrol 
in 197 5 .  
One investigation o f  comb ined fiscal and monetary offsets 
assumed that the Federal Reserve system would be willing -- contrary 
to it s policy when prices rose in 1973 and 1974 -- to supply enough 
money to prevent a rise in interest rates . Then the loss in purchasing 
power from increased oil prices would be off set if in the first quarter 
after decontrol a reduction in withholding rates reduced tax collections 
by $10 - 13 billion and if further tax cuts of $6 to $9 billion occurred 
in the following three quarters . Government expenditures would have to 
remain at the same level that they would reach if controls were con­
tinued . 167
Adj usting macroeconomic policy to accommodate the impacts of 
decontrol would be considerably easier if prices rose gradually to 
equality with import prices by May 197 9 .  That approach t o  decontrol in 
May 1979 can achieve efficiency goals without rilacroeconomic . disrupti�n 
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-- if appropriate monetary and fiscal policy is adopted . However, that 
decontrol would cost consumers about $13 billion in increased energy 
costs in 1979 .  
EXCISE TAXES ON CRUDE OIL 
A third alternative would use taxes to reduce the revenues of 
oil producers and royalty owners by the same amount as do current price 
controls . Those tax revenues would make possible the reduction of other 
taxes affecting consumers to restore the purchasing power lost to price 
increases. Such a system could perform as well as current price controls 
in terms of consumer benefits and macroeconomic policy, but with less 
damage to economic efficiency. 
Excise taxes on crude oil could be designed to replicate 
current price controls . if definitions of lower tier and upper tier oil 
were retained . An exc ise tax on lower tier oil could be declared to 
equal the difference between the May 15 , 1973 price of that oil and the 
current. landed cost of imported oil .  The tax on upper tier oil could be 
set equal to $1. 35 plus the difference b etween the current price of im­
ported oil and the price of upper tier oil on February 1 ,  19 7 6 .  All oil 
not now subj ect to control would be exempt from the tax." 
To preserve the current cost advantage of domestic over im­
ported oil, · upper and lower tier taxes could be reduced by $ . 21 .  
With this tax system, all crude oil would sell a t  a price deter­
mined by the price of imported oil. Entitlements would not be required to 
equalize crude oil cost . However , the revenue from selling a barrel of oil 
a producer retained· after taxes would b'e the same as the current ceiling 
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price on lower and upper tier oil (plus 21¢ if the import bias were 
retained) . 168 The revenue from this excise tax could be returned to
consumers through tax reductions (or prevention of tax increases) aimed 
at whatever groups are specified in the redistributive goals of Congress . 
Since consumers would face product prices based on the true 
marginal cost of oil, the welfare loss due to increased demand that 
exists under the current system would be eliminated and imports of crude 
oil would be reduced . Welfare loss from lost domestic production would 
remain . It could be reduced by a schedule of excise tax reductions 
identical to the schedule of price increases now in effect,  or special 
exempt ions for high cost production. If the excise tax were phased 
properly with reduction in other taxes , no macroeconomic effects should 
result . Briefly, it should be mentioned that this tax differs in prin-
ciple from the "windfall profits" taxes on oil producers much discussed 
in 1975.  Those taxes were collDllonly designed as a percentage of the in-
creased income of energy producers over some baseline. That provision 
does not discriminate as does the excise tax between increased profits on 
existing production where the tax cannot affect investment decisions 
and profits obtained through new investment where it can. Consequently 
it would have an adverse effect on production decisions . 
Second , windfall tax proposals often contained plowback pro-
visions , forgiving some portion of the tax in proportion to new invest-
ment in oil (or other energy) production. The plowback introduces new 
sources of economic inefficiency, including an incentive to produce 
from uneconomic properties and an incentive use production techniques 
that are excessively capital-intensive. Like the released oil provision 
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that existed before January 197 6 ,  it could be defended on grounds that 
oil imports must be reduced . 
The excise tax has several virtues beyond its removal of the 
subsidy to imports (and excessive demand) without macroeconomic shock 
or reduction in consumer purchasing power . It could be implemented on 
the basis of data currently collected and compiled by FEA, since it 
works similarly to price controls . 
It would also make possible the elimination of the crude oil 
entitlements system since all refiners would pay the same market price 
for crude oil. Elimination of entitlements would remove the discretion 
to redistribute rents within the oil industry which o il price regulators 
currently enj oy. Claims for special tax treatment would probably take 
the place of applications for exceptions from price controls , but -- in 
a cynical view -- this may be less noticeable because of the long his-
tory of tax preference for oil producers . 
Dismantling the entitlements system would , however, remove the 
subsidy to small and independent refiners provided historically by the_ 
oil import program and currently by_ the "small refiner bias" in the 
entitlements system. If that bias is purely redistributive , it can b e  
removed without deleterious effects o n  economic efficiency though at 
some cost to the market share of . independent refiners . 
if the subsidy through entitlements is viewed as an antitrust 
measure , its removal could result in a less competit ive and atomistic 
petroleum industry, particularly if the lower gasoline prices charged 
by independent refiners are a factor in maintaining the market share of 
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independent , unbranded gasoline retailers. The alternative to using 
such a subsidy to preserve competition is antitrust action, through new 
or existing legislation. 
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APPENDIX 
Statist ical Analysis of Drilling Activity169 
Both the Hughes rig count and the American Petroleum Institute ' s  
report o f  total footage drilled show a clear growth trend through 19 7 5 ,  
and appear to drop off after January 1976. 170 A simple regression model
and statistical test were used to see if the 1976 dates were significant-
ly below the trend line inferred from earlier increases in activity. 
In both cases , the index of well-drilling activity was regres-
sed against time. No attempt was made to develop a comprehensive ex-
planatory model of exploratory and development activity . However ,  dummy 
variables for Decemb er and January were introduced because of an obvious 
peak in December activity and trough in January. The year-end effects 
probably arise from attempts to complete act ivity during the taxab le year 
so as to qualify intangible drilling costs for tax deductions. 
The same regression equation was fitt ed to data from January 
1973 through May 1976, and to the same data from January 1973 through 
December 197 5 .  A Chow test 171 using the results of the two regressions
was used to test the hypothesis that the monthly activity rates observed 
in January through May 1976 were generated by the same process that 
generated the rates observed bewteen January 1973 and December 1976 .  
The regression equation fitted was 
y = ao+ alxl + a2x2+ a3x3 
where 
y rig count or footage -drilled 
xl time 
x2 December dummy 
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x3 = January dummy 
Inclusion of the dummies contributed explanatory power . Using rig 
counts from January 1973 through December 1975 , inclusion of the dum­
mies improved the corrected R2 from . 7469 to . 7679.  Using footage dril-
led for the same period, inclusion of dummies improved the corrected 
R2 from . 5589 to . 6 966 . A Durbin-Wilson statistic of . 25 indicated
severe serial correlation remained in the rig count regression errors 
even when dummies were us ed ; the footage regression had a Durbin-Wilson 
statistic of 2 . 03 .  
I t  was possible t o  rej ect at the . 001 level the hypothesis 
that the regression equation fitted to rig count data generat ed the 
19 7 6  data. In fact , to six places the probab ility that hypothesis was 
true was zero . 
It is not possible to rej ect the hypothesis that the footage 
drilled data were generated by the regression equation at the . 05 level , 
but it was . possible to reject at the . 10 level . 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
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